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Abstract 
 
This study gives an insight into the behaviour and performance of large speculators and 
large hedgers in 29 US futures markets.  Using a trading determinant model and priced 
risk factors such as net positions and sentiment index, results suggest hedgers 
(speculators) exhibit significant positive feedback trading in 15 (7) markets.  Information 
variables like the S&P500 index dividend yield, corporate yield spread and the three 
months treasury bill rate were mostly unimportant in large players’ trading decisions.  
Hedgers had better market timing abilities than speculators in judging the direction of the 
market in one month.  The poor market timing abilities and poor significance of positive 
feedback results suggest higher trading frequency intervals for speculators.  Hedging 
pressures, which measure the presence of risk premium in futures markets, were 
insignificant mostly in agricultural markets.  As a robust test of hedging pressures, price 
pressure tests found risk premium to be still significant for silver, crude oil and live 
cattle.  The positive feedback behaviour and negative market timing abilities suggest 
hedgers in heating oil and Japanese yen destabilize futures prices, and points to a need to 
check CFTC’s (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) position limits regulation in 
these markets.  In fact, large hedgers in these two markets are more likely to be leading 
behaviour, in that they have more absolute net positions than speculators.  Alternatively 
stated, positive feedback hedgers in these two markets are more likely to lead institutions 
and investors to buy (sell) overpriced (underpriced) contracts, eventually leading to 
divergence of prices away from fundamentals.  Atlhought hedgers in crude oil had 
significant positive feedback behaviour and negative market timing skills, they would not 
have much of a destabilizing effect over remaining players because the mean net 
positions of hedgers and speculators were not far apart.  While the results are statistically 
significant, it is suggested these could be economically significant, in that there have 
been no regulation on position limits at all for hedgers compared to speculators who are 
imposed with strict limits from the CFTC. 
  
 Further, mean equations were regressed against decomposed variables, to see how 
much of the futures returns are attributed to expected components of variables such as net 
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positions, sentiment and information variables.  While the expected components of 
variables are derived by ensuring there are enough ARMA (autoregressive and moving 
average) terms to make them statistically and economically reliable,  the unexpected 
components of variables measure the residual on differences of the series from its mean.  
When decomposing net positions against returns, it was found expected net positions to 
be negatively related to hedgers’ returns in mostly agricultural markets.  Speculators’ 
expected (unexpected) positions were less (more) significant in explaining actual returns, 
suggesting hedgers are more prone in setting an expected net position at the start of the 
trading month to determine actual returns rather than readjusting their net positions 
frequently all throughout the remaining days of the month.  While it important to see how 
futures returns are determined by expected and unexpected values, it is also essential to 
see how volatility is affected as well.  In an attempt to cover three broad types of 
volatility measures, idiosyncratic volatility, GARCH based volatility (variance based), 
and PARCH based volatility (standard deviation) are used.   
 
Net positions of hedgers (expected and unexpected) tend to have less effect on 
idiosyncratic volatility than speculators that tended to add to volatility, reinforcing that 
hedgers trading activity hardly affect the volatility in their returns.  This suggest they are 
better informed by having a better control over their risk (volatility) measures.  The 
GARCH model showed more reliance of news of volatility from previous month in 
speculators’ volatility.  Hedgers’ and speculators’ volatility had a tendency to decay over 
time except for hedgers’ volatility in Treasury bonds and coffee, and gold and S&P500 
for speculators’ volatility.  The PARCH model exhibited more negative components in 
explaining current volatility.  Only in crude oil, heating oil and wheat (Chicago) were 
idiosyncratic volatility positively related to return, reinforcing the suggestion for stringent 
regulation in the heating oil market.  Expected idiosyncratic volatility was lower (higher) 
for hedgers (speculators) as expected under portfolio theory.  Markets where variance or 
standard deviation are smaller than those of speculators support the price insurance 
theory where hedging enables traders to insure against the risk of price fluctuations.  
Where variance or standard deviation of hedgers is greater than speculators, this suggest 
the motivation to use futures contracts not primarily to reduce risk, but by institutional 
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characteristics of the futures exchanges like regulation ensuring liquidity.  Results were 
also supportive that there was higher fluctuations in currency and financial markets due 
to the higher number of contracts traded and players present. 
 
Further, the four models (GARCH normal, GARCH t, PARCH normal and 
PARCH t)1 showed returns were leptokurtic.  The PARCH model, under normal 
distribution, produced the best forecast of one-month return in ten markets.  Standard 
deviation and variance for both hedgers’ and speculators’ results were mixed, explained 
by a desire to reduce risk or other institutional characteristics like regulation ensuring 
liquidity.  Moreover, idiosyncratic volatility failed to accurately forecast the risk 
(standard deviation or variance based) that provided a good forecast of one-month return.   
This supports not only the superiority of ARCH based models over models that assume 
equally weighted  average of past squared residuals, but also the presence of time varying 
volatility in futures prices time series.   
 
The last section of the study involved a stability and events analysis, using 
recursive estimation methods.  The trading determinant model, mean equation model , 
return and risk model, trading activity model and volatility models were all found to be 
stable following the effect of major global economic events of the 1990s2.  Models with 
risk being proxied as standard deviation showed more structural breaks than where 
variance was used.  Overall, major macroeconomic events didn’t have any significant 
effect upon the large hedgers’ and speculators’ behaviour and performance over the last 
decade. 
 
 
                                                          
 
1 (GARCH normal) refers to the GARCH volatility model assuming a normal distribution. (GARCH t) 
refers to the GARCH model under a t distribution.  (PARCH normal) refers to a PARCH volatility model 
under a normal distribution, and (PARCH t) refers to a PARCH model under a t distribution. 
2 Events analysed in this study were the US tightening interest rates after a long period of easing in 1994-
1995, the Mexico crisis in 1994, the Asian Crisis in 1997-1998, the emerging markets slump and recovery 
in 1995-1996, the temporary revival from Japanese Recession in 1994-1996, the Russian crisis of 1998, 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) near financial collapse in 1998, and the introduction of the Euro 
currency in early 1999. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend 
on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations, whether moral or 
hedonistic or economic.  Most probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the 
full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken 
as the result of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge rather than inaction, and not as the 
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative 
probabilities.” 
John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) “The general theory of employment, interest and 
money” (1936, 161–162) 
 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation for Study 
 
 Futures markets enable those who want to manage price risk (hedgers) to transfer 
that risk to those who are willing to accept it (speculators).  Futures exchanges also 
provide price information as benchmarks in determining the value of a particular 
commodity or financial instrument on a given time and day.  Benefits such as risk 
transfer and price discovery reach every sector where changing market conditions 
introduce economic risk, including areas like foreign exchange, imports and exports, 
financing, and agriculture (Pennings, 1998).  Besides the benefits associated with risk 
reduction as important factors in motivating decisions to engage in futures trading, 
potential users are heavily influenced by their personal assessment of the performance 
and reliability of a futures market (Ennew et al., 1992).  The biased assessment of the 
performance is essentially influenced by the information users have been exposed to 
about the hedging and speculation services of the futures contract.  This is a consequence 
of the complex nature of  the financial services provided by futures markets, which is also 
backed by regulation and macroeconomic events.  
 
 
 
15
 The trading game, like many other financial ventures, is biased in favour of the 
big money, the big traders, the money managers, the professionals, the commercials, the 
hedge funds, the mutual funds, the insiders and the politically connected. Whether legal 
or not, inside information is pervasive.  Prosecutions or government policing will not stop 
this. It is a reality of the market.  Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
taken a number of measures to slightly increase the odds for the public by making more 
information transparent.  The SOES (Small Order Execution System), price 
decimalization and other measures have helped. However, in the futures industry, it 
seems that very little has been done to help the non-professional futures trader. Money 
rules, and the game is tilted decidedly in favour of the professional trader.  For instance, 
the last few years have witnessed a mass entry of hedge funds into the commodity 
markets. Hedge funds control billions, if not trillions, of dollars. They trade big positions, 
collect large fees, and some of them even make big money for their clients. This is why, 
as a result of several well-known financial catastrophes, “herding3” has again become a 
critical term in the financial dictionary. Investors and fund managers are portrayed as 
herds that charge into risky ventures without adequate information and appreciation of 
the risk-reward trade-offs and, at the first sign of trouble, flee to safer directions. Some 
observers express concern that herding by market participants further increases volatility, 
destabilizes markets, and increases the fragility of the financial system.4   
  
Recent financial research has laid emphasis on how individual trading behaviour 
relates to daily asset returns (for example, Goetzmann and Massa 2003).  A remarkable 
factor behind this research is the prospective weight large players may have on the 
financial markets.  In fact, several academic findings suggest that certain trading 
strategies can influence the returns and volatility of these markets.  For instance, 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) demonstrate that positive feedback behaviour is 
correlated with investor performance, and that both the behaviour and performance 
appear to be associated with the level of sophistication of the investor, i.e. foreign 
                                                          
 
3 One common form of herding is positive feedback trading. 
4 See, for example, Persaud (2000) for an analysis of how the interaction of herding and institutional risk 
management strategies may further increase volatility; and Council on Foreign Relations (1999) for the role 
hedge funds may have played in the Asian crisis.  
 
 
16
investors like investment banking houses pursue positive feedback strategies and achieve 
superior performance.  Conversely, Odean (1998) finds that the investors at a US 
discount brokerage house are unwilling to realise losses, and presents evidence which is 
consistent with contrarian behaviour.  This motivates a need to investigate how positive 
feedback and contrarian behaviour relates to the trading determinants of the large and 
most influential players in the US futures markets, i.e, large hedgers and large speculators 
as defined by the CFTC. 
 
 Significant research has also discussed whether speculation is beneficial or 
harmful5. Legislatures shared a negative view about speculators well into the twentieth 
century with both the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934 and the Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA) of 1936 being passed largely to tackle the perceived problems of 
“excessive” speculation in corporate stocks and in commodities futures and options.  
More recently, the idea that speculation is harmful has lost favour.  The conservative 
economic understanding now is that speculation, whether in derivatives or equities, is 
reasonably efficient because it transfers risk to those who can bear it most easily and 
facilitates market prices to better reflect underlying forces of supply and demand.  
However, the CEA still imposes margin requirements, position limits, short sales 
restrictions, capital gains rules, and other technical regulations that have both the purpose 
and the effect of discouraging speculative trading6.  On the other hand, large hedgers are 
left mostly unregulated once they pass the test of being defined as commercials through 
the CEA7.  Recent findings from Haigh et al. (2005) and NYMEX (2005) both find 
significant effect of rebalancing activities of large hedgers upon returns volatility.  
Lukken (2006) also find that when hedgers readjust their current positions to optimise 
their net positions, they significantly influence the market as well as influencing the 
volatility of returns.  Alternatively stated, on one hand there are regulatory bodies 
imposing strict control on speculators, while on the other hand, hedgers who can 
                                                          
 
5 See Chapter 2, section 2.5 for more insights on their effects on markets.  
6 See Stout (1999) for more on regulation imposed on speculators.  Furthermore, exchanges are required by 
CFTC rule 150.5 to adopt speculative limit rules for certain other contracts not subject to CFTC speculative 
limits. 
7 The CMFA even allows Bona Fide Exemptions  to encourage agricultural hedging positions (section 121 
of the Act). 
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influence significantly markets are left wandering.  This motivates further study where 
the issue of whether speculation or hedging is beneficial or destabilizing.  The plan is to 
investigate whether large hedgers and/or large speculators have some destabilizing effect 
on the futures markets, by moving prices away from their fundamental values.  This is 
important, as stated above, current legislation support that speculators are destabilizers, 
and hence the presence of position limits upon their trading and not hedgers’.  
Simultaneous positive feedback behaviour and market timing ability tests would allow to 
check whether these influential players are market destabilizers. 
 
 Investors’ perceptions about risk also change with time, as shown in Graph 1.1.  
This graph shows investors’ attitude towards risk and liquidity in the 1990s.  While the 
correlation between risk and return (left-hand scale of graph) is measured by the slope 
coefficient of a cross-sectional regression of realized returns on historical volatility for a 
number of asset classes, liquidity is obtained as a GDP-weighted average of overnight 
real rates in the eurocurrency market for the US dollar, yen, euro and sterling. A rise in 
the coefficient indicates greater tolerance for risk; a decline indicates more risk aversion.  
Interestingly, the bond market turmoil during 1994 and the Asian crisis in mid-1997 
interrupted extended periods of a relaxed market attitude towards risk.  Also, the market 
strains following the Russian default and the near-collapse of LTCM took place against a 
background of a prolonged period captured by a cautious investor attitude. 
 
 
     Sources: Datastream; national data; BIS (2000) estimates. 
Graph 1.1 
Investors’ attitude towards risk and liquidity 
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Further, as defined by the Basel Committee (2001), the control of risk by 
management8 is the fourth and final most important part of the risk management process. 
While the benefits of risk dispersion are attainable without holding massive positions in 
the underlying financial instruments, too often in a monetarily plaid past the access to 
such leverage has motivated speculative excesses that have led to financial spasm.  
Moreover, while it is unlikely to reform the underlying human behaviour that lead to 
excess, there is a need to reinforce risk-management capabilities to restrict such detours 
from the road to balanced growth.  Alternatively stated, in line with Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998), it is believed that a good finance theory is to be grounded on 
evidence about how people actually behave and perform.  That is why the understanding 
of risk and return becomes highly critical in understanding behaviour and performance of 
any rational player.  This leads to the third motivation which looks at the “return and 
risk” relationship under different volatility models such as standard deviation, variance, 
and idiosyncratic volatility.  By decomposing priced risk variables like three months 
treasury bill rates, dividend yield, corporate yield spread into expected and unexpected 
values, the plan is also to investigate how much of these expected values help in 
determining return and volatility.  This is important to test whether large hedgers and/or 
large speculators are better informed by making use of more expected values than 
unexpected values in determining their risk and return.   
 
The changing nature of the ‘risk and return’ relationship (see graph 1.1) in the 
1990s introduces the fourth motivation factor of this study, where an event analysis is 
undertaken.  More specifically, as mentioned earlier, major economic events like the 
Russian and Asian crisis seemed to have led to changing risk attitudes.  In an attempt to 
bring all the motivations in line, the last part of this study investigate the effect of eight 
major economic events over the trading determinant, risk and return relationship model, 
and, trading activity and volatility relationship of large hedgers and speculators in the US 
                                                          
 
8 Management can be generalized to investors, firms and government bodies, where each of these are 
concerned about the policy implications of this study. 
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futures markets.  This is important in that it helps in understanding if such players are, if 
at all, affected by major economic events. 
 
In sum, existing research has mostly analysed the behaviour and performance of 
institutional investors in equity markets9, especially mutual funds.  Yet not much is 
known about the behaviour of futures traders, and more specifically large hedgers and 
large speculators in futures markets.  The scope of this study extends from analysing the 
behaviour of large speculators and large hedgers, to the performance of these key market 
players, by looking at volatility and forecasting models, and the risk and return 
relationship over ten-years window events in the 1990s for large hedgers and large 
speculators.  What makes this research really challenging and significant is the usage of 
the Commitment of Traders data.   This research reduces the gap in further understanding 
the largest players’ trading determinants, effect of hedgers and speculators’ trading over 
markets and regulation, risk and return attitudes, and their changing reactions over major 
economic events.  This study is supported by the use of market risk factors, regulatory 
issues, and event analysis in the US Futures markets in the 1990s.   
 
Why US Futures markets? 
 
The US Futures market is studied for various reasons, such as its history, the 
industry’s growth, sector growth and uniqueness of its data.   For example, the US is still 
a significant part of the global activity in terms of interest rate, currency and equity index 
futures markets, as can be seen in Graph 1.2.1.    Panel A clearly shows that the interest 
rate futures markets are the most actively traded futures instruments globally.  More 
importantly, the US had highest market share (55–57%) in terms of locations of interest 
rate, currency and equity index contracts still outstanding.  European markets rank second 
with 29–32% of market share.  Panel B further supports the US as a leader in futures 
markets, where interest rates, currency and equity index futures contracts have the highest 
market share over the 2003–2006 period.  Graph 1.2 in Appendix 6.3 shows that US was 
                                                          
 
9 See Chapter 2 for a detailed literature review on behaviour and performance in equity markets. 
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still leading in terms of futures contracts traded in the 1990s.  Table 1.1 below also shows 
that US Futures derivatives have been among the top international futures contracts and 
also that US Futures Exchanges have been leaders on a global basis. 
 
 
 
Panel A
Amount outstanding (in billions of US dollars)
Instrument/location 2003 2004 2005 2006
All markets 13752 18903 21619 25824
Interest rate 13123 18164 20708 24699
Currency 79 103 107 140
Equity index 549 635 802 986
US 56% 55% 57% 57%
Europe 32% 32% 29% 29%
Asia and Pacific 11% 12% 12% 13%
Other markets 1% 1% 1% 1%
 
Source : BIS 
 
Graph 1.2.1 
Futures instruments traded on global exchanges by location (notional 
principal in US billions) 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
U.S. T-bonds (CBOT) 84 99 112 90 78 71 69 63 72 86
3-Month Eurodollar (CME) 88 99 109 93 129 184 202 208 297 410
Euro-Bund (Eurex) 77 112 248 378 178 191 244 239 299 173
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CBOT, USA 222 242 281 254 189 201 276 373 489 561
LIFFE, UK 170 209 194 105 135 160 238 311 343 101
CME, USA 177 200 226 200 195 222 444 530 684 883
BM&F, Brazil 134 122 87 63 80 95 113 173 187 132
Eurex** 77 112 248 378 289 312 536 668 684 784
Top International Contracts*
Top Five Exchanges
 
* FIA volume figures include futures, options on futures, and options on stock indexes (no individual
stock exchanges. options are included), interest rate, and currencies traded on the world's futures,
options, and securities exchanges
**  Before 1998, it was DTB & SOFFEX combined  
Source: FIA 
 
 
Why the 1990s set as the data frame? 
 
1990–2000 has been chosen as the timeframe for study, as this is the decade that 
provided the most swings in the US Futures market (1955––2005).  This can be observed 
in Graph 1.3, which shows that, in 2005, US futures volume peaked at 1652 millions.  
The opportunity of studying the ‘1990-2000’ period is supported from the graph, where it 
can be seen there were ups and downs in the total number of US futures trading volume, 
compared to the rest of the 2000-2005.  This is also supported by the fact that, most of the 
largest US futures markets have also witnessed an increase in activity during the 1990–
2000 timeframe (see Appendix 6.2 and 6.3).  Interest rate derivatives have been the most 
actively traded contracts.  The US Treasury bond and the Eurodollar are the top two 
international most traded contracts globally.  US futures markets are also chosen as 
trading in them is more important for price discovery and release of information (Dhillon, 
Table 1.1 
Top international contracts (volume) and Top 5 exchanges 
(volume) 
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Lasser, and Watanabe, 1997).  More importantly, they are the only provider of the unique 
Commitment of Traders (COT) data about speculators and hedgers.  The 1990s is set as 
the timeframe due to its events and excellent US performance (economic and regulatory), 
making it a good framework and a benchmark for pursuing this research10. 
 
 
 
        Source: FIA 
 
1.2 Contribution to Literature: 
 
 This study contributes to the literature in that it provides evidence on the 
behaviour and performance of major types of traders in 29 commodities futures using 
CFTC’s COT data.  A unique specification of the COT database is that it gives a nice 
defragmentation of futures positions by key market players—hedgers and speculators11.  
                                                          
 
10 See Chapter 2, section 2.17.1 for more details on the success of the 1990s. 
11 Commercial and Non-commercial Traders: When reporting to the Commission, an individual trader is 
classified either as "commercial" or "non-commercial." Reported futures positions are classified as 
commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular commodity for hedging as defined in the 
Commission's regulations (1.3(z)). A trading organisation gets classified as a "commercial" by filing a 
statement with the Commission (on CFTC Form 40) that it is commercially "...engaged in business 
activities hedged by the use of the futures or option markets."  To ensure accuracy and consistency, the 
Commission may exercise judgment in re-classifying a trader if it has more information about the trader’s 
use of the markets. See Appendix 6.8.2 for information regarding classification among different entities. 
Graph 1.3 US Futures Volume (in millions) 
(1955-2005) 
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That is done on the basis of whether a reportable position12 is taken primarily for hedging 
purposes as defined by the CFTC regulations. 
 
Two critical parts are focussed on in this study.  The first one relates to behaviour, 
and more specifically is concerned with the relation between net futures position by 
traders’ type, futures returns, market sentiment and information risk variables.  
Contrarians and positive feedbacks behaviour for each trader type are analysed.  In fact, 
by including priced risk factors (information variables) they help in understanding 
whether they do influence hedgers/speculators in their positive feedback or contrarian 
behaviour.  Similarly, the inclusion of a sentiment index reveals whether large players do 
use sentiment in determining monthly decisions.  Most importantly, the usage of net 
positions shows its importance compared with well-used variables like volume and open 
interest.  Hedging pressure effect tests are carried out to determine to existence of the 
transfer of risk from hedgers to speculators.  Cross-hedging pressure effect tests help in 
reducing the scarce evidence of whether other futures contracts’ hedging pressures might 
affect one particular futures contract.  Further, by looking simultaneously at the 
behaviour (trading determinant) and possession of superior information (market timing 
ability) of large players, this study is the first one enlightening if large hedgers and 
speculators do destabilize futures prices.  For instance, evidence of feedback trading does 
not entail market destabilization if these traders incorporate fundamental information into 
prices.  Positive feedback trading together with negative market timing ability of a trader 
type suggest that the trader type tends to push away futures prices from their fundamental 
value, and thus destabilizes the market (Lakonishkok et al., 1992).  This section of the 
study helps to shed further light in the area of policy implications, in helping regulatory 
bodies like CFTC to decide whether speculators/hedgers should have more tightened 
limit positions imposed to avoid disturbance in market flow. 
 
                                                          
 
12 See Appendix 6.8.1 for more information on reportable positions. 
 
 
 
24
The second critical part of this study relates to performance.  The main 
contributions cover the decomposed mean (return) model, volatility models, forecasting 
and a stability based event analysis.  Firstly, the decomposition into expected and 
unexpected components of variables like net positions, sentiment, and priced risk factors 
helps to better understand how decomposed variables significantly affect the futures 
actual mean return.  Essentially, the decomposition of variables into expected and 
unexpected components is to ensure the expected component (conditional mean of 
individual series) contain enough terms to make it still significant and reliable, while the 
unexpected component measures the residual on differences of the series from its mean.  
More significant expected components help in suggesting that large hedgers or large 
speculators are well informed players in using specific expected variables to affect their 
return at the start of the trading month.  Besides, this is the first study including a lagged 
hedging pressure variable in the mean equation, which adds value whether the existence 
of risk premium or non-marketable risk is significant after taking into account priced risk 
factors like market dividend yield and three months Treasury bill yield.  The regression 
of decomposed variables against idiosyncratic volatility is also carried out and helps in 
knowing how significant expected and unexpected components of variables contribute to 
idiosyncratic volatility.  Idiosyncratic volatility, itself, is also decomposed into expected 
volatility and unexpected volatility to aid in knowing whether speculators’ volatility 
(risk) is higher than hedgers’.  The reason behind decomposing idiosyncratic volatility 
into expected volatility and unexpected volatility is to know how much of this volatility 
measure is determined by expected volatility (at the start of the trading month) and how 
much is determined by unexpected values of volatility (durig the rest of the trading 
month).  It would be expected that hedgers’ expected volatility would be less than 
speculators’ expected and unexpected volatility since hedgers are in the market to reduce 
risk, and hence have an expected volatility (set at the start of the month) which is less 
than speculators’.  Speculators’ expected volatility and unexpected volatility (during the 
rest of the month) would be expected to be higher in affecting total volatility, in that 
speculators are in the market to bear more risk and also more induced to change their risk 
levels all during the trading month. 
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The return/ risk relationship is also the first to be tested with actual return being 
regressed against expected and unexpected volatility.  This helps to gain a better 
understanding  in how significant expected risk and unexpected risk explain hedgers’ and 
speculators’ futures return.  As laid out by the literature on portfolio theory, higher risk is 
compensated with higher return, and speculators normally bear more risk.  The 
relationship between “expected risk” and return for specific players in a specific market 
can provide an important foundation for futures trading models, in that, it provides an 
assumption that expected risk can be used as a proxy measure of risk in determining 
futures returns.  For example, a lower value of expected risk in a market where hedgers 
are non-predominant can be explained by their lower expectancy of a higher return.  
Hence, the lower the risk, the lower the return, as supported by portfolio theory. 
 
  Further, this study integrates the use of GARCH/PARCH volatility models, 
which help not only to support the existing usage of these conditional variance models.  
The issue of why this study uses GARCH and PARCH volatility models is supported 
chiefly because one is standard deviation based and the other one is variance based.  It is 
of interest to know whether standard deviation or variance provides a better proxy of risk 
for each player in determining actual returns.   For instance, Davidian and Carroll (1987) 
argue that standard deviation specifications are more robust than variance specifications.  
Evidence is rare for models containing information variables, sentiment index, hedging 
pressures and net positions.  The performance evaluation of GARCH and PARCH 
models, under both normal and t distribution, is a first one in explaining whether the 
conditional variance or standard deviation-based volatility model better explain the actual 
futures return.  The decomposition of forecast errors into mean, variance and covariance 
proportions tells us how far the mean return of our model is from the mean of the actual 
series, how far the variation of the volatility model is from the variation of the actual 
series, and the remaining unsystematic errors from the volatility model.  The use of 
different error distribution assumption such as normal and t is also the first one to check 
whether hedgers’ and speculators’ return follow a normal distribution.  Due to the 
PARCH model being based on standard deviation rather than variance, it is expected the 
PARCH model to exhibit more skewness due to more outliers.  A PARCH model, under 
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a t distribution, would be expected to exhibit less skewness since the t distribution would 
lead to smaller conditional errors as explained in Bollerslev (1987).  Further, by checking 
skewness and kurtosis measures, this study is the first to look at whether hedgers’ 
probability functions would have a lower (flatter) kurtosis in more futures markets than 
speculators, due to hedgers entering the market to reduce risk and speculators entering the 
market to bear that risk.  
 
The section on forecasting (static) reveals whether the GARCH and PARCH 
based volatility can accurately help in forecasting one-month futures return.  Supporters 
of superior forecasting ability from large traders are Chang (1985) and Leuthold, Garcia, 
and Lu (1994).13  This is also the first study to compare GARCH and PARCH model 
specifications under both normal and t distribution.  Further, this study checks for the 
suitability of idiosyncratic volatility as a good proxy of risk, by testing whether 
idiosyncratic volatility can match the volatility measure (standard deviation or variance) 
that accurately forecasted one-month futures return.  
 
The last section of this study, which relates to a stability and event study, brings a 
further contribution since it is the first to look at the stability of the trading determinant 
model, the mean return model, the risk and return relationship model, and the trading 
activity and volatility relationship model of hedgers and speculators over eight specific 
macroeconomic events in the 1990s.  Briefly, the trading determinant model is important 
in that it relates to the behaviour of hedgers and speculators in how they would change 
their net positions for next month, based on today’s returns, sentiment, and priced risk 
factors like treasury bill rates, corporate yield spread and dividend yield.  The mean 
return model, in turn, examines the effect of net positions, sentiment, information 
variables have on existing futures return, after adjusting for stationarity and 
misspecification of variables.  This model, while basic, is essential to see how these 
variables are related to return in a specific month period on average.  The risk and return 
                                                          
 
13 Chang (1985) finds superior forecasting ability of large traders in the wheat contract for the 1951–1980 
interval, and Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994) demonstrate that elite traders earn significant net dollar 
returns in the frozen pork bellies market. 
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relationship model investigates the relationship between return and risk, where risk is 
proxied as standard deviation and variance.  The trading activity and volatility model 
investigates the relationship between net positions and risk, where risk is proxied as 
standard deviation and variance.  All these four models are of interest, in that they 
essentially form important models underlying the motivations of this study.  They are 
robust tested to see whether they are still stable after accounting for major global events 
over the US futures markets.  Alternatively stated, the use of recursive estimates also tests 
for the robustness of these models over the long run.  For instance, it is possible to see 
whether hedgers or speculators continue to exhibit significant positive feedback or 
contrarian behaviour over the whole ten years.  Similarly, the risk and return relationship 
of hedgers and speculators can be tested if stable over the last decade.  More importantly, 
recursive estimates of independent variables in each of the models over the ten-year 
period help to find any significant structural break which matches a major 
macroeconomic event listed in this study.  This helps in knowing whether 
hedgers/speculators significantly change their net positions during major events, whether 
their returns are affected during major events, and whether their attitude to risk changes 
during major events of the 1990s (May 1990–Dec 2000)14.  For instance, there was a 
decline in the foreign exchange and commodity contract (by 4% and 8%), much of which 
can be attributed to the financial turbulence that followed the Russian debt moratorium 
and near collapse of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) (BIS, 1998). 
Similarly, the commodity and equity-linked segments expanded the most rapidly of all 
underlying risk categories, with increases of 20% and 24% (to $1.8trn and $0.5trn).  This 
followed the aftermath of the introduction of the Euro earlier in the year (BIS, Dec 1999).  
Events looked at are: effect of US Federal Reserve tightening up interest rates for a 
duration of 20 months after a long time of easing; effect of Mexico crisis; effect of 
Emerging Markets slump and rebound; effect of temporary revival of Japanese recession 
in the mid-1990s; effect of Asian crisis; effect of LTCM near default & Russian crisis; 
and the introduction of the Euro currency.  Finally, but not least, the relationship between 
trading activity and volatility for hedgers and speculators is tested in this study over a 
                                                          
 
14 So far, in previous literature, there is no underlying model or theory that suggest hedgers or speculators 
net positions or returns should change following an announcement or event. 
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ten-year period for the first time, where volatility is both proxied as standard deviation 
and variance.     
 
These are the direct contributions to the existing literature and regulatory bodies.  
The non-availability of CFTC COT data in all the 29 futures markets before made such 
an analysis an impossible one.  With the defragmentation of the market into 
hedgers/speculators, this study is also a guide to small traders (who form the residual of 
the futures market) to be able to know how the influential players (large hedgers and/or 
large speculators) change their monthly net positions for next month based on current 
returns, which players bear more or less risk in specific markets, and how they are 
affected after specific major economic events. 
 
 
1.3 Organisation of the study 
 
This study is organized into five main chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter 1:   
This chapter starts by giving a brief layout of the benefits of futures markets, followed by 
the ever-changing risk and return relationship of investors during the 1990s due to events.  
The reasons behind choosing the US Futures markets are then explained, in relation to the 
top five globally traded futures contracts and futures exchanges leaders.  The reasons of 
setting the data sample to be the 1990s are further explained with some history of futures 
markets in the US over the 1955-2005 periods.  Finally, the contributions of this study are 
laid out. 
 
 
Chapter 2: 
The existing literature is reviewed in this chapter, by starting with the notion of zero-sum 
game in the futures market. Previous research about investor sentiment and information 
variables are covered.  Then, all the theoretical backgrounds about contrarian/ positive 
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feedback behaviour, volatility, forecasting, and a detailed synopsis of each event to be 
analysed are laid out.  
 
Chapter 3: 
The data and research methodology used are presented in this chapter.  Efforts have been 
made to clarify the role of the CFTC in the US Futures markets, and its unique data, the 
COT.  This chapter discusses the research objectives of this study.  For consistency and 
ease of readability, a data classification and coding page, together with some flowcharts 
are presented in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 4: 
All empirical evidence from this study are provided in this chapter.  The analysis is first 
made up of time series properties like stationarity, followed by the behaviour and 
performance sections.  The behaviour section looks at contrarian/ positive feedback 
behaviour of hedgers/speculators, followed by market timing and hedging pressure 
effects tests.  The performance sections initially deal with GARCH/PARCH/idiosyncratic 
volatility models, and then proceed to forecasting, stability and event analysis.  The 
emphasis is on the trading determinant model, mean return model, risk and return 
relationship of hedgers/ speculators over the sample period.  Finally, the relationship 
between trading activity and volatility is looked at. 
 
Chapter 5: 
This final chapter concludes this study, by giving a summary of findings, policy 
implications and practical significance, and some notes about generalization of results. 
The limitations of this study are discussed with directions for future research.  Some 
concluding remarks end the chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter starts by giving us an understanding that futures trading is a zero-
sum game and that investor behaviour differs.  Both mainstream hedging and speculation 
theories are looked at, before giving an insight about large speculators and large hedgers 
in futures markets.  Issues relating to regulation are laid out, with particular emphasis on 
speculative position limits imposed in futures markets.  Further, investor sentiment, 
information variables, assumption for excluding volume, and implication of changing 
horizon are discussed since they form critical components of this study.   
 
 Once the literature reviews on these important areas are looked at, this chapter 
then considers all behaviour models that are specifically being tested.  Models based on 
contrarian behaviour, positive feedback behaviour and hedging pressure effects are laid 
out, with particular emphasis on short run/long run perspectives of hedgers/speculators 
and robustness of each model.  Models based on the performance section of the study are 
then discussed.  In particular, volatility models such as GARCH and PARCH are 
discussed with relation to the symmetry assumption, forecasting, policy implications and 
error distributions under each model.  The final part of the chapter relates to events 
analysis, where the success of the 1990s in the US are first looked at, before looking at 
each event in detail.   
 
2.2 The Zero-sum game 
 
Above all, one must contemplate that futures trading, unlike stock trading, is a 
zero-sum game.  This means that capital changes hands, for every $1 won by one trader 
there is exactly $1 lost by another trader.  If one wants to buy a futures contract, someone 
else has to be willing to sell it to the person and take the offsetting position.  Therefore, at 
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any given time, the number of long futures contracts exactly equals the number of short 
futures contracts.  That’s very different from the equity world, where essentially everyone 
can win or lose at once and winning does not require an opposite trader to realize an 
identical loss.  Eventually, if one is not a superior trader to the traders on the opposite end 
of his futures trades, he will lose.  Unlike stocks, futures don’t create or destroy wealth, 
but rather shuffle it around speculators and hedgers mainly15 (Harris, 1993).   
Alternatively stated, this study is challenging in that it relates specifically to distribution 
of contracts among hedgers and speculators. 
 
2.3 Investors and Behaviour  
 
Common views are investors trade to rebalance portfolios (for risk sharing or 
liquidity requirements) and speculate on private information (Llorente et al., 2001).   
Systematic irrational responses to sentiments and fads from investors are also present 
(Shiller, 1984; De Long et al., 1990).  More critical is that different trading motives 
predict different performance across investor types.  If for hedging purposes, asset prices 
must decrease (increase) to attract speculators to buy (sell) (Merton, 1987; Llorente et al., 
2001).  If for speculative purposes, the investor will buy (sell) the asset, reflecting the 
positive (negative) private information about the asset’s future payoff and the eventual 
price will rise (fall) (Llorente et al., 2001).  Furthermore, when a trader underreacts 
(overreacts) to news, the consequential asset prices reveal momentum (reversals) (Hong 
and Stein, 1999).  Although various empirical tests have been performed on equity 
investor behaviour and performance, evidence about the behaviour and performance of 
the largest hedgers and speculators in major futures market is rare.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
15 http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~lharris/ACROBAT/Zerosum.pdf  
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2.4 Hedging Revisited 
 
Theories regarding futures price behavior or price information have been well 
reviewed by Carter (1999) and Leuthold and Pennings (2000).  Of particular interest to 
our study is the price insurance, earnings returns, and liquidity theories. 
 
2.4.1 Price Insurance Theory 
 
While Hoffman (1932) states that hedging is shifting risk, Smith (1922) says that 
hedging enables hedgers to insure against the risk of price fluctuations.  Previously, 
Marshall (1919) disseminates this view by stating that the hedger does not speculate, but, 
he insures.   Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939) discuss hedging in terms of risk avoidance 
and insurance.  In this line of thought, any loss made by the hedger on the transaction 
represents an insurance premium paid to the risk taking speculator.   Prior to 1940’s, this 
price risk motivation argument was the theoretical reason of why firms used futures 
exchanges, or as Blau (1944) statement that commodity futures exchanges are market 
organisations specially developed for facilitating the shifting of risks due to unknown 
future changes in commodity prices; i.e, risks which are of such a nature that they cannot 
be covered by means of ordinary insurance…”.  
 
2.4.2 Earnings Returns Theory 
 
 Working (1953) challenges the idea of risk insurance by stating that hedging is 
the pursuit of profit through the exploitation of (expected) changes in the basis, that is, 
the exploitation of opportunities for profit presented by the prospective movement of 
prices in the futures market relative to the movement in the cash market. In this view, 
hedging is primarily a sort of arbitrage, to be engaged in only when the hedger perceives 
a promising opportunity for profit.16  Later, Working renounces his earlier position when 
                                                          
 
16 In the view of Working (1953), hedging in futures consists of making a standard contract to buy or sell, 
established and controlled by a commodity exchange, as a temporary substitute for an intended later 
contract to buy or sell on other terms. Working (1962) differentiates between several categories of hedging: 
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he assertes that (short) hedgers tend to lose money to speculators and they do so even in 
times where futures prices have fallen.  The explanation is the “dips” or “bulges” that 
tend to occur when hedgers sell or buy futures contracts.  Hence, Working’s hedgers have 
to pay a price to speculators, i.e., they incur execution costs for the prompt carrying out 
of their sale or purchase transaction.  This explanation links back to the price insurance 
theory: the reason for hedgers to have their orders executed expeditiously is to reduce the 
interval in which their inventories are left uncovered, exposed to the risk of price change.  
The adoption of the portfolio theory approach in the 1960’s to decisions in futures 
markets rehabilitated the risk reduction notion in hedging theory. 
 
2.4.3 Liquidity Theory 
 
 Telser (1981) argues that organized futures markets exist because they are 
superior to informal forward markets. An organized futures market has well structured 
rules, standing committees for arbitrating disputes, and a limited membership.  In contrast 
to futures contracts, forward contracts rely on the good reliance of parties.  Also, 
compared to standardized futures contracts, a typical forward contract crops up after  
ample negotiations between the individual parties.  Therefore, they cannot be offset by 
identical contracts, and there is no scope for the advantages of clearinghouses and 
settlement by the payment difference.  Through their rules and standardization, futures 
provide liquidity and eliminate counter-party risk. Telser (1981) states that an organized 
market facilitates trade among strangers.  Also in Telser’s view the use of futures 
exchanges helps to reduce risk, but he also acknowledges that there are other ‘risk-
reducing’ instruments available to the firm.  Telser argues that even if one accepts the 
price insurance theory, it does not explain why an organized futures market is necessary 
in order to accommodate hedging.  Telser argues that a merchant who wishes to avoid the 
price risks of holding inventories can do so without an organized futures market, namely 
by entering into forward transactions in the cash market.  In this view the motivation to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
carrying charge hedging, operational hedging, selective hedging, anticipatory hedging and pure risk 
avoidance hedging.  
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use futures contracts is not essentially driven by the firm’s want to reduce risk, but by the 
institutional characteristics of the futures exchange itself like regulation ensuring 
liquidity. 
 
2.5 Speculation revisited 
 
A study from CBOT in 1983 revealed an increasing relationship between the 
number of years a speculator had traded and his transaction volume during a particular 
quarter; 51% of traders with ten or more transactions in the quarter studied had more than 
five years trading experience.  However, Peck (1981) arrives at the alarming conclusion 
that in spite of the tremendous overall growth in commodity markets, speculation has in 
fact declined significantly on the three largest agricultural futures markets over a fifteen 
year period.  Peck's work calls for us to learn more about the speculator's motivations in 
order to effectively assess their continuing role in the markets.  In spite of their large 
share in market volume, the profile and motivation of the habitual speculator are not well 
understood.  On the one hand, the traditional regulatory literature views the public futures 
trader as unsophisticated, uninformed and undercapitalized (Draper, 1985); such a profile 
is used to justify calls for strict regulation.  On the other hand, most economic theory 
models the speculator's behavior as rational (i.e., they are assumed to be risk averse, 
profit-motivated investors) (Baker et al., 1977).  Canoles et al. (1998) findings contradict 
both these profiles: one the one hand, their sample appears to be financially sophisticated, 
well-educated, and well-capitalized; on the other, their sample does not appear to be 
especially risk averse, and is probably not trading solely for profit.   
 
Over the past five decades much more research attention has been directed toward 
the returns of speculators than towards their behaviour and motivation. A series of studies 
since the 1940's has yielded a consistent picture of speculative account performance. 
Beginning with Stewart's (1949) pioneering study and continuing through Hartzmark's 
(1991) article, four general conclusions have come into view: 1) when transaction costs 
are included, total net losses substantially exceed total net gains; 2) the average trade loss 
consistently exceeds the average trade profit; 3) there are a significant number of one 
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time (or near one time) traders.  (Hieronymus (1971) finds that 37% of all accounts 
surveyed are one time traders); 4) losses are constantly allowed to run while profits are 
cashed out.  Ross (1975) finds that losing positions are held on average twice as long as 
winning positions. 
 
2.5.1 Recreational utility of speculators 
A number of earlier studies have suggested aspects of recreational utility in 
speculators' behaviour.  Rockwell (1967) notes that speculators do not require an ex post 
history of profits in order to continue trading.  He explains that speculators are possibly 
are risk seekers and are consequently willing to lose money for the privilege of 
speculating.  Smidt (1965) discovers that 45% of respondents who indicated they thought 
of themselves as being unsuccessful traders were not ready to change their trading 
approach.  Further, only 12% of all respondents indicate they would stop trading due to 
losses.  Smidt concludes that these unusual findings suggest non profit-seeking economic 
behaviour.  Draper (1985), in noting that 41.5% of commodity speculators in a Barron's 
Magazine survey said they were "seeking excitement," suggests that in addition to the 
investment aspects of futures markets, there are also significant consumption features.  
These propositions of recreational consumption are also proponed by psychologists 
studying habitual gamblers.  For instance, Hyde (1978) argues that for the habitual 
gambler, gambling is an "end" rather than a "means to an end."  The pleasure of betting 
or risk taking and the sense of being chief in the action are more critical than the winning 
or losing of money.  Research by psychologists has found many clinically defined 
gamblers to be trading in the financial markets.  In general, Murrell (1979) contends they 
can be divided into three categories: 1) profit motivated, 2) obsessive, or 3) leisure 
consumers, with the vast majority falling into the "leisure consumption" category.  
Murrell's categories might be used to classify habitual speculators as well. 
 
2.6 Large hedgers and speculators: an insight 
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There is powerful support in early literature for the assumption that hedgers are 
less well-informed about market expectations than speculators17. Large speculators have 
been the most profitable group of traders in the 1980s and 1990s according to Chatrath et 
al., 1997).  Also, large numbers of speculators will enter the market any time there is a 
risk premium, so that the futures price must equal the expected future spot price, if the 
costs of storage are ignored.18  It also happens, as shown by Chang (1985) and by 
Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994), that some large traders, particularly in some 
commodities in the United States, are as well informed as speculators.19   
 
The effects of speculation in futures markets have been the topic of a long-lasting 
debate.  It is argued that speculation has a number of desirable features (Kawaller et al., 
1990).  Briefly, they can be summarized as (a) by buying low and selling high, 
speculators stabilize prices and (b) by making future economic expectations, speculators 
smooth the time-series behaviour of the long-run equilibrium of the economy.  In 
contrast, Hart (1977) shows that a sophisticated speculator could make money by 
exploiting the naive forecasting rules of less sophisticated agents and thereby 
destabilizing the future price.  Also, Bessembinder (1992) finds that hedging activity has 
only minor effects on the pricing of Eurodollar futures contracts.  Other critics suggest 
that large speculators have distorted commodity prices, so that the "commodity futures 
markets no longer accurately reflect the economic realities of supply and demand" 
(Taylor and Behrmann, 1994)20.  Newbery (1987) also points out that a producer with 
                                                          
 
17 In regards to hedgers, Hawtrey (1940) says that “… they regard the making of price as a whole time 
occupation for experts, and, in general, will not pit their fragmentary information against the systematic 
study at the disposal of the professional dealers…”  See also Johnson (1960).  
18 Hartzmark (1987) suggests that these traders may be risk lovers, or may simply enjoy dealing in futures 
markets. 
19 However, Chang et al. (2000) show the increased use of S&P 500 futures contracts by large hedgers over 
the sample period.  The increased importance of hedgers in the stock index futures market may be due to 
the increased investment in mutual and pension funds over the same period, the increased supply of 
customized over-the-counter financial products or to an increased understanding and acceptance of futures 
contracts as a financial instrument. 
20 Note that Dalvi et al. (1997) find that speculation declined significantly in all three speculative measures 
in two of the three currency markets (Japanese yen and Swiss francs), in two of three financial markets (the 
S&P 500 and municipal bonds), and in heating oil #2.  Furthermore, speculation declined or remained 
unchanged in at least two of the three speculative measures in eleven of the remaining commodity markets. 
These declines occurred in agricultural (oats, soybeans, and wheat), financials (NYSE Stock Exchange 
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market power may, even under rational expectations, advantageously destabilize the cash 
market through speculation (Kocagil, 1997).  Alternatively stated, an increase in well-
informed speculative trade has two opposite effects on measured volatility.  It increases 
volatility due to new fundamental information since the information is impounded into 
prices more quickly and decreases volatility due to order flow imbalances caused by 
uninformed traders because informed traders provide liquidity in such events (Harris, 
1989). 
 
 
2.7 Investors, market and liquidity 
 
It is important to note that while the market as whole may be operating efficiently, 
significant subsets ,i.e, individuals in that market may not.  Beaver has argued: 
 
“…it is important to distinguish between securities market and individual investors, 
because the role of information can vastly be different in each context.  To a certain 
extent, the distinction is artificial, in that aggregate actions of individuals determine 
market behaviour.  However, the process of aggregation is often deceptive, and if we fail 
to make the distinction, we may be subject to any one of a number of fallacies of 
composition…” (Winsen, 1976).  Furthermore, (Caginalp and Laurent, 1998) find traders 
are reacting to expectations involving strategies and resources of other participants.  In a 
similar fashion, uninformed traders over react to another’s trades, thereby exaggerating 
price movements (Daigler and Wiley, 1999).   
 
Moreover, although futures markets are highly liquid compared to commodity 
spot markets, the failure of investors to take advantage of commodity futures as 
investments indicates that there remain effective barriers (Hirshleifer, 1988).  For 
instance, few non-commercials (speculators) investors take positions in commodities 
markets (futures, forwards, spots), which suggest that there exist barriers to participation, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Composite Index and Eurodollars), livestock (live hogs and live cattle), and in the coffee, crude oil, and 
platinum markets. 
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possibly arising from fixed set up costs required to learn about these markets, or 
alternatively because of taking small positions (as with minimum contract sizes)21.   On 
the other hand, Chang (1985) and Marcus (1984), find commodity futures prices changes 
are correlated with hedging positions taken previously by producers.   
 
2.8 Speculative Position limits 
Section 4a of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) provides limits on speculative 
trading on the premise that excessive speculation may lead to excessive price volatility. 
This section directs the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to set 
speculative position limits on futures.  The CFTC directly sets limits on futures contracts 
and mandates the exchanges to adopt and enforce limits where the Commission has not 
established speculative position limits. For instance, (Dutt et al., 1997) provide 
justification for regulators to set tighter speculative position limits and exchanges to set 
higher margin requirements for inter-crop year spread positions relative to intra-crop-year 
spread positions.  There are three basic elements to the regulatory framework for 
speculative position limits. They are:  
(1) the size (or levels) of the limits themselves;  
(2) the exemptions from the limits (for example, for hedge positions); and  
(3) the policy on aggregating accounts for purposes of applying the limits22 
 
2.9 Investor sentiment 
Investor sentiment is studied in that it teaches us about biases in stock market 
forecasts of investors, and about the opportunities to earn extra returns by exploiting 
those biases.  For instance, Bernstein and Prahuman (1994) find that the sentiment of 
                                                          
 
21 The set up costs may be interpreted as the time investment required to avoid being at a severe 
informational disadvantage in the commodity market.  Therefore, it includes the effort required to 
understand the mechanism of trading, principles of futures pricing, and the complex factors influencing 
demand supply conditions (Hirshleifer, 1988). 
22 http://www.cftc.gov/opa/backgrounder/opaspeclmts.htm 
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Wall Strategists is a useful contrary indicator.  Arthur Levitt, chair of the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission, warned day traders that they should trade only “with funds 
they afford to lose” (Wessel, 1999). 
 
While sentiment levels of individual investors and strategists are reliable contrary 
indicators of future S&P500 returns (Fisher and Statman, 2000), Clarke and Statman 
(1998) find no statistically significant relationship between the level of sentiment of 
newsletter writers and DJIA or S&P500 returns in the following 4, 26, or 52weeks.  In 
addition, some researchers have suggested that the returns to large (small) cap stocks are 
related to the sentiment of large (small) investors.  For instance, Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 
(1991) conclude that small investors concentrate their holdings in small-cap stocks, thus 
creating such a link.  Arguably, Fisher and Statman (2000), find no support for the 
argument that the sentiment of small investors follow the performance of small-cap 
stocks more closely than the performance of large-cap stocks.   
 
Among major factors that affect investor sentiment are stock returns.  While De 
Bondt (1993) finds consistent positive and significant relationships between S&P500 
returns and future changes in the sentiment of individual investors, Wang (2003), further 
finds after controlling for market risk factors, that speculators respond positively to 
market sentiment and hedgers against market sentiment.  Clarke and Statman (1998) and 
Fisher and Statman (2000) find that newsletter writers form their sentiments with the 
expectation of short term returns to continue and eventual reversals of long-term returns.   
 
2.10 Information variables 
 
To introduce market risk into models, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Harvey (1989) 
use the following information variables: 
 
1. Monthly dividend yield of the S&P500 index, which tends to be higher 
during periods of slow economic growth or recessions (Fama and French, 1989) is 
regarded as a signal for the risk premium. 
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2.  3-Month T-bill yield, representing the short-term discount rate or 
expected inflation23. 
3. Corporate bond default yield spread, i.e., Moody’s Baa-rated corporate 
bond yield less Aaa-rated corporate bond yield, represents a premium of default 
risk. 
 
Bessembinder and Chan (1992), and Bjornson and Carter (1997) show that these above 
factors are priced risk factors in futures markets.  Information variables also play an 
important role in the volatility spillover across markets (Chatrath and Song, 2003).  
Easley and O’Hara (2002) find information risk is a determinant of asset returns.  
Campbell and Shiller (1988) present evidence that dividend yields forecast stock returns.  
Chan et al. (1985) find that changes in short term interest rates can explain the 
equilibrium pricing of equities, and Chen (1991) shows that the cyclical behaviour of T-
bill rates (low during economic contractions) captures the cyclical variation in equity risk 
premiums.  Stock index dividend yield and the bond default and term spreads in the US 
markets help forecast the risk premium component of the foreign currency futures basis 
(Baum and Barkoulas, 1996).  It is of interest to examine how these priced risk factors 
influence traders’ trading decisions and how traders perform after controlling for risk.  
 
In a study of fifteen US futures markets, coefficient estimates for information 
variables for hedgers have opposite signs to those of speculators (Wang, 2003).  This 
tends to be in line with the “hedging demand” argument of Merton (1973).  Because the 
available investment opportunities change as the information variables vary, Merton 
shows that investors may hedge these changes by investing in a way that gives them 
higher wealth precisely when investment opportunities are unattractive, i.e, expected 
returns are low.  Therefore, hedgers adjust their positions as a way of hedging against 
movements in expected returns, as contrasted with the behaviour of speculators24.  
                                                          
 
23 When non stationary, differencing of dividend yield is carried upon (Wang, 2003). 
24 Lynch (2001) provides evidence on the impact of return predictability on investors’ multiperiod equity 
portfolios choices.  He shows that return predictability of information variables can tilt equity investors’ 
portfolios away from high book-market and small-size stocks.  Thus, hedging demands provide an 
explanation for the size and book-market effects. 
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Furthermore, French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) extend Merton’s work by dividing 
market volatility variables into expected and unexpected components using ARMA 
models. 
 
2.13 Market implications of monthly horizons 
 
 Because perceived risk varies inversely with time horizon, required returns vary 
directly with perceived risk.  Furthermore, with market liquidity varying directly with 
distribution of investor horizons, changes in distribution of investor horizons might affect 
the level and volatility of market returns, i.e, if average horizons shrink, perceptions of 
risk should increase, therefore, higher returns (Olsen and Khaki, 1998).  In addition, 
because horizon length is bounded by zero, a reduction of dispersion of horizons created 
by shortening of horizons (say from monthly to weekly data) should lead to poorer 
liquidity and greater volatility in market prices (Greezy, 1997).  Finally, but not least, 
Peter (1994) supports that prices exhibit a pattern of volatility consistent with time 
horizons.   
 
 Moreover, Holmes (2006) reports that the rise in commodity prices is partly due 
to the more diversified types of financial investors and investment strategies, particularly, 
passively managed investments.  In that line of thought, Beenen (2005) supports that such 
fund investors (large speculators) often pursue a fully collateralized long-only futures 
strategy with a longer term investment horizon.  Investing in such longer term horizon 
(e.g monthly) include benefits such as diversification at a relatively low cost.  
Historically, commodity prices have had a relatively low correlation with prices in other 
asset classes and a high correlation with inflation (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2004).  
These academics also showed that historically, the return on a diversified basket of long 
commodities futures has been comparable with return on other asset classes with similar 
risk characteristics such as equity.   
 
 BIS (2007) also supports that non-commercials were dominated by managed 
money traders (MMT).  In a seminal paper, Haigh et al. (2005) suggest that MMT 
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participants do not change their positions as frequently as other participants.  Wang 
(2004) further examines the relation between trading activity by trader type and futures 
returns over different horizons and found results were consistent on average.   Similarly, 
he found negative conditional betas using weekly returns which are consistent with 
Bessembinder (1992) who used monthly data.  These add support to the use of monthly 
CFTC data.  Lastly, but not least, Wang (2003) supports it is less likely for traders’ 
perception of risk to be changed over a short interval.  The choice of monthly data 
interval not only makes the results comparable to the previous studies on backwardation 
or hedging pressure theories, but allow for consistency with monthly macroeconomic 
variables included in regression models. 
 
2.13 Contrarians 
2.13.1 Contrarians v/s naïve strategies 
 
 For decades, scholars and investment professionals have argued that value 
strategies outperform the market Dreman (1977).  These value strategies generally looks 
upon buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, historical prices, 
book assets, or other measures of value. De Bondt and Thaler (1987) argue that extreme 
losers outperform the market over the subsequent several years.  While it is argued that 
value strategies have produced superior returns, the interpretation of why they have done 
so is more of a debate.  Value strategies might produce higher returns because they are 
contrarians to “naïve”25 strategies followed by other investors.  These naïve strategies 
might vary from forecasting using old earnings data, to overreaction to information, or 
equating a good bargain with a well-run company’s year irrespective of price.  Anyhow, 
some investors tend to get overly excited26 about stocks that have done very well in the 
past and buy them up, so that these “glamour” stocks become overpriced.  Likewise, they 
overreact to stocks that have done very badly, oversell them, and these out-of-favour 
“value” stocks become under priced.  In brief, contrarians bet against these naïve 
                                                          
 
25 “naïve” strategies are also sometimes referred as “popular” models (Shiller, 1984) and “noise” (Black, 
1986) 
26 See overreaction hypothesis 
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strategies (Lakonishok et al., 1994).  Because contrarian strategies invest 
disproportionately in stock that are under priced and under invest in stocks that are 
overpriced, they outperform the market (DeDondt and Thaler, 1985; and Haugen, 1994).  
In that line of thought, while Levis and Liodakis (2001) find biases in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, Dechow and Sloan (1997) find that naïve reliance on analysts’ forecasts of 
future earnings growth can explain over half of the higher returns to contrarian strategies.   
  
2.13.2 Over reaction hypothesis: short-run and long-run perspectives 
2.13.2.1 Long-run perspective 
 
The long-run perspective, which suggests that stock prices momentarily digress 
from their fundamental values due to swings of optimism and pessimism, has been 
examined using monthly returns by researchers including De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
and Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992).  Evidence from the long run perspective is 
generally not consistent with the hypothesis.  As Bowman and Iverson (1998) argue, the 
overreaction event comes from basic human biasedness in processing information, so if it 
is authenticated, it should manifest itself in other markets. Kryzanowski and Zhang’s 
(1992) long-term over-reaction findings in Canadian markets seem to contradict those of 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US markets and those of Alonso and Rubio (1990) in the 
Spanish market27.  Notwithstanding, Jegadeesh (1990) reports that a contrarian strategy, 
based on information from the previous month, yields statistically significant abnormal 
returns of 1.99% per month over 1934-1987 period in US markets, and 1.75% outside 
January.  This result is quite outstanding, as these abnormal returns are nearly double 
those resulting from De Bondt and Thaler’s long term contrarian strategies.  There is no 
out-of-sample evidence to support Jegadeesh’s (1990) one-month contrarian findings28. 
 
                                                          
 
27 Kryzanowski and Zhang’s (1992) find significant continuation behaviour for winners and losers in the 
subsequent one and two years, and insignificant reversal over long test periods.  Cleary and Inglis (1998) 
also find performance continuation over the medium term in Canadian markets. 
28 Lehmann (1990) finds that one-week winners and losers experience significant return reversals the next 
week, thereby reflecting arbitrage profits that persist after corrections for bid-ask spreads.  However, 
Conrad, Gultekin, and Kaul (1997) argue that Lehmann’s (1990) results are largely attributable to the bid-
ask bounce of transaction prices. 
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2.13.2.2 Short-run perspective 
 
The short-run perspective, which focuses on biases in the stock market reaction to 
the arrival of unexpected information, has also been analysed using daily returns by 
researchers such as Akhigbe, Gosnell and Harikumar (1998).  Bowman and Iverson 
(1998) perform a similar analysis using weekly returns.  Evidence on the short-run 
perspective favors the overreaction hypothesis. Alternatively stated if investor over-
reaction/under-reaction is real, then the price correction process should primarily occur 
over a very short-term period since it is difficult to justify that any arbitrage opportunity 
arising from these deviations persists over a long period (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998). 
 
 
2.13.3 Anatomy of a contrarian strategy 
T here is much support from  behavioural finance that individuals form their 
predictions of the future without a full understanding of mean reversion.  In other words, 
individuals tend to base their expectations on past data for the individual case they are 
considering without appropriately weighting data on what psychologists call the “base 
rate” or the class average.  Kahneman and Tversky (1982, p.417) explain: 
 
“…One of the basic principles of statistical prediction, which is also one of the least 
intuitive, is that the extremeness of predictions must be moderated by 
considerations of predictability… Predictions are allowed to match impressions 
only in the case of perfect predictability.  In intermediate situations, which are of 
course the most common, the prediction should be regressive, i.e, it should fall 
between the class average and the value that best represents one’s impression of the 
case at hand.  The lower the predictability the closer the prediction should be to the 
class average.  Intuitive predictions are typically non-regressive: people often make 
extreme predictions on the basis of information whose reliability and predictive 
ability are known to be low…” 
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To make the most of this defect of intuitive forecasts, contrarian investors should sell 
stocks with high past growth as well as high expected future growth and buy stocks with 
low past growth as well as low expected future growth.  Prices of these stocks are most 
likely to reflect the failure of investors to impose mean reversion on growth forecasts (La 
Porta, 1995). 
 
2.13.4 Are contrarian strategies riskier? 
 
Two alternative theories explain why value strategies have produced higher 
returns in the past.  The first one saying that they have done so because they exploit the 
mistakes of naïve investors, is backed by the fact that investors appear to extrapolating 
the past too far into the future, even though the future does not warrant such 
extrapolation.  As to value stocks being fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks, these 
would be so if they underperform glamour stocks in some states of the world, and second, 
those are on average “bad states” (in which the marginal utility of wealth is high, making 
value stocks unappealing to the risk-averse investor).  Interestingly, the reward for 
bearing fundamental risk does not seem to explain higher average returns on value stocks 
than on appealing stocks (Lakonishok et al., 1994). 
 
2.13.5 Performance of contrarians 
 
Contrarians buy stocks that performed poorly over the past two to five years 
(prior losers) and sell short stocks that performed well over the same period (prior 
winners).  This approach earns subsequent excess returns of about 8 per cent per year 
(DeBondt and Thaler, 1985).  However, the profits may be partly misleading, a product 
of methodological and measurement problems (Ball, Kothari, and Shanken, 1995).  It 
may also be that the excess returns are “real” but rational reward for time-varying risk 
(Fama, 1991).  Nonetheless, other academics like (Schiereck et al., 1999) find contrarian 
strategies to beat a passive approach invested in the market index.  Odean (1998) 
supports that the investors at a US discount brokerage house are reluctant to realize 
losses, and presents evidence which are consistent with contrarian behaviour.  Moreover, 
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using Finland’s data, domestic investors, particularly households, tend to be contrarians 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000).  Evidence from the US, Japan, U.K., and other European 
countries suggests that over long time intervals, contrarian strategies generate significant 
abnormal returns (Arshanapali, Coggin, and Doukas, 1998; Fama and French, 199829).  
Finally but not least, Jegadeesh (1990) observes a seasonality pattern in contrarian profits 
and document a significantly different return pattern in January. 
 
 Importantly too, many researchers attribute the performance of contrarian 
strategies to investor behaviour.  De Bondt and Thaler (1985) also mention that past 
performance can provide a proxy for investor sentiment, and since prices are initially 
biased either by unnecessary optimism or pessimism; prior losers would make more 
attractive investments than prior winners over the long-term.  Their argument is 
consistent with the hypothesis of long-term over-reaction by investors to information – a 
hypothesis documented in several other markets (e.g, Gunaratne and Yonesaaw (1997) in 
Japan, Schiereck, De Bondt, and Weber (1999) in Germany). 
 
 
2.13.6 Robustness in contrarian investing 
 
We must be vigilant in drawing conclusions about the relative importance of each 
horizon from a cross-horizon comparison of the share of positive buy ratio differences.  
While it is fair to conclude that uneven large magnitudes for the more recent horizons 
imply that the more recent horizons are more important, the converse need not apply.  
Larger magnitudes for the more distant horizons, can be simply be due to larger return 
inconsistencies between winning and losing stocks for the more distant horizons than for 
the more recent horizons.  This is because the more distant horizons identify winners and 
losers over a larger number of days (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000).  Also, it’s worth 
encompassing the fact that the contrarian strategy almost inevitably leads to initial losses 
as an undervalued stock continues to go down.  People are very averse to losses 
                                                          
 
29 Note that the out performance of such strategies has declined and even reversed in the most recent years. 
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Likewise, Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) find 
that the overreaction phenomenon is considerably stronger for smaller firms than for 
larger firms.  Similarly, Odean (1998) finds that small investors are reluctant to realize 
their losses, and they sell winners “early”.  That’s critical for small investors’ decisions 
(Bange, 2000). 
 
2.14 Positive feedbacks 
Positive feedback investors buy stocks when prices rise and sell when prices fall.  
Many forms of behaviour common in financial markets can be described as positive 
feedback trading.  It can result from extrapolative expectations about prices (Frankel and 
Froot, 1988), or trend chasing (De Long et al., 1990).  It can also be a consequence of  
stop loss orders, which in effect prompt selling in response to price declines.  Similarly,  
positive feedback trading can result from the liquidation of the positions of investors 
incapable to meet margin calls.  Positive feedback trading is also displayed by buyers of 
portfolio insurance, who might use this practice because their willingness to bear risk 
rises sharply with wealth  (Black, 1988).  
 
2.14.1 Destabilizing feature  of positive feedback trading 
 
With positive feedback traders, rational speculation can be destabilizing.  When 
rational speculators receive good news and eventually trade, they recognize that the 
initial price increase will stimulate buying by positive feedback traders tomorrow.  In 
expectation of these purchases, informed rational speculators buy more today, driving 
prices up today higher than their fundamental values.  Tomorrow, positive feedback 
traders react by buying due to today’s price increase and so keep prices above 
fundamentals even as rational speculators are selling out and stabilizing prices.  The 
critical issue is that, although part of the price rise is rational, part of it is an outcome 
from rational speculators’ anticipatory trades and from positive feedback traders’ reaction 
to such trades.  Trades from rational speculators destabilize prices because they prompt 
positive feedback trading by other investors  (DeLong et al., 1990).  Furthermore, it 
might pay a large speculator to destabilize prices (Hart, 1977). 
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In addition, the interaction of informed rational speculators and positive feedback 
traders leads to price destabilization which has several plausible empirical implications.  
DeLong et al. (1990) model generates a positive correlation of stock returns at short 
horizons, as positive feedback traders responds to past price increases by entering into the 
market, and negative correlations of stock returns at long horizons as prices eventually 
return to fundamentals.  Such an attribute of realized returns has found also empirical 
support in Poterba and Summers (1988). 
 
Managed futures trading are also purported to be guided by similar, positive 
feedback systems (Brorsen and Irwin, 1987).  This may cause unwarranted futures price 
movements as managed funds and pools attempt to simultaneously buy after a price 
increase or sell after a price decrease30.  Captivatingly, the concentration of commodity 
pool trading in financial futures markets is high, as these are the largest and most liquid 
markets.  Commodity pool trading is not intense in smaller futures markets, such as 
livestock futures. This substantiates the observation that CPOs31 and CTAs are aware of 
the possible market impacts of their trading and seek to curtail the impacts by limiting the 
size of their trading in smaller markets (Irwin and Yoshimaru, 1999). 
 
 
2.14.2 Horizons of positive feedbacks 
 
 Importantly, positive feedback trading can occur at many horizons.  Investment 
pools buy stock and then sell the stock slowly as positive feedback demand picks up rely 
on extrapolative expectations over a horizon of a few days.  Frankel and Froot’s (1988) 
forecast have a horizon of several months, which is also relevant for bubbles like those 
                                                          
 
30 Positive feedback trading systems also are known as technical trading systems. These systems are based 
on historical price patterns, and include moving average, price channel, and momentum systems.  Previous 
research indicates technical systems tend to generate similar futures trading signals (Lukac, Brorsen, and 
Irwin, 1988). 
 
31 Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) 
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that may have occurred in 1929 and 1987.  Provided people anticipate a price rise over 
specific horizons on which they focus to continue, they structure extrapolative 
expectations that may support positive feedback trading patterns.  Furthermore, De Long 
et al. (1990) suggest that that application to longer horizons is the most appropriate, since 
in that case learning is less likely to prevent positive feedback traders from repeating their 
mistakes. 
 
2.14.3 Under-reaction hypothesis of positive feedbacks 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and others have documented the seeming 
profitability of such strategies.  Over short periods of 3-12 months, there is a considerable 
degree of stock return persistence32.  Also, observations that (1) positive feedbacks seem 
profitable, (2) that the volume of profits is linked to the “slow” adjustment of prices to 
earnings surprises as well as to (3) the “slow” revision of analyst earnings forecasts- all 
point to the conclusion that the market under reacts to information, especially news about 
company income (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996).  In a similar fashion, 
(Schiereck et al., 1999) using Frankurt Stock Exchange (FSE) find that positive feedback 
strategies appear to beat a passive approach33 that invests in the market index. 
 
2.14.4 Performance of positive feedback trading 
 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that mutual fund managers tend to pursue such 
strategies.  Brennan and Cao (1997) present evidence supporting the analysis that foreign 
investors should pursue such strategies and achieve inferior performance because they are 
less informed than domestic investors.  Choe et al. (1999) find that foreign investors tend 
to be feedback traders, the latter paper focusing on short past-return horizons.  Cutler et 
al. (1990) find evidence of positive correlation of returns at horizons of a few weeks or 
                                                          
 
32 Positive feedbacks in 12-month returns are also reported in De Bondt and Thaler (1985).  The findings 
were not emphasized, however, since long-horizon price reversals were the focus of the paper. 
33 The passive approach would be similar to a buy-and-hold (excess) return, which combines the return for 
each stock multiplicatively, [(1+Rj,1)(1+Rj,2)…(1+Rj,n)], and subtracts the compounded market return, 
[(1+Rm,1)(1+Rm,2)…(1+Rm,n)]  (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
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months.  Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) analyzing the Finnish market, also demonstrate 
that positive feedback behaviour is correlated with investor performance, and that both 
the behaviour and performance appear to be associated with the level of sophistication of 
the investor, i.e, foreign investors (professionally managed funds or investment banking 
houses), pursue positive feedback strategies and achieve superior performance.  More 
importantly, after removing feedback investing’s contribution to performance, Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2000) find that the feedback-adjusted performance of foreigners is highly 
significant34.  Lakonishok et al. (1994) show how the positive feedback strategy of 
uninformed traders is directly associated with trend following and higher volatility.   
Finally, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that following a positive feedback strategy 
over the previous six months will generate returns of approximately 1% per month over 
the six subsequent months in US markets.   
  
2.14.5 Do positive feedbacks persist in long run? 
 
Following market under reaction and over reaction hypotheses, one could argue 
feedback trading to be successful over short-time periods (six to twelve months).  That’s 
because market participants who share a positive sentiment about an asset will continue 
to buy even when negative information starts to build up.  However, this negative 
information will eventually result in an over enthusiastic price revision, which does not 
take into account factors such as the probability that firms with bad results will turn 
themselves around, and that very few actually go out of business (Hilton, 2001).  Despite 
these arguments, however, positive feedbacks might persist in the long run. 
 
Firstly, every episode might look different to positive feedback traders, and so 
their learning from past mistakes might be limited.  Learning might be particularly 
restricted if each episode of divergence of price from fundamentals takes several years, as 
might have been the case with conglomerates and real estate investment trusts (Soros, 
                                                          
 
34 The feedback-adjusted return for a stock over say (t to t+x) is the stock’s actual return from t to t+120 
less the average of the x days (that begin on day t) of the alternative stock(s) in the feedback class portfolio 
to which the stock belongs on day t (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). 
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1987).  Alternatively stated, by the time the new bubble emerges, many investors have 
forgotten the old one or have been replaced by younger investors who have never 
experienced the old one at all.  Secondly, even if noise traders exit the market with losses 
now, they may save and return to the market later, especially if several years pass 
between bubbles.  Finally, if traders’ mistakes cause them to take positions that carry 
more market risk than rational investors’ positions, they can earn higher returns in the 
market even if they make judgment errors.  As such, positive feedback trading may well 
persevere in the long run (De Long et al., 1990).  However, Frankel and Froot (1988) find 
market participants expect recent price changes (short run) to trigger others in the same 
direction, while they also expect prices to return to their fundamental values in the long 
run.  Similarly, De Bondt and Thaler (1987), and De Long et al. (1990) find that extreme 
actions in prices of individual assets eventually revert, as long as part of these movements 
is accounted for by positive feedback trading.  
  
2.14.6 Robustness in positive feedbacks 
 
First, positive correlations of returns on a stock market index at short horizons can 
come in part from non-synchronous trading (De Long et al., 1990).  In this case, the 
positive serial correlation is a fabrication of the construction of the market index and not 
a fact about the prices at which trades in individual securities can be carried out.  
However, Cutler et al. (1990) find significant positive serial correlations at short horizons 
in bond, gold, and foreign exchange market, where non-trading problems are not likely to 
be serious.  
 
2.14.7 Feedback trading and herding 
 
Extant evidence suggests that individual investors’ herding is related to lag 
returns, i.e, individual investors feedback trade.  Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1991) 
demonstrate that flows into mutual funds are an increasing function of recent market 
performance.  Similarly, Sirri and Tufano (1998) present evidence that individual 
investors invest disproportionately in funds with strong prior performance.  Alternatively, 
 
 
52
consistent with the disposition effect, Odean (1998) support that individual investors are 
more likely to sell past winners than losers.  As for institutional investors, studies like 
Wermers (1999) and Lakonishok et al. (1992) present strong evidence that these investors 
engage in some positive feedback trading and also document a strong relation between 
mutual fund herding and quarterly returns, i.e., they herd and exhibit positive feedback 
trading. 
 
2.15 Hedging pressure effects 
 
Futures prices are acknowledged to diverge from expected future spot prices 
because of risk premia in futures markets.  The existence of a risk premium is 
fundamental in that it affects the transaction costs and benefits of hedging, including the 
benefits of including futures in a portfolio.  Important  research about how futures risk 
premia relates to systematic risk and hedging pressure can be found in Jagannathan 
(1985).  In fact, hedging pressure is derived from risks that parties, do not, or cannot, 
want to trade because of market frictions such as information asymmetries and 
transactions costs.  Using CFTC data for 20 futures markets, Roon et al. (2000) find own-
hedging and cross-hedging pressures variables from within the futures own group are 
crucial in explaining futures returns35.  Hirshleifer (1988) also shows that futures prices 
can be affected by hedging activity, containing a positive (negative) risk premium if 
hedgers are net short (long).  Changes in the degree of net long or short hedging activity 
should therefore result in a change in the level of the expected risk premium.  The total 
risk premium is the compensation expected by speculators for taking positions that offset 
hedgers’ excess supply or demand.  Empirical evidence found by Chang (1985) and 
Bessembinder (1992) also generally identify non-zero premia in futures prices. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
35 A rollover strategy is created for the return series.  For the nearest-to-maturity series a position is taken in 
the nearest-to-maturity contract until the delivery month, at which the position changes to the following 
contract, which then becomes the nearest-to-maturity contract. 
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2.15.1 Own hedging pressure variable and effect 
Positions of large traders in futures markets as reported by CFTC are used as 
proxies for hedging pressures. For each futures contract, Roon et al. (2000) create a 
variable that is based on reported positions of hedgers for each futures market as follows: 
 
         Number of short hedge positions – number of long hedge positions 
Qt =     ____________________________________________________                (2.1) 
              Total number of hedge positions 
 
Assuming that Qt is created from positions that by definition occur from hedge demand, it 
seems practical that this variable can be used as a proxy for the total non-marketable risks 
(Roon et al., 2000).  By regressing futures returns against the hedging pressure variable 
and adjusting for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, they find significant 
relation between futures return and their own hedging pressure.  Their results support 
Bessembinder (1992) who find that the average futures returns are considerably larger 
when hedgers are net short rather than when they are net long.  Insignificant hedging 
pressure effects are found for index futures.   
 
2.15.2 Cross hedging pressure variable and effect 
In order to analyse the effects of hedging pressure from other futures markets on 
the futures risk premia, Roon et al. (2000) study each group of futures contracts and 
analyse the effect of hedging pressure variables within each group on future returns.  
Cross-hedging pressure regression used is as follows36: 
       
Ri,t+1 (j) = iα  + iβ Rm,t+1 (j)  +  ∑
=
n
s
tsis Q
1
,,θ (j)   + ei,t+1 (j)                          (2.2)  
 
                                                          
 
36 Note that iβ Rm,t+1 (j)  (market risk) implements the S&P500index returns within the model for the Wald 
tests, but is initially omitted for the hedging pressure effects.  
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, where i refers to futures contract i in market j (financial, agricultural, etc) and m refers to 
S&P500 market returns.  The variables tsQ ,  are the n hedging pressure variables within 
the group. Therefore, is,θ measures how responsive the futures return is against hedging 
pressure variables within its own group.   
 
Using semi-monthly data, Roon et al. (2000) reveal that, except for the S&P500 
index futures and live cattle futures, for each contract at least one of the hedging 
pressures within the group resulted in an estimated coefficient is,θ that is significantly 
different from zero.  In addition, numerous contracts have significant coefficients for 
hedging pressures other than their own.  For instance, metal futures show coefficients that 
are notably different from zero for the silver and platinum hedging pressure variables.  
Similarly, the hedging pressure variable of Deutsch mark futures has a significant effect 
on all other currency futures, consistent with cross-hedging effects.  The Wald test 
hypothesis is,θ =0 being rejected, shows the relevance of own hedging pressures in 
explaining futures returns.   As for the hypothesis that only, own-hedging pressure is 
relevant, it was rejected at 5% significant level, implying the importance of cross-hedging 
pressures as well.   
 
2.15.2 Robustness of hedging pressure effects 
 
To test, the robustness of such hedging pressures, the price pressure hypothesis 
should be accounted for.  The price pressure hypothesis suggests that an increase in 
demand (supply) in the number futures contracts will result in an upward (downward) 
temporary change in the future price, and will in due course reverse out (Roon et al., 
2000).  As such, due to the reversal of the futures price change, an unexpected demand 
(supply) of futures contracts will be related with negative (positive) futures returns.  
Alternatively stated, while hedging pressure theory states that expected futures returns 
will be high whenever the level of hedging pressure is high, the price pressure hypothesis 
suggests that expected futures returns will be high, following a sizable increase in 
hedging pressure.  To show whether futures returns are affected by price and/or hedging 
pressures, a price pressure effects test is used in Roon et al. (2000), where the pressure 
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variables are divided by their own standard deviation.  Results reported in Roon et al. 
(2000) show significant hedging pressure effects, even after controlling for price 
pressure.   
 
2.16 Volatility, Error distribution and Forecasting 
2.16.1 Volatility 
 
There is a widespread perception in the financial press that volatility of asset 
returns has been changing (Maheu and Mccurdy, 2004).  The new economy is 
introducing more uncertainty. Indeed, it can be argued that volatility is being transferred 
from the economy at large into the financial markets, which bear the necessary 
adjustment shocks37. Market volatility as a whole has not become more volatile, but 
uncertainty on the level of individual firms has increased substantially over a 35-year 
period (Campbell et al. 2001). 
 
2.16.1.6 Volatility persistence 
Merton (1980) states: "However, from the work of Rosenberg (1972) as well as 
many others, the hypothesis that the variance rate on the market remains constant over 
any appreciable period of time can be rejected at almost any confidence level".   A 
number of papers (Haque et al., 2000; and Kim and Singal, 1999) examine the return-
volatility behavior of a number of emerging market economies.  Schwert (1989) shows 
weak evidence that macroeconomic volatility provides incremental information about 
future stock return volatility, and also that volatility is higher during recessions.  Roth et 
al. (2003) show a positive relation between volatility and open interest for both hedgers 
and speculators, suggesting that an increase in volatility motivates both hedgers and 
speculators to engage in more trading in futures markets.   
 
                                                          
 
37 “Coping with the market’s mood swings,” Financial Times, London, September 27, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
56
 Other previous studies in the finance literature suggest that investors may increase 
their participation in futures trading when volatility increases.  For instance, in Shalen’s 
(1993) noisy rational expectations model of a futures market, speculators determine the 
size of their trading position on futures contracts based on the dispersion of beliefs among 
traders about the equilibrium price of futures.  Shalen further suggests that the dispersion 
of expectations is closely related to volatility.  In addition, a higher volatility may induce 
investors to increase trading in futures because futures contracts constitute a convenient 
means to amend their investment positions (Chen, Cuny, and Haugen, 1995).  The Chen 
et al. model shows that when the stock market volatility increases, investors wishing to 
reduce risk exposure would sell stocks and stock index futures, thereby stimulating 
futures trading. The analyses of both Shalen and Chen et al. suggest that volatility is 
positively related with trading demand.  Easley and O’Hara (1987) argue that informed 
traders may choose to break up their trade such that they don’t trade quickly on 
information.  Chang, Chou, and Nelling (2000) also show that open interest of hedgers 
increases when volatility is higher.  Finally, Peck (1981) studies the role of speculation 
and price volatility and found that speculation is closely related to trading volume.  Even 
if the study of price volatility can be performed without reference to volume, as in 
Streeter and Tomek (1992), most often these two variables are linked together, as in 
Cornell (1981).  Finally, but not least, currency futures volatility seems to have a less-
persistent memory than commodity futures’ volatility (Crato and Ray, 2000). 
 
2.16.1.7 Information variables and volatility 
The literature also points to the importance of considering economic variables in 
addition to the information variables (Kenyon et al., 1987); and Goodwin & Schnepf, 
1998).  For e.g., Kenyon et al. (1987) find a direct relationship between the level of 
futures prices and price volatility. That is, as price increased, price volatility also tended 
to increase.  Streeter and Tomek (1992) supports that price level may be reflecting the 
effects of supply and demand on volatility.  Consequently, it may be difficult to ascertain 
the effects of supply and demand variables when the price level is included in a model of 
volatility.  A nonlinear relationship between price and volatility was shown by Hudson 
and Coble (1999).   Other economic variables have shown to be imperative to price 
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volatility.  For example, Goodwin and Schnepf (1998) find that variables such as private 
stocks, market concentration, and exports were significant determinants of price volatility 
in grains. 
  
2.16.1.8 Policy and volatility 
CFTC and exchanges regulatory policy has the potential to affect price volatility. For 
instance, some evidence from Ray et al. (1998) supports that movement toward more 
“market oriented” policy is expected to increase price volatility, whereas others like 
Collins and Glauber (1998) argue that this is not inevitably true.  For e.g., an important 
agricultural policy variable is the non-recourse or Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
loan rates.  Other thing being equal, the loan rate is expected to reduce volatility because 
it limits the downward movement in price.  Hudson and Coble (1999) reject the idea of 
heading towards more “market-oriented” policies.  This is in line with the idea of no real 
increase in volatility for cotton with the functioning of the FAIR 1996 Act as put forward 
in Ray et al. (1998).  In other words, the specification of the policy variable effects 
constraint the possibility of a broad conclusion about which policy components affect 
volatility.  For instance, certain components of policy such as acreage set asides have 
been shown to affect farm income volatility (Zulauf, 1998).  Predominantly in the most 
recent market-oriented market environment after the FAIR 1996 Act, six out of eight 
storable commodity futures markets provided both an unbiased forecast signal of cash 
prices.  This shows the economic significance of using futures markets to guide the 
production of storable commodities because it results in optimal resource allocation in the 
welfare sense (Stein, 1981) – more hedging since 1996. 
 
2.16.1.9 GARCH model 
Traditional time-series analysis makes the assumption that current price is a linear 
function of historical prices. In autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
models, price changes are assumed to be drawn independently from an identical normal 
distribution.  Yet, non-constant volatility of price leads to autocorrelation patterns in the 
conditional variance of price innovations where the variance is conditional on the 
information set available at the time forecasts are being formed. 
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Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model help explain conditional 
variance movements and capture part of the excess kurtosis in commodity prices 
(Bollerslev, 1986; Engle, 1982).  Yang and Brorsen (1992) examining daily cash prices 
of seven agricultural commodities, support the non-normality of daily returns.  Beck 
(2001) derives that Muth’s (1961) rational-expectations model of commodity markets 
implies an ARCH process in spot prices of storable commodities.  Her analysis of 19 
different commodity prices, using yearly data, finds significant ARCH processes for most 
storable commodity price series. 
 
In fact, Bollerslev (1986) extends the ARCH model by including past variances as 
well as past forecast errors.  Due to past variances, this model is referred to as generalized 
ARCH (GARCH).  A GARCH (1, 1) model is employed and expressed as: 
 
+= 02 ϕσ t 1ϕ 21−tξ   + 2ϕ 21−tσ + tε       (2.3)  
 
, where the restrictions 0ϕ >0 and 1ϕ  and 2ϕ ≥0 are imposed to insure a positive variance. 
Both ARCH and GARCH impose the restrictions on coefficients to ensure a positive 
variance.  An extra restriction is that both ARCH and GARCH models assume symmetry 
in the distribution of asset returns.  The GARCH model has the benefit of including 
heteroscedasticity into the estimation process.  All GARCH models are martingale 
difference implying that all expectations are unbiased (Bollerslev, 1986).  Moreover, the 
GARCH models allow the capture of volatility clustering in financial data.  Volatility 
clustering in stock returns implies that large (small) price changes follow large (small) 
price changes of either sign.  Also, conclusions regarding predictability of returns based 
on the significance of autocorrelation coefficients are valid only after controlling for the 
ARCH effects (Errunza et al., 1994).  Chou (1988) and Bollerslev, Chow and Kroner 
(1992) show that the persistence of shocks to volatility depends on the sum of the 
( 1ϕ + 2ϕ ) parameters. Values of the sum lower than one suggest the volatility response 
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tends to decay over time.  Otherwise, values of the sum equal (or greater) than one 
suggest indefinite (or increasing) volatility persistence to shocks over time.  Nonetheless, 
a significant impact of volatility on the stock prices can only occur if shocks to volatility 
persist over a long time (Poterba and Summers, 1986). 
 
Hardouvelis and Kim (1996) study the volatility of copper futures contracts as it 
relates to margin requirements. Chang, Chen, and Chen (1990) find copper, silver and 
platinum futures bear more risk (as measured by their standard deviations) than equity 
stocks.  After examining the volatility of copper futures prices, Bracker and Smith (1999) 
concludes that this volatility was more suitably modelled as a Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) process of time-varying volatility.  Urich (2000) 
presents hedging models in which spot and futures prices are cointegrated in their logs 
and return disturbances are GARCH.  Yang and Brorsen (1993) find GARCH effects in 
13 of the 15 futures markets studied.  Najand and Yung (1991) find that GARCH effects 
persist for Treasury bond futures.  Ragunathan and Peker (1997) produce similar results 
for Australian financial futures.   
 
2.16.1.10  Symmetry: an important assumption 
The assumption of symmetry, i.e, that all traders have the same starting variance 
of information, same cross covariance between signals and the same covariance between 
signals and true value is critical for the analysis (Foster and Viswanathan, 1996).  
Suominen (1996) and Karpoff (1988) suggest that the observed positive correlation 
between volume and returns in equity markets can be explained by the presence of 
differential costs in acquiring short and long positions.  As a result, one should not 
observe any asymmetry in futures markets since the costs of taking short and long 
positions in such markets are symmetric, which can be verified by calculating the 
contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the two variables (Karpoff, 1988).  
Furthermore, Kocagil and Shachmurove’s (1998) volume-return correlations support 
Karpoff’s (1988) hypothesis that the absence of trading cost asymmetry assures 
symmetric trading volume in futures markets like copper, corn, crude oil, gasoline, gold, 
heating oil, live cattle, orange juice, palladium, platinum, silver, soybeans, sugar (world), 
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wheat, S&P 500 index and Treasury bond.  Further, Merton (1995) argues generally that 
the introduction of futures trading and derivative markets can improve efficiency by 
reducing asymmetric responses to information38. Dadalt et al. (2002) also support the 
conjectures of Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) who argue that hedging reduces noise 
related to exogenous factors and hence decreases the level of asymmetric information.39  
Finally, large players are likely to have less asymmetric information due to higher 
institutional ownership and greater analysis (see Atiase, 1985)40. 
 
2.16.2 Error distribution 
 
Research on probability distributions often use changes in the logarithms of 
prices. The evidence is mixed on whether price changes are well approximated by the log 
normal distribution. For example, Hudson, Leuthold, and Sarassoro (1987) find that the 
log normal distribution is a good approximation for wheat, soybeans, and live cattle for 
daily prices for the years 1976 through 1982, but not if earlier years are included. 
Similarly, Hilliard and Reis (1999) observe on every price intraday change for soybeans 
for the period July 1990 to June 1992, and they conclude that the logarithmic changes are 
not distributed normally.  It is not infrequent that agricultural futures prices, like many 
other financial series are distributed nonnormally with the fat tails. (Yang and Brorsen, 
1993; and Hall, Brorsen, and Irwin, 1989) suggest that the distribution of commodity 
price changes is not normal, but is leptokurtic.  For six agricultural futures, Corazza et al. 
(1997) find returns are not log-normally distributed, due to fatter tails and instability in 
                                                          
 
38 Academics argue that asymmetries occur due to the effect of price falls on operating and financial 
leverage (see, for example, Nelson, 1991).  However, the extent to which these explanations can account 
fully for the observed asymmetric effect is debatable.  In particular, see Braun, Nelson, and Sunier (1991), 
who argue that these explanations are insufficient in explaining the extent of the observed asymmetries.  
Thus, the market dynamics argument may well explain, at least in part, the observed asymmetries in 
volatility. 
39 Brown (2001) provides further support of the asymmetric information mitigation hypothesis. In an 
examination of the risk practices of a large multinational, he reports that its hedging decisions are in part 
motivated by attempts to reduce informational asymmetries. 
40 Dadalt et al. (2002) examine the relationship between derivatives usage and information asymmetry 
using a structural model in which they simultaneously model derivatives usage as a function of information 
asymmetry and vice versa (see Graham and Rogers, 1999).  Coefficients on the asymmetric information 
variables were generally negative and statistically insignificant. 
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the variance level (accounting for the relatively many outliers).  Bera and Garcia (2002) 
and Manfredo et al. (1999) propose a t distribution after the normal distribution being left 
with excess kurtosis.  Similarly, Bailey and Myers (1991) use a conditional t distribution 
and find strong evidence of persistent shocks to the volatility.  Finally, Poitras (1990) 
conclude that more “normal” distributions are produced by increasing the differenced 
data interval from daily to weekly. 
  
An understanding of the probability distributions of futures prices is important to 
decision makers. First, optimal hedges in futures depend on the parameters of the 
underlying probability distributions, and the estimates of these parameters depend, in 
turn, on the analyst’s assumed model of the distribution (McNew and Fackler, 1994).   
Second, models of options prices make assumptions about the nature of the probability 
distribution of the underlying asset.  In the case of traded agricultural options, the 
underlying asset is a position in a futures contract (Tomek and Peterson, 2001).  In 
addition, these authors suggest that changes in volatility can pressure the margin level for 
futures contracts and hence influence the cost of hedging.  Moreover, one might expect 
that with normally distributed data the symmetric GARCH model would exhibit the 
lowest RMSE.  Bracker and Smith (1999) show that the GARCH model rank first 
compared to the asymmetric EGARCH, AGARCH, and GJR for some futures market. 
 
2.16.3 Forecasting 
  
 It is well known that successful hedging and speculative activities in futures 
markets depend critically on the ability to forecast price movements (Girma and 
Mougoue, 2002). The econometrics literature is full of studies comparing the forecasting 
ability of various time-series models.41  For instance, Poon and Granger (2003) list 39 
studies comparing the out-of-sample forecasting abilities of the GARCH (1, 1) model and 
the historical variance.  Factors influencing the supply and demand of inventories provide 
critical information towards making expectation about the value of the month price at 
                                                          
 
41 For an excellent review of existing studies in this area see Poon and Granger (2003).  Notable examples 
include Loudon et al. (2000) and Hansen and Lunde (2001). 
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maturity.   As time passes, new information comes, and both the price level and the price 
differences  can alter.  However, in an efficient market, truly new information is a 
surprise and is incorporated rapidly into price changes making arbitrage opportunities 
disappear quickly.  Indeed, most traders cannot profit from price forecasts if markets are 
efficient.  Put another way, econometric models in the public domain cannot outperform 
efficient futures markets as forecasts of the maturity price (Tomek, 1997).  Also, 
consistent with the existing volatility forecasting literature, Manfredo et al. (1999) 
confirm the difficulty in finding a “best” volatility forecasting method across different 
horizons and data intervals.  Yet, markets may not be strong form efficient, and some 
traders may profit by having better (private) data and models (Bessler and Brandt, 1992).  
Moreover, price-forecasting models can have statistical, but not economic significance, 
that is, returns from using the forecasts are less than transaction costs (Peterson, 2001).  
Overall, the literature suggests that no one particular method for forecasting the volatility 
of asset returns performs best over a wide array of data series and alternative forecast 
horizons.  The sensitivity of the forecasts and the forecastibility of volatilities to diverse 
techniques depend very much on the return series in question (Jackson, Maude and 
Perraudin, 1997).   
 
One issue addressed by Poon and Granger (2003) is whether volatility forecast 
errors are best measured in terms of the standard deviation or variance.  As they point 
out, when the RMSFE is measured in terms of the variance, a few outliers tend to 
dominate the results.  In addition, derivative prices are roughly proportional to the 
standard deviation.  Consequently, they define RMSFE in terms of the standard 
deviation, and find that the GARCH model puts too much weight on recent observations 
relative to those in the past.  This is consistent with prior evidence showing that asset 
market volatility has a long memory, such as Ding and Granger (1996).  They also make 
mention of the inability of other models to forecast very well out-of-sample due to the 
cost of added complexity underscoring the argument of Dimson and Marsh (1990). 
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2.17 Events Analysis 
 
For a proper event study, it is worthwhile to take a look at the following diagram, 
depicting all the important events in the US during the 1990s42.   
 
 
 
 
Sources: MSCI, Bloomberg Financial Markets and Citibank Analysis 
 
2.17.1 Success of 1990s 
 
 
In the late 1990s, many policymakers agreed that there have been fundamental 
changes in the US economy, of which remarkable economic performance has been the 
subject of so much analysis (for example see Baily, 2001; DeLong and Summers, 2001; 
Claussen and Staehr, 2001).  Food and energy prices were stable, the volatility of growth, 
unemployment, and inflation was stable and the  push for fiscal and monetary policies 
made interest rates more responsive to inflation than was the case in previous periods 
(Mankiw, 2001).  As Friedman said “…I'm baffled. I find it hard to believe..What I'm 
puzzled about is whether, and if so how, they suddenly learned how to regulate the 
                                                          
 
42 Adapted from Chafkin (2002). 
Table 3.1 
Major macroeconomic events during the period April 1991- April 2001 
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economy.  Does Alan Greenspan have an insight into movements in the economy and the 
shocks that other people don't have?…" (Taylor, 2001)  
 
 New Economy proponents argued that the use of new information and 
communication technology (ICT) has reformed the economy in important ways.  
Furthermore, many economies have become more integrated into the world economy 
with increased openness for trade and human capital (Mankiw, 2001).  Other forces were 
also at work including the earlier deregulation of key US industries, financial innovation 
and a more intense pressure of competition.  Up till 1999, the US stock market was just 
remarkable (Temple, 2002).  Price-earning ratios for the aggregate US market were at the 
highest levels ever observed in the Twentieth Century.  For example, the market value 
was a mere $7.4 trillion in January 1996, and the market value of publicly held company 
stock reached $17.5 trillion, in December 1999, hit a monthly peak in August of 2000 at 
$18.9 trillion, and had fallen to $15.5 trillion in April of 2001 (Baily, 2001).  Temple 
(2002) also suggests that the US experience is exceptional, and have used it to criticise 
the apparent lack of progress in other countries, particularly of Europe.  Governments 
outside the US are routinely blamed for presiding over sluggish economies that are 
overregulated and slow to innovate (Savag, 2004).  Other factors behind the success of 
1990s like stable food and energy price shocks, good performance of stock market, and 
macroeconomic policy can be found in found in Appendix 6.6. 
 
2.17.2 Events and volatility 
 
The way futures markets respond to important macroeconomic variables depends 
on how information in these variables change expectations of different parties.  This, in 
turn, depends on the historical experiences of parties and on the anticipated reactions of 
policy makers and thus, may vary across countries and across policymaking regimes 
(Hakkio and Pearce, 1985).  Some researchers concentrated their efforts into the 
investigation of the effects of news on various measures of volatility of asset returns.  
These include Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Hung (1997) who utilised option price 
implied volatilities for the US dollar exchange rates to look at the effet of news on 
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volatility.  Kim (1998) uses the GARCH methodology to analyse the news effects on the 
Australian dollar exchange rate volatility.  In general, these studies report an increase in 
volatility of asset returns in response to new information.  For instance, it has been found 
that the bond volatility significantly rose in response to the surprise component of each 
announcement suggesting that when the market is presented with new information 
relevant for bond pricing, there are elevated trading activities with the result of higher 
price volatility (Kim, 1999). 
 Turbulence in financial markets over recent years gave birth to many propositions 
to restructure the international financial system to improve stability (Eichengreen, 1999; 
and Kenen, 2000).  In fact, structural breaks have been identified for several futures 
contracts, implying that the volatility increase is in some cases due to upward shifts and 
not due to continuous changes (Menkhoff and Frommel, 2003).  They also show that 
volatility has been increasing until the introduction of Euro in January 1999.  Others like 
Flood and Rose (1999) demonstrate that exchange rate volatility can not be linked to 
changes in underlying fundamentals but rather to an influence by the regime in the sense 
that the float is related to higher volatility than the former Bretton Woods regime.  
Similarly, there is evidence in favour of the recent floating regime, indicating the 
usefulness of economic variables in explaining longer-term exchange rate movements 
(see Rogoff, 1996).  Cheung (2001) argues that macroeconomic announcements have a 
smaller impact on the gold market than on the Treasury bond or foreign exchange 
markets.  Patterson and Fung (2001) find that the Eurodollar, although influenced 
substantially by domestic US news, is an international asset that is traded globally.  Thus, 
price changes in the Eurodollar may more readily reflect both world news and changes in 
risk premiums among different Eurocurrency rates in the international financial market.  
Conversely, the 3-month US Treasury bill is a prima facie domestic asset that may be less 
affected by offshore information Patterson and Fung (2001).  While it is outside the scope 
of this study to look at all events of the last decade, an attempt is made with 8 
macroeconomic global events namely: 
• US tightening interest rates after a long period of easing in 1994-1995. 
• Mexico crisis in 1994 
• Asian Crisis in 1997-1998 
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• Emerging markets slump and recovery in 1995-1996 
• Temporary revival from Japanese Recession in 1994-1996. 
• Russian crisis of 1998 
• Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) near financial collapse in 1998 
• The introduction of the Euro Currency in early 1999. 
Details for each of these events can be found in Appendix 6.9 
 
 
2.18 Conclusion 
 
The emphasis of most empirical studies on the behaviour and performance of key 
market players has been to look at either some really specific groups of traders like floor 
merchants, CTOs, CTAs and hedge funds, or some groups based on their behavioural 
features like contrarians, positive feedback traders, noise traders and herds.  Very few 
studies have attempted to distinguish between the two key market players of the futures 
markets, namely large hedgers and large speculators.  There is scarce evidence of the 
trading determinants of these key market players: their reliance on variables like dividend 
yield, sentiment data, three-month Treasury bill, corporate yield spread, and most 
importantly net positions in determining their actual returns; the existence of their 
superior market timing ability as opposed to significant risk premium in futures markets; 
their destabilizing features in futures markets; the betterment of standard deviation or 
variance as a proxy of risk in explaining these players’ actual return and forecasting one- 
month return under different error distribution assumptions; the relationship between risk 
and return for these players; the relationship between trading activity and risk; and the 
effect of major macroeconomic events upon the behaviour and performance of these key 
players in the US futures industry.  By making use of the CFTC COT data and 
quantitative econometric models, this study fills in the gap in these areas to promote a 
better understanding of how the giants of the US futures industry behaved and performed 
during the Clinton era.   
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Chapter 3: 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the data and research methodology used in this study.  An 
overview of the CFTC in the futures markets is provided, followed by a brief introduction 
about the COT unique data reports and its usage by key market players.  This chapter 
then discusses the research objectives of this study, followed by the statement of 
problems and econometric steps taken to achieve these objectives.  For consistency and 
ease of readability, a data classification and coding page, together with some flowcharts, 
are presented in this chapter.   
 
3.2 Data 
 
An analysis of CFTC and its COT database is essential before moving to the 
statement of hypotheses. 
 
3.2.2 CFTC  
 
The mission of the CFTC is to protect public users and the market players from 
abusive practices and manipulation related to the sale of commodity and financial futures 
and options, and to promote competitive, open, and financially well structured futures 
and option markets.  The US Congress introduced the CFTC in 1974 as an independent 
organization with the endorsement to implement rules on commodity futures and option 
markets in the United States. The organization's mandate has been renewed and extended 
several times since then, most recently by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000 (CFMA).  Today, the CFTC ensures the proper functioning of the futures markets 
by enhancing their efficiency and competitiveness, building their integrity and protecting 
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market players through the clearing process.  Through effective management and control, 
the CFTC enables the futures markets to serve the important function of providing a 
means for price discovery and offsetting price risk43.  
 
3.2.2 COT  
 
The first COT report was in 1962, reporting only thirteen agricultural 
commodities.  However, it was declared as "another step forward in the policy of 
providing the public with current and basic data on futures market operations".  Those 
monthly reports were always published on the 11th or 12th calendar day of the following 
month.  However, in forthcoming years,  COT report was published more often, changing 
to mid-month and month-end in 1990 to weekly since October 199244.  The COT report is 
published quicker, i.e, on the 6th business day after the "as of" date (1990) and then to the 
3rd business day after the "as of" date (1992).  It includes more data on the number of 
traders in each category, a crop-year breakout,  concentration ratios (early 1970s) and 
data on option positions (1995). 
 
 Principally, COT reports provide defragmented data on each Tuesday's open 
interest for markets traders who hold positions equal to or above the reporting levels 
established by the CFTC.  The weekly reports for Futures-Only Commitments of Traders 
and for Futures-and-Options-Combined Commitments of Traders are released every 
Friday at 3:30 p.m. Eastern time.  Reports are accessible in both short and long formats.  
For reportable positions, further data are made available for commercial and non-
commercial holdings, spreading, changes from the previous report, percentage of open 
interest by category and numbers of traders.  The short report shows open interest 
individually by reportable and non-reportable positions.  In addition, the long reports also 
collection the data by crop year, where appropriate, and shows the focus of positions held 
                                                          
 
 
43 See http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftchome.htm 
44 See previous footnote to access more information on COT and CFTC. 
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by the largest four and eight traders.45  There are roughly 41 scholarly works that have 
used the COT data up to now (Haigh et al., 2005).   For this study, data from Pinnacle 
Data Corp., Webster, New York, which was extracted from CFTC magnetic tapes, was 
used. Since 10/16/1992, the CFTC has compiled the data weekly (as per market close on 
Tuesday) and releases two weekly reports on alternating Fridays.  Although COT is still 
only weekly data, its quality more than makes up for its quantity: it is the only source of 
the actual holding of these three key groups by having inside information on the trading 
activities of the "savvy Commercials", the "too shrewd Non-Commercials" and the 
"unsuspecting Small Traders".46 
 
3.2.2.1 Use of COT 
 
The NGFA (National Grain and Feed Association) provided to CFTC 2006 
Review Commission47 the most comprehensive list of traders who use the COT reports: 
“farm marketing advisors/brokers; commercial hedging advisors; FCMs, IBs, and CTAs; 
cash merchandiser/hedgers or similar decision makers, including end-users, exporters, 
processors, merchants; and OTC dealers or other trading desks.”  For instance, there may 
be situations when speculators are more likely to have an indication of the hedging 
imbalances.  First, extraordinary surges in the level of hedging imbalances will likely 
attract speculators. For instance, sudden increases of short hedgers in agricultural futures 
may be noticed early when there are harvest revisions, or later, in the trading pits.  
Second, several commodities pursue evident patterns of hedging imbalances.  For 
instance, coffee has historically had an excess of short hedgers over long hedgers, with 
some exceptions in 1984, and oats has had an excess of short hedgers since 1987 
(Chatrath et al., 1997).  For the purpose of this study, monthly net positions of 
commercials and non-commercials are used48.  Product specifications like reporting 
levels for each of the 29 futures markets are provided in Section 3.2.5. 
 
                                                          
 
45 See http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftccotreports.htm for more on COT data. 
46 See http://pinnacledata.com/cot.html for more on Pinnacle data. 
47 See http://cftc.gov/files/cftc/cftcnoticeonsupplementalcotreport.pdf for the CFTC 2006 review. 
48 See Section 2.12 for implications of choosing monthly data interval. 
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3.2.3 Sentiment Index 
 
The sentiment data used in the study is the Consensus bullish sentiment index 
provided by Investors Co-op & Consensus Inc49.  The exclusive Consensus Sentiment 
Index is the premium measure of positions and outlook of major professional brokerage 
firms and advisors as interpreted and recorded by Consensus Inc.  By drawing from a 
diversified mix of both brokerage house analysts and independent advisory services, 
Consensus ensures a strong and reliable system when compiling the index.  The data 
covers a wide range of ways players approach the market, including the fundamental, 
technical, and cyclical.  Consensus makes no attempt to distinguish among these 
approaches and considers only opinions which have been committed to publication and 
therefore have an influence on the trading public, and does not consider opinions which 
brokers or advisors may hold but do not disclose publicly.  The data has been published 
since May 1983, and is available through Consensus Research as early as 8:00 p.m. 
Central Time on Tuesdays.  These are matched with the net positions and return series in 
this study.      
3.2.4 Return Series and Information Variables 
Continuous series of futures returns is created for each market.  The return is measured as 
the percentage change in settlement prices of the contract with the nearest delivery date 
using a rollover strategy (Chatrath et al., 1999).   The use of sequential rollovers of short-
term futures hedges is helpful as it might serve as a long-term hedge (Gardner, 2001)50.  
Also, the Samuelson “maturity effect” hypothesis51 is avoided with rollover, in that the 
selected futures prices are not biased at the maturity dates.  For example, a position is 
taken in the nearest-to-maturity contract until the delivery month in which the position 
switches to the second-nearest contract.  To match the COT data, we construct a monthly 
return series, which is the holding period return over one-month interval (Tuesday–
                                                          
 
49 See http://www.consensus-inc.com/hotline.htm for more on the Consensus sentiment data.  
50 See also Roth et al. (2003). 
51 Samuelson (1976) argued that we would expect a negative relationship between maturity and futures 
price volatility, since a piece of information released when there is a long time to maturity will have little 
effect on futures prices, but the same information released just before maturity will have a large effect. 
 
 
71
Tuesday).52   Data on futures prices and information variables are sourced from 
Datastream53.   
 
 A sample of 29 actively traded US futures contracts over the May 1990–Dec 2000 
interval is chosen54.  The sample consists of four currencies (British pounds, Swiss 
francs, Canadian dollars, Japanese yen), three financials (Eurodollars, T-bonds, S&P500), 
sixteen agriculturals (soybean, soybean oil, soybean meal, pork bellies, hogs (frozen), 
cattle (live), feeder cattle, wheat—Chicago, wheat—Kansas, wheat—Minn (Minnesota), 
corn, sugar #1, cocoa, coffee, cotton, lumber), and six minerals (silver, gold, copper, 
platinum, crude oil, light sweet heating oil #2).55  The sample of markets chosen are from 
ten different US exchanges, thereby allowing for enough market characteristics and 
cross-sectional differences in the underlying assets. 
 
                                                          
 
52 In the same line as Wang (2003), return is measured as the percentage change in settlement prices of a 
futures contract over 4-week interval (see also Sorensen, 2002).  
53 Corporate bond yields are those from Lehman Brothers. (see Athanassakos and  Carayannopoulos, 2001)  
54 See section 1.1 for reasons behind choosing 1990–2000 data interval. 
55 For each futures product specification details, see section 3.2.5, Data classification and coding section. 
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3.2.5 Data Classification and Coding 
 
Symbol Market* Reporting levels (contracts)
Minerals
Silver SI CE 150
Gold GC CE 200
Copper HG CE 100
Platinum PL NYMEX 50
Crude Oil, light sweet CL NYMEX 350
Heating Oil #2 HO NYMEX 250
Financials
Eurodollars ED IMM 1000
T-bonds US CBOT 1000
S&P500 SP IMM 1000
Currencies
British Pounds BP IMM 400
Swiss Francs SF IMM 400
Canadian dollar CD IMM 400
Japanese Yen JY IMM 400
Agriculturals
Soybean S CBOT 500,000 bushels, 100 contracts
Soybean Oil BO CBOT 200
Soybean Meal SM CBOT 200
Porc Bellies, frozen PB CME 25
Hogs LH CMM 100
Cattle (live) LC CME 100
Feeder cattle FC CME 50
Wheat - Chicago W CBOT 500,000 bushels, 100 contracts
Wheat - Kansas KW KCBOT 500,000 bushels, 100 contracts
Wheat - Minn MW MGE 500,000 bushels, 100 contracts
Corn C CBOT 750,000 bushels, 150 contracts
Sugar #1 SB CSCE 400
Cocoa CC CSCE 50
Coffee KC CSCE 100
*CE Commodity Exchange Inc.
NYMEX New York Mercantile Exchange
IMM International Money Market
CBOT Chicago Board of Trade
CME Chicago Mercantile Exchange
CMM Chicago Mercantile Market
KCBOT Kansas City Board of Trade
MGE Minn. Grain Exchange
CSCE Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange
NYCE New York Cotton Exchange
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3.3.1 Primary Objectives 
 
The research objectives concentrate on providing contribution to three particular 
areas related to the behaviour and performance of large hedgers and large speculators in 
29 US Futures markets.  The first area of concentration relates to the behaviour section 
(see graph 3.1).  In particular, behavioural models are tested for positive 
feedback/contrarian behaviour, market timing abilitiy, existence of risk premium, 
destabilizing features of large players over futures prices and the need to reconsider 
CFTC’s regulation. 
 
The second part of the study looks at the performance theme and event analysis 
theme (see graph 3.1).  In particular, performance is related to the effect of expected and 
unexpected components of variables like net positions on return and volatility of large 
speculators and hedgers; and the suitability of standard deviation and/or variance in 
explaining actual returns.  The ability of standard deviation or variance in forecasting 
one-month return under different error distribution assumptions, and the suitability of 
idiosyncratic volatility as an accurate proxy of risk in forecasting one- month return 
under different error distribution assumptions also form the basis for the performance 
section.  In regards to the event analysis theme (see graph 3.1), the use of recursive 
estimates over the trading determinant model, the mean return model, the return and risk 
relationship model, and trading activity and volatility relationship model are looked at.  
The effect of eight major macroeconomic events of the 1990s is tested for structural 
breaks in these models. Structural breaks are potentially important in the events section 
due to the fact that there is huge evidence documenting the instability of many important 
relationships among economic variables.56  The use of a ten-year period regression helps 
in asserting the long-run properties of these models, and whether large hedgers and large 
speculators continue to exhibit stable relationships between independent and dependent 
variables of the models in this study.   
 
                                                          
 
56 For instance, Stock and Watson (1996) suggest that the laws of motion governing the evolution of many 
important macroeconomic time series appear to be unstable.  See also Frommel and Menkhoff (2003). 
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 For the purpose of this study, econometric software Eviews 5.0 is used to conduct 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions such as trading determinant model, market 
timing test, hedging pressure tests and mean equation models; GARCH and PARCH 
volatility models under Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models; 
ARMA model specification and diagnostic tests for variables and models; stability tests 
(recursive estimates), static in-sample performance evaluation and out-of-sample 
forecasting.  Specification details of each test used can be found in the Appendix.  All 
results are reported 10% significance level except for the initial unit root reported at 1%, 
5% and 10% level.  Throughout Chapter 4 and appendices, only significant t ratios are 
shown due to high number of markets being analysed. 
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3.3.2 Statement of Hypotheses: 
 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Large speculators exhibit contrarian behaviour, and large hedgers 
exhibit positive feedback trading. 
 
As stated in Chapter 2 (section 2.13 and 2.14), there have been numerous studies 
regarding positive feedback and contrarian behaviour trading in equity markets.  Very 
few studies like Brorsen and Irwin (1987), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Wang 
(2003) looked at behaviour over futures markets.  While the first two studies find 
significant positive feedback trading in managed futures trading (where speculators are 
predominant), Wang (2003) find hedgers (speculators) to exhibit positive feedback 
(contrarian hehaviour) trading in 15 futures markets.  Hedgers would normally be 
expected to be contrarians, due to the presence of hedging pressure effects, which 
necessitates a negative relationship between net position and subsequent returns.  This 
hypothesis, fills in the gap by adopting Wang (2003) trading determinant model over 29 
futures markets.  If the changes in net positions of one trader type (at time t+1) is 
negatively related to returns (at time t), this would suggest that the trader is pursuing a 
contrarian strategy.  If the changes in net positions of one trader type (at time t+1) is 
positively related to returns (at time t), this would suggest the trader is pursuing a positive 
feedback strategy.  Sentiment index and information variables are also included to test for 
their significance in each player’s trading determinant behaviour. 
 
H0: There is no significant contrarian (positive feedback trading) behaviour for 
speculators (hedgers). 
 
H1: There is significant contrarian (positive feedback trading) behaviour for 
speculators (hedgers) and/or there is significant contrarian (positive feedback 
trading) behaviour for hedgers (speculators). 
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Methodology: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of the following trading 
determinant model.  Check for sign and significance of 2ϕ  to determine contrarian or 
positive feedback behaviour. 
 
1+Δ tNP  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ tSI + 2ϕ tR + 3ϕ tyield Tbill + 4ϕ tAAA-BAA + 5ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ    (3.1) 
    
Δ 1+tNP  is the change in net positions of large speculators in month t+1.  A net position 
is defined as the long position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 
contracts.  Δ tSI  denotes the change in the Consensus index in month t. tR  is the futures 
return in month t, in percent.  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, Divyieldt are the three information 
variables included in the model.   
 
Hypothesis 2:  Large speculators have superior market timing ability compared to 
large hedgers in judging correctly the direction of the market. 
 
Backed by Wang (2003) behaviour models who find speculators outperform 
hedgers and Keynes (1930) theory of normal backwardation, this second assumption is 
critical in that it shows whether large speculators have superior market timing ability than 
large hedgers.  Due to the fact that hedgers are motivated essentially in taking positions to 
insure their business , and that speculators are essentially in the market to take risk and 
get a higher return, their different motives would guide them towards different market 
timing abilities.  More importantly, there is huge debate that hedgers pay a premium to 
speculators like suggested in Keynes’s (1930) theory of normal backwardation, where 
two important assumptions are made - hedgers are net short, and speculators do not have 
forecasting ability.  While it could be found that hedgers are mostly net short, the second 
assumption about large speculators having no forecasting or market timing ability is yet 
to be tested in this study to support the existence of risk premium in the futures markets.  
This hypothesis fills the gap by using Wang (2003) market timing ability test, for 
comparison purposes, over 29 futures markets.  If the changes in net positions of one 
trader type (at time t) is negatively related to the futures returns (at time t+1), this would 
suggest that the trader has incorrectly judged the direction of the market and is getting 
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negative returns in the next period (t+1).  However, if the changes in net positions of one 
trader type (at time t) is positively related to the futures returns (at time t+1), this would 
suggest that the trader has correctly judged the market direction and is getting positive 
returns in period t+1.  Large speculators and large hedgers can both possibly also 
correctly judge the market direction, showing that these players are informed players.  
The purpose of this hypothesis is to find support for the existence of risk premium, where 
following Keynes (1930) theory of normal backwardation, large speculators would be 
generally net long and would not be expected to have good market timing ability.  
Information variables are implemented to know if hedgers and speculators have good 
market timing abilities, after controlling for priced risk factors. 
 
H0: There is no significant market timing ability of large speculators and/or large 
hedgers in the futures markets. 
 
H1: There is significant positive (negative) market timing ability of large speculators 
and/or large hedgers in the futures markets. 
 
Methodology: Perform OLS regression of the following regression.  Check for positive 
sign and significance of 1ϕ  to determine superior market timing ability and vice versa. 
 
1+tR  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ itNP + 2ϕ tyield Tbill + 3ϕ tAAA-BAA + 4ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ     (3.2) 
 
1+tR  is the futures return in one month time, in percent.  Δ itNP is the change in net 
positions of large hedgers and large speculators in the current month.  A net position is 
defined as the long position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 
contracts.  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, Divyieldt are the three information variables included 
in the model.   
 
Hypothesis 3:  Significant own-hedging pressure and cross-hedging pressure effects 
exist in the futures markets. 
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Important studies reveal that findings regarding outperformance of hedgers or 
speculators over each other is mixed.  While, Hartzmark (1997) find hedgers to earn 
consistent profits in several futures markets, Wang (2001) find speculators to outperform 
hedgers in six agricultural futures markets.  Others like Roon et al (2000) (see section 
2.15), support that futures markets have significant own- and/or cross-hedging pressure 
effects within certain groups of commodities like agriculturals and minerals, such that 
any outperformance can be explained by hedging pressure theories rather than market 
timing abilities.  This hypothesis, backed by the previous one, supports the existence of 
risk being transferred from large hedgers to large speculators in the US futures markets.  
Significant own- and cross- hedging pressure effects are expected in the agricultural 
group, particularly where hedgers are mostly net short. 
  
H0: There is no significant own- and/or cross-hedging pressure effect(s) in the 
futures markets. 
 
H1: There is significant own- and/or cross-hedging pressure effect(s) in the futures 
markets. 
 
Methodology:  
 
1. Calculate own-hedging pressure variable (λ) as follows:  
 
             Number of short hedge positions – number of long hedge positions 
λt =     ______________________________________________                (3.3) 
               Total number of hedge positions 
 
 
2. For own-hedging pressure test, perform the following OLS regression and check 
for sign and significance of 1ϕ  to determine existence of risk premium in own 
futures markets. 
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1+tR  =  0ϕ  + 1ϕ  λt + 1+tξ        (3.4) 
 
3. For cross-hedging pressure test, perform the following OLS regression and check 
for sign and significance of 1ϕ  to determine existence of risk premium spilling 
from other futures markets. 
 
)(
1,
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tiR +  =  
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0
jϕ  +     ∑
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n 1
ϕ i, n (j) λ n, t (j)      +   )( 1jt+ξ         (3.5) 
 
 where i (i = 1, 2, 3K, n) refers to the futures market and j (j=1,..,4) refers to the 
specific group the futures market belong to.  ∑
=
N
n 1
ϕ  represent the coefficients of own- 
and cross-hedging pressure variables for each futures market within each of the four 
groups.  For comparison with Roon et al (2000), the 29 futures markets are grouped 
into four groups as financials, currencies, minerals, and agriculturals. 
 
4. For price-pressure test, perform the following OLS regression and check for sign 
and significance of 1ϕ  and 2ϕ to determine the existence of risk premium in futures 
markets, after accounting for price pressures effects on returns.  
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where: λ ti,  is the own-hedging pressure variable, θΔ ti ,  is the change in hedging 
pressure variable (price pressure), )( ,tiθσ  is the standard deviation of own-hedging 
pressure variable, and )( ,tiθσ Δ  is the standard deviation of change in hedging 
pressure variable. 
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Hypothesis 4:  The large speculators and/or large hedgers are destabilizing the 
futures markets. 
 
This hypothesis shows whether large speculators and/or large hedgers have a 
destabilizing force over the futures markets.  As supported in Chapter 2 (sections 2.5 and 
2.8), large speculators have in some cases been heavily regulated due to their 
destabilizing nature in markets.  On the other hand, large hedgers have not been imposed 
with strict regulations like position limits and higher margin requirements.  Based on the 
results from hypothesis 1 and 2, if one trader type exhibits positive feedback trading, 
together with negative performance in judging the market direction, this would suggest 
that the trader is moving away prices from their fundamentals, i.e. they are destabilizing 
the futures market, and vice versa. 
 
H0: There is no significant positive feedback trading and negative performance of 
large speculators and/or large hedgers. 
 
H1: There is significant positive feedback trading and negative performance of large 
speculators and/or large hedgers. 
 
Methodology:  
1. Check both for the significant positive feedback behaviour from hypothesis 1, and 
negative market timing abilities from hypothesis 2.  The existence of both 
simultaneously suggests destabilizing features of hedgers or speculators in futures 
markets. 
 
2. This can be further supported with the two following tests: 
 
(i) Firstly, with the decomposition of volatility into expected and unexpected 
volatility. Before proceeding further, there is a need of a volatility measure.  
In line with Lopez (2001), it can shown 
2
tξ  is an unbiased estimator of 2tσ  
as follows: 
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tR = μ t + tξ ,   tξ  = tt zσ ,  tz ~ N(0,1)      (3.7) 
, where the conditional mean μ t  = E [ ]1| −ΩttR  
, 1−Ωt is the information set available at time t-1, 
, tξ  is the innovation term, 
, tσ is its conditional variance, 
 
    
2
tξ  = E [ ]12 | −Ωttξ   
= 
2
tσ .E [ ]12 | −Ωttz   
 = 
2
tσ       
 
Then, volatility is decomposed using ARMA model specification, where it is ensured that 
there are no autocorrelation in the individual time series57.  Perform the following OLS 
regression and check for sign and significance of 1ϕ  and 2ϕ . 
 
+= 02 ϕσ t 1ϕ  Exp  2tσ + exp2Unϕ  2tσ + tε      (3.8) 
 
The decomposition of volatility into expected and unexpected volatility allows for 
determining how much expected volatility contributed to the volatility measure.  For 
instance, if hedgers expected volatility is higher, this would support NYMEX (2005) and 
Haigh et al (2005) that their trading activity is volatile, and would further warrant a need 
to recheck such large players position limits in terms of regulation in the futures markets.   
 
(ii) Secondly, with the effect of expected and unexpected volatility on futures returns.   
                                                          
 
57  This is done by checking for autocorrelation properties of ARMA model, by using correlograms (AC, 
PAC, Ljung-Box Q-statistics).  If autocorrelations have a seasonal pattern, include SAR (Seasonal 
Autoregressive) and SMA (Seasonal Moving Average) terms.  Choose appropriate number of lags (up to 10 
lags) in the ARMA model by using Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria.  The whole procedure is 
repeated using different terms and number of lags until series is free of autocorrelation. 
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Perform the following OLS regression of risk/return using expected and unexpected 
volatility as independent variables and futures returns as dependent variable, and check 
for sign and significance of 1ϕ  and 2ϕ . 
 
+= 0ϕtR 1ϕ  Exp  2tσ + exp2Unϕ  2tσ  + tε      (3.9) 
Hedgers’ expected volatility would be expected to be negative or insignificant, since they 
are in the market with a view of minimizing risk as laid out in Hoffman (1932).  Any 
finding or a positive and significant expected risk coefficient in determining returns 
would add further support of a need to recheck regulation for specific players in specific 
futures markets.  The link between expected return and volatility has implications for the 
relation between hedging demand and volatility.  With a higher expected volatility at the 
start of the month, hedgers are expected to adjust their portfolios accordingly.  A rise in 
unexpected volatility, however, may cause hedgers to raise their future expectations in 
estimates of expected volatility, and hence increase the demand for hedging.  That’s why, 
one might expect the relation between return and expected volatility to be weaker than for 
unexpected volatility. 
 
PERFORMANCE  
 
Hypothesis 5:  There is some significant expected component for variables like 
hedgers’ and speculators’ net positions, sentiment and information variables in 
explaining returns and idiosyncratic volatility.   
 
Many studies analysed the relation between extent of futures participation and 
price volatility.  For instance, Chang et al (2000) find no strong relationship between 
open interest, expected and unexpected volatility.  Others like Ward (1974) and Peck 
(1981) find a negative relation between the degree of market participation (open interest) 
by speculators and volatility.  Despite the potential link between returns, volatility and 
speculation, much less attention has been given to how volatility and returns depend on 
the expected (ex ante) value of independent variables such as net position, sentiment and 
information variables.  This hypothesis also fills the gap where market participation is 
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proxied by net positions for the first time, and not by open interest or volume as used 
extensively in previous literature (see Karpoff (1987) for a review).    
 
Following French, Schwert and Stamburgh (1987) work on decomposing market 
volatility variables into expected and unexpected components, the aim of this hypothesis 
is to determine, using ARMA specifications, how each each decomposed variable affect 
the return and volatility of hedgers and speculators.  Alternatively stated, the purpose in 
doing so is to assess whether traders’ reactions to returns or volatility depend upon the 
predictability of variables they use.  If there are relatively more significant expected 
components of variables in determining hedgers’ or speculators’ returns, this suggests the 
specific player is more reliant upon expected values of variables in determining their 
returns.  Alternatively stated, the expected component of a variable reflect the value of 
that variable as of the beginning of the trading month, where as the unexpected 
component captures unanticipated changes during the month.  For instance, with a higher 
expected net position at the start of the month, hedgers would readjust their portfolios 
accordingly.  However, a rise in unexpected net position may cause the large players to 
increase their future expectations in estimates of expected net positions, and hence 
increasing their future returns.  This is supported in Chang et al (2000) who find the 
expected open interest is less than unexpected open interest, such that hedgers respond 
more to surprises in open interest and open they can predict.  That’s why, one might also 
expect the relation between return and expected net positions to be weaker than for 
unexpected positions.  Further, the decomposition of net positions against volatility can 
also help to justify whether there is a positive relationship between trading demand and 
volatility as supported in Karpoff (1987).  The decomposition of information variables 
would add further support in testing whether large players in US futures markets use 
these priced risk factors in determining their returns, and also whether they affect current 
volatility levels.    
 
H0: There is no significant expected and/or unexpected component of each variable 
determining the returns and risk of each trader type.  
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H1: There is a significant expected and/or unexpected component of each variable 
determining the returns and risk of each trader type.  
 
Methodology:  
1. Check for stationarity of each individual time series. 
2. Check for autocorrelation properties of ARMA model, by using correlograms 
(AC, PAC, Ljung-Box Q-statistics).  If autocorrelations have a seasonal pattern, 
include SAR (Seasonal Autoregressive) and SMA (Seasonal Moving Average) 
terms.  Choose appropriate number of lags (up to 10 lags) in the ARMA model by 
using Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria.   
3. Check for no autocorrelation in the individual time series using Q-statistics and 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test.  Otherwise repeat step 2 using different terms and 
number of lags until series is free of autocorrelation.   
4. Carry an ARCH LM test to ensure equations below are uncorrelated with past 
residuals and efficient 
5. Perform the following OLS regressions of mean equation and idiosyncratic 
volatility equation, using decomposed components of sentiment, net 
positions,information variables, and a lagged hedging pressure variable to control 
for hedging pressure effect. 
 
Mean equation 
tR = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP  
 + 5ϕ HPt-1 + 6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ  Unexp tyield Tbill  
+ 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA  
+ 10ϕ Exp tDivyield + 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield + tξ      (3.10) 
 
Volatility equation 
 
2
tσ = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP  
 + 5ϕ HPt-1 + 6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ  Unexp tyield Tbill  
+ 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA  
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+ 10ϕ Exp tDivyield + 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield + tξ     (3.11) 
 
6. Repeat step 2 for mean equation and also. 
7. Check for sign and significance of expected and unexpected components ( 1ϕ - 11ϕ ) 
 
Hypothesis 6:  The GARCH and/or PARCH volatility models accurately reflect(s) 
the volatility in determining actual returns for each player. 
 
Following Engle (1982), the innovation in the mean, tξ , of the monthly close-to-
close futures prices of the most active contracts, is assumed to be serially uncorrelated 
with mean zero, hence justifying the use of ARCH processes such as GARCH and 
PARCH.  Instead of using models where the variance of tomorrow’s return is an equally 
weighted average of the squared residuals from the last month, the GARCH and PARCH 
models allow the weights to be self-determined.  Finally but not least, commodity price 
volatility is known to have a time-varying pattern as documented in Yang and Brorsen 
(1993).  In markets, where speculators trade actively, prices are subject to lots of 
speculative trades, which increases the volatility in prices.  Consequently, this leads to 
more speculation and hence even more volatility.  This is why time-varying volatility 
models, particularly ARCH, are widely used to model the behaviour of commodity prices 
(Beck, 2001).   
 
While, the GARCH model is well documented in existing literature (see section 
2.16.1.9), the PARCH model is less commonly used.  If any series is normally 
distributed, one can characterize its distribution by its first two moments or the common 
use of a squared term (Mckenzie et al 2001).  Hence the use of variance models.  
However, for non-normal error distribution, the use of a squared term is less appropriate.  
The same authors suggest that by imposing such a structure on the data, it may drastically 
lead to sub-optimal models.  Introduced by Ding et al (1993), the PARCH model, allows 
the optimal power term to be estimated rather than imposed.  See Brooks et al (2000) and 
Ding et al (1993) for a review of PARCH models.  Denoting one to the power of term 
result in a standard deviation based volatility model. 
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This purpose of this hypothesis is to be the first to contribute as to whether the 
variance measure (GARCH) or the standard deviation measure (PARCH) more 
accurately reflects the risk of each trader type.  Following empirical support of the 
extensive usage of ARCH (particularly GARCH models) and non-constant variance (see 
section 2.16.1.9), this study makes use of GARCH (variance based) and PARCH 
(standard deviation based) volatility models to reduce the gap in better understanding the 
risk of each trader type.  The GARCH model will show how lagged volatility and news 
of volatility from the previous period impact on current players’ volatility.  This provides 
the possibility to check for persistence of volatility to shocks for hedgers and speculators 
during the last decade.  The difference between conditional standard deviation (PARCH) 
and conditional variance (GARCH) models shows which model captures more significant 
negative variables like lagged volatility and news of volatility from the previous period.  
This hypothesis is complemented with the robust check of the in-sample model 
performance of hypothesis 8. 
 
H0: The ‘variance’ (GARCH model) and/or the ‘standard deviation’ (PARCH 
model) are indifferent in measuring the risk of each trader, in determining actual 
returns. 
 
H1:  The ‘variance’ (GARCH model) or the ‘standard deviation’ (PARCH model) is 
a better measure of the risk of each trader, in determining actual returns. 
 
Methodology:  
  
1. Set up of mean equation as follows: 
 
tR = 0ϕ + 1ϕ tSI + 2ϕ tNP + 3ϕ HPt-1+ 4ϕ tyield Tbill  
              + 5ϕ tAAA-BAA + 6ϕ tDivyield + tξ      (3.12) 
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where tR is the monthly returns, tSI is the sentiment index, HPt-1 is the hedging pressure 
effect variable; tyield Tbill , tAAA-BAA , tDivyield are the three information variables.  
Note that Gannon (1996) and McKenzie (1999) find the mean model specification has 
little impact on the ARCH models estimated in both discrete and continuous time. 
 
2. OLS regression of the GARCH and PARCH volatility equations as follows: 
 
GARCH volatility equation 
 
+= 02 ϕσ t 1ϕ 21−tξ   + 2ϕ 21−tσ + tε       (3.13) 
 
PARCH volatility equation 
δσ t  = 0ϕ    +   ∑= −− −
p
i
ititi i
1
)( δξγξϕ   +  δσϕ jt
q
j
j −=
∑
1
 + tε    (3.14) 
where: δ>0, γ i 1≤  for i = 1,K,  r, and γ i  = 0 for all i > r, r ≤  p. 
 
 
Substituting δ=1, i=j=1 and γ i  = 0 in equation 4.14.1, results in a symmetrical PARCH 
model as follows: 
 
tσ = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ 1−tξ   + 2ϕ 1−tσ + tε       (3.15) 
 
Note that if δ=2, and γ i  = 0 for all i, the PARCH model is simply a standard GARCH 
specification. 
 
3. Ensure both volatility models are white noise by calculating the correlograms of 
squared residuals and probability (observed r-squared) from an ARCH LM test. 
4. Check for sign and significance of 1ϕ  and 2ϕ in volatility equations to determine 
the effect of lagged volatility and news about volatility from the previous period. 
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5.  Check for sum of 1ϕ  and 2ϕ in volatility equations to determine persistence of 
shocks in specific markets. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  The error distribution of each trader type is tested in reference to 
whether they are normally distributed. 
 
Based on the previous hypothesis, it has been assumed that the series are normally 
distributed.  While it might work well with the GARCH model where second moments or 
squared terms are used, the PARCH model might not be the best optimal model where 
the series are not normally distributed (see McKenzie et al, 2001 for example).  Also, if 
the error term in the mean equation mostly contains outliers, the Gaussian normal 
distribution is inappropriate.  To deal with such leptokurtosis, the model(s) can be 
estimated, assuming conditional errors are drawn from a conditional t-distribution 
(Bollerslev, 1987).   
 
The purpose of this hypothesis is to check the error distribution of the GARCH 
and PARCH models used.  Based on the assumption that the mean equation and the 
variance equation have been arrived at, the Jacques-Bera normality test is critical in 
knowing which error distribution the series tends to follow.  Earlier empirical support 
from section 2.16.2 showed that most agricultural and metals display right skewness and 
excess kurtosis under normal distribution.  Testing normality of the PARCH and GARCH 
models, under t distribution, is a first one assessed under this hypothesis.  Due to the 
PARCH model being based on standard deviation rather than variance, it is expected the 
PARCH model to exhibit more skewness due to more outliers.  A PARCH model, under 
a t distribution, would be expected to exhibit less skewness since the t-distribution would 
lead to smaller conditional errors as explained in Bollerslev (1987).  A lower kurtosis is 
expected particularly where for hedgers since hedgers are in the market to reduce risk and 
speculators to bear that risk as supported by hedging and speculators theories in section 
2.4 and 2.5. 
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H0: The distribution of each commodity for each trader type departs from 
normality. 
 
H1: The distribution of each commodity for each trader type is normally distributed. 
 
Methodology: Perform normality test for GARCH and PARCH models, under both 
normal and t distribution, using Jarque-Bera statistics, skewness and kurtosis measures. 
 
Hypothesis 8:  The models used (GARCH / PARCH) have good forecasting abilities 
for each trader type. 
 
 Following massive support from literature reviews like Poon and Granger (2003) 
(see section 2.16.3), this hypothesis carries weight in that it is the first one where the 
forecasting abilities of the GARCH and PARCH models are assessed.  Forecast 
evaluation and model performance tools commonly used in empirical support include 
bias proportions, covariance proportions, Theil inequality and root squared mean error 
(RMSE).  All these are tested to reveal whether the GARCH or PARCH model is better 
specified in explaining actual returns.  Out-of-sample forecasting for one month return is 
also tested for each model using graphical representations.  The out-of-sample forecasting 
helps not only to find which volatility model(s) accurately predict one-month return, but 
whether idiosyncratic volatility can accurately serve as a proxy to volatility in matching 
the volatility in one month’s time.   
 
 
H0: The GARCH and/ or PARCH model are indifferent in predicting the 
performance of each trader type. 
 
H1: The GARCH or the PARCH model better predicts the performance of each 
trader type. 
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Methodology: 
1. Perform in-sample model evaluation using Theil inequality test, proportions (bias, 
variance and covariance) and RMSE. 
2. Carry out-of-sample forecasting with graphical representation of one-month 
forecast return from GARCH and PARCH models against actual returns. 
3. Include 95% confidence intervals to ensure actual returns are within range of 
forecasted returns. 
4. Check for accuracy of idiosyncratic volatility in forecasting one-month return 
with graphical representation of actual volatility (from GARCH and PARCH 
model) against idiosyncratic volatility. 
 
Hypothesis 9:  The large hedgers/large speculators changed their behaviour and 
performance during specific events in the 1990s. 
 
This final hypothesis relates to both an event and stability analysis of whether 
large hedgers and/or large speculators changed their behaviour and performance during 
specific events in the 1990s, or if they were indifferent to these events.  The purpose of 
this hypothesis also add further support to earlier hypotheses in regards to how large 
hedgers or speculators change their future trading positions based actual returns, how 
their returns are affected by net positions, how the risk and return relationship varies over 
time, and what relationship exist between trading activity and volatility.  All these models 
are tested before and after important global events.  Hence the use of an event and 
stability test.   
 
The Fed easing interest rates in the early 1990s, the Mexico crisis, the Japanese 
crisis, the temporary slump of emerging markets in the mid-1990s, the Asian crisis, the 
Russian crisis and Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) are chosen as events in that 
they are international in nature with different backgrounds, making the analysis a more 
comparable and distinct one.  The trading determinant model, mean equation model, and 
return/risk relationship model are tested for stability and structural breaks.  A fourth 
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model and last model within this hypothesis tests the relationship between net positions 
and volatility, where volatility is proxied as standard deviation and variance. 
 
H0: Large hedgers and/or large speculators did not significantly change their 
behaviour and performance during one or more of the events of the 1990s. 
 
H1: Large hedgers and/or large speculators significantly changed their behaviour 
and performance during one or more of the events of the 1990s. 
 
Methodology: 
 
1. Recursive estimates regression of the trading determinant model, mean equation 
model, risk and return relationship model, and trading activity and volatility 
model as follows: 
 
Trading determinant model 
Δ 1+tNP  =  0ϕ  + 1ϕ  tR + tξ         (3.16)  
 
Mean equation model 
tR  =  0ϕ  + 1ϕ tNP + tξ         (3.17)  
  
Risk and return relationship model 
+= 0ϕtR 1ϕ tσ + tε         (3.18) 
+= 0ϕtR 1ϕ 2tσ + tε         (3.19) 
 
Trading activity and volatility model 
tNP = 0ϕ + 1ϕ tσ + tε         (3.20) 
tNP = 0ϕ + 1ϕ 2tσ + tε         (3.21) 
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where:  Δ 1+tNP  is the change in net positions in one month time, tR is the actual monthly 
returns, tNP is the actual net positions, tσ is the standard deviation based on the 
PARCH volatility model, and 2tσ is the variance based on the GARCH volatility model. 
Other variables such as sentiment index and information variables are excluded due to the 
small sample size of some events and non-significant effect of some variables in as found 
in earlier hypotheses (see Gurrib, 2008).   
 
2. Check for sign and significance of 1ϕ  in each model over whole sample period to 
determine significance of independent variable, hence stability, in the long run. 
3. Check for structural breaks in each model.  Match any structural break with one 
of the eight macroeconomic events.  Check for significance of break before and 
after event to determine if event has affected recursive estimates of model. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter starts by laying out details about the uniqueness and broad use of the 
COT data, some features of the CFTC as a regulatory body in the US, the sentiment index 
data, calculation of futures returns, a data coding and classification list, the primary 
objectives of this study, and the statement of hypotheses to be analysed in the next 
chapter.  Graph 3.1 is also provided to help in gaining a better understanding of the 
behaviour, performance and event analysis sections of this study.  The main econometric 
tests are laid out in this graph to ease follow-up in Chapter 4.   
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Chapter 4: 
RESEARCH OUTPUT AND FINDINGS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
This section encapsulates the research output and findings of this study.  Initially, 
time series properties tests such as unit root test are performed to test for stationarity in 
the futures returns, sentiment index, net positions (for hedgers and speculators), and 
information variables.  The individual Augmented Dick-Fuller (ADF) unit root test and 
panel unit root tests (ADF Fisher test and Im, Perasan and Chin test) are performed to 
avoid spurious regressions. 
 
 This chapter further provides the analysis of the behaviour and performance 
sections of the study.  The behaviour section looks at positive feedback and contrarian 
behaviour for both large speculators and large hedgers.  A market timing test follows to 
assess whether speculators perform better than hedgers.  To test for robustness of superior 
performance of speculators, own- and cross-hedging pressure effects tests are carried out.   
 
  In the performance sections, the mean equation is first regressed against 
decomposed variables together with a lagged hedging pressure variable.  Volatility 
equations (derived from ARMA models) are also regressed in relation to expected and 
unexpected volatility components.  GARCH and PARCH volatility models are then 
assessed, and commodity return series under both models are tested to see if they are 
normally distributed.  Further, the return and risk relationship is looked at where risk is 
decomposed into expected and unexpected volatility.  Static forecasting of one-month 
futures return is then carried out, both under normal and t distributions for GARCH and 
PARCH models.  The ability of the idiosyncratic volatility to accurately match standard 
deviation or variance in forecasting one-month returns is then looked at.  Diagnostic and 
model specification tests are carried out on all the models used before making any 
comment. 
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 Finally but not least, events analysis is carried out for the eight named events.  
The robustness or stability of the behaviour and performance models is re-looked at when 
faced with structural breaks.  The trading determinant model (behaviour), mean equation 
(performance), return/risk relationship model, and trading activity and volatility 
relationship model are tested for robustness with recursive stability tests.  The purpose of 
this section is to further analyse the concept of risk (standard deviation and variance) and 
return relationship at different time intervals and how the relationship is affected by 
specific macroeconomic events.  This chapter ends with a conclusion of all the findings 
of this study. 
 
 
4.2 Time Series Properties and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The first couple of things examined under descriptive statistics is whether the 
mean of futures returns are “near zero” values as expected in efficient markets58.  The 
mean of hedgers’ net positions would reveal whether hedgers are net short as expected59, 
and the mean of speculators’ net positions would reveal whether speculators are net long 
on average.  The mean of each trader type should also be negatively related due to the 
concept of futures trading being a zero-sum game.  The mean of hedgers is also expected 
to be of greater magnitude than the mean of speculators, showing that hedgers are the 
main players in the futures market as expected, and that the difference between the mean 
of the two players’ net positions is attributed to the existence of small traders. The 
standard deviation of hedgers and speculators should reveal not only whether hedgers or 
speculators change their net positions more often, but also which group exhibits more 
swings in its average returns, e.g. highly-traded currency and financials compared with 
agriculturals.  Further, the mean of sentiment index should be almost the same over the 
different commodities due to the trend-chasing behaviour of the 1990s.  The standard 
deviations in one particular group will reveal which consumers have more volatile 
sentiment.  The mean and standard deviation of information variables would also reveal 
                                                          
 
58 See Fama (1991) Efficient Market Hypothesis and three factor model for an example. 
59 Most hedgers, particularly in commodity markets, are producers or manufacturers who face the risk of 
falling prices when selling their goods in the future.  Hence, they short to reduce that risk. 
 
 
96
whether these priced risk factors are significant in the decision-making process by 
players, by being significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  Finally, but 
not least, it is also of interest to see how each variable relate to each other, and 
correlations between important variables such as net positions, changes in net positions, 
sentiment and returns will be laid out. 
 
 Before carrying out any regression analysis throughout the whole study, all data 
series are tested for stationarity in levels or after differencing60.  Both individual (ADF) 
and panel unit root tests (ADF Fisher and Im, Perasan and Chin) are performed using 
both Akaike and Schwarz information criteria.  Results for individual unit root tests are 
reported in tables 4.1–4.3.  An ADF test with trend and no intercept has been included as 
per ADF model specification in Appendix 6.5.161.  The ADF test statistic used in the test 
is a negative number.  The more negative it is, the stronger the rejection of the hypothesis 
of a unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.  Table 4.6 reports the descriptive 
summary statistics. 
 
 As can be seen from Table 4.1, ADF test futures returns and market sentiment are 
stationary at levels.  Both Akaike and Schwarz information criteria results confirm that 
there is no need for differencing, i.e. I(0).  This is also observed in other studies where 
futures returns are used instead of futures prices (Wang, 2003).  Table 4.2, however, 
shows that net positions for hedgers are not stationary at levels, for Eurodollars, t-bonds, 
soybeans, S&P500, feeder cattle, wheat (Kansas), cocoa and coffee.  Net positions for 
speculators are not stationary at levels for Swiss francs, Japanese yen, feeder cattle, wheat 
(Chicago), wheat (Kansas), cocoa, lumber, soybeans, and soybean oil.  Further, Table 4.3 
reports that the corporate yield spread, the dividend yield, and the Treasury bill yield are 
non-stationary at levels.  All non-stationary series become stationary at I(1)62, i.e. after 
differencing one time.  ADF Fisher test and Im, Perasan and Chin panel unit root tests 
                                                          
 
60 See Working (1953) for more details on futures trading and stationary processes. 
61 An intercept is not included due to restricted sample size and Eviews software specifications.  A trend 
component is included however due to hedgers and speculators reversing most of the positions after a point 
of time.  However, future research might further robust the variables with a trend and intercept component. 
62 Appendix 6.10, Graph 4.1 and Graph 4.2 provide tabular and graphical representations that all series are 
stationary after differencing one time. 
 
 
97
also support the above findings of individual unit root tests and can be found in Appendix 
6.10.   
The descriptive summary statistics in Table 4.6 are divided into three panels.  
Panel A shows that the mean returns in the 29 futures markets are significantly not 
different from zero.  This supports the Efficient Market Hypothesis that, on average, no 
superior returns can be achieved in futures markets.  The high positive mean values of 
sentiment data support the fact that US futures markets moved with bullish events in the 
1990s.  The mean values of net positions of hedgers were negative in 21 of the 29 futures 
markets, suggesting that large hedgers were mostly net short during the 1990s.  In fact, 
out of the 16 agricultural futures markets, only corn and feeder cattle markets of large 
hedgers were net long.  Large hedgers being net short is backed by Keynes (1930).  Large 
speculators, on the other hand, are net long for 21 of the 29 futures markets.  More 
importantly, the mean net positions of speculators are less than hedgers for most markets.  
This can be explained by the existence of effective barriers to participation, like those 
proposed by Hirshleifer (1988).  These barriers might arise from fixed set-up costs 
required to learn about these markets.  This suggests why large hedgers are the market 
players that were mostly followed by investors in decision-making in futures markets.63  
The difference in mean values between large speculators and large hedgers can be 
attributed to small speculators’, small hedgers’ and small traders’ mean as defined by the 
CFTC, where small speculators, small hedgers and small traders are the rest of the 
market. 
 Panel B shows the correlation between returns, net positions at levels of hedgers 
(speculators), changes in net positions of hedgers (speculators), and market sentiment.  
The correlation between changes in net positions of hedgers (speculators) with market 
sentiment appears to be negatively (positively) related.  Futures returns and changes in 
net positions of hedgers (speculators) appear to be also negatively (positively) correlated.   
The correlation coefficient between return and hedgers’ change in net positions tends to 
be greater than those between return and speculators’, in absolute values.  This is 
supported by Marcus (1984) and Chang (1985) who found that commodity futures price 
                                                          
 
63 Several studies like Khouris and Perrakis (1998) and Chang et al. (2000) suggest that large hedgers 
generally pick the right direction of futures markets. 
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changes are negatively correlated with hedging positions taken previously by producers.  
Net positions of hedgers appear to be negatively correlated with net positions of 
speculators, with the soybean oil futures market exhibiting the highest negative 
correlation (0.975) between these large players.  This finding supports the fact that 
trading in futures markets is a zero-sum game.  Panel C results show that all the 
information variables are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.   
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Stationarity of sentiment index & futures returns (level series)
Sentiment index Futures returns
ADF test result under ADF test result under
Information Criteria Information Criteria
Akaike Schwarz Akaike Schwarz
Metals
SI -6.059 -6.990 -24.842 -24.842
GC -6.729 -6.729 -23.037 -23.037
HG -7.645 -7.348 -15.734 -25.769
PL -3.627 -8.621 -19.302 -27.620
Financials
ED -6.192 -7.427 -4.049 -14.877
US -7.320 -7.320 -26.837 -26.837
Currencies
BP -8.192 -7.806 -5.414 -24.172
SF -7.192 -7.192 -23.827 -23.827
CD -8.323 -8.323 -13.634 -26.353
JY -5.378 -7.488 -25.267 -25.267
Soybean complex
S -7.598 -7.598 -26.179 -26.179
BO -6.840 -8.670 -24.690 -24.690
SM -3.790 -8.093 -26.820 -26.820
Stock Index
SP -6.688 -6.688 -26.938 -26.938
Meats
PB -8.660 -8.660 -23.940 -23.940
LH -8.575 -8.575 -5.107 -21.951
LC -8.889 -8.889 -26.304 -26.304
FC -9.676 -9.676 -28.246 -28.246
Grains
W -6.919 -6.919 -24.880 -24.880
KW -6.919 -6.919 -10.004 -24.309
MW -6.919 -6.919 -10.363 -24.220
C -6.386 -6.258 -7.373 -25.532
Foods
SB -5.090 -6.885 -23.760 -23.760
CC -8.709 -8.709 -24.844 -24.844
KC -8.662 -8.352 -12.545 -24.751
Fibres
CT -7.878 -7.878 -7.023 -23.260
LB -9.992 -9.678 -22.358 -22.358
Energy complex
CL -7.314 -6.965 -12.346 -26.533
HO -8.070 -8.070 -6.968 -26.395
This table shows the test for unit root for investors’ sentiment data and futures returns, using Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  Investor sentiment is proxied by the Consensus Index, in percent.  The futures
returns is measured as the percentage change in settlement prices of a futures contract over 1 month period. 
*(**)(***) denotes significance of ADF test at 1%(5%)(10%)  level.  Both Akaike and Schwarz
information selection criteria are used. Specification of ADF test, Akaike and Schwarz information criteria
can be found in appendices.  An ADF test with a trend, but no intercept is being used as follows:
 
Table 4.1 
Stationarity of sentiment index and futures returns 
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Hedgers NP Speculators NP
ADF test result under ADF test result under
Information Criteria Information Criteria
Akaike Schwarz Akaike Schwarz
Metals
SI -5.136 -5.136 -4.749 -4.749
GC -4.766 -4.766 -3.841 -4.817
HG -5.044 -5.044 -5.256 -5.256
PL -5.468 -5.468 -5.563 -5.563
Financials
ED *,**,*** -1.806 -1.806 -3.519 -3.519
US *,** -2.456 -4.515 -4.420 -4.420
Currencies
BP -7.417 -7.417 -7.012 -7.012
SF -6.752 -6.797 *,**,*** -1.818 -6.544
CD -5.668 -5.668 -6.257 -6.390
JY -4.937 -4.937 **,*** -2.535 -5.324
Soybean complex
S *** -3.280 -2.882 *** -3.239 -3.239
BO -4.109 -4.109 *** -3.117 -3.967
SM -4.169 -4.169 -4.563 -4.563
Stock Index
SP *,**,*** -0.059 -0.926 -4.108 -4.108
Meats
PB -4.563 -4.283 -4.346 -4.346
LH -3.665 -3.808 -3.899 -3.899
LC -4.766 -4.766 -4.552 -4.552
FC *,**,*** -1.207 -4.088 *** -2.749 -3.867
Grains
W -4.870 -5.925 *,**,*** -1.827 -4.593
KW *,**,*** -0.033 -2.514 *** -2.919 -5.529
MW -5.511 -5.511 -4.842 -4.842
C -3.919 -3.919 -3.642 -3.642
Foods
SB -5.046 -5.046 -4.463 -4.463
CC *,**,*** -2.297 -2.739 *,**,*** -2.100 -2.937
KC **,*** -2.728 -5.767 -3.771 -7.104
Fibres
CT -4.897 -4.897 -4.540 -4.315
LB -3.540 -4.669 *** -3.347 -5.116
Energy complex
CL -5.444 -5.444 -5.486 -5.486
HO -4.445 -5.735 -3.518 -6.589
This table shows the test for unit root for net positions of large hedgers and large speculators, using
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  Net positions (NP) are defined as the long positions less the short
positions of a trader type on the basis of the CFTC's COT reports, in units of 1,000 contracts.  *(**) (***) 
denotes significance of ADF test at 1%(5%)(10%)  level.  Both Akaike and Schwarz information selection
criteria are used. Specification of ADF test, Akaike and Schwarz information criteria can be found in
appendices. An ADF test with a trend, but no intercept is being used as follows:
 
Table 4.2  
Stationarity of large hedgers and large speculators 
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Stationary of information variables
Level series
    ADF test result under
      Information Criteria
Akaike Schwarz
Corporate Yield Spread *,**,*** -0.758 -0.362
Dividend yield *,**,*** -0.492 -0.818
90-day T-bill yield *,**,*** -2.716 -2.632
Test critical values: 1% level -3.483
5% level -2.885
10% level -2.579
This table shows the test for unit root for the corporate yield spread, dividend yield and 90-day T-bill yield, 
using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  Corporate yield spread is the monthly yield on the Lehman's
BAA-rated bonds less the yield on AAA-rated bonds.  Dividend yield is the monthly yield on the 
S&P500index.  90-day T-bill is the monthly yield on the 3-month Treasury bills.  *(**) (***) denotes 
significance of ADF test at 1%(5%)(10%)  level.  Both Akaike and Schwarz information selection criteria 
are used. Specification of ADF test, Akaike and Schwarz information criteria can be found in appendices.
An ADF test with a trend, but no intercept is being used as follows:
 
 
 
  
Table 4.3 
Stationarity of information variables 
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Panel A: Summary statistics for Returns, Sentiment, and Net Positions
Returns (%) Sentiment (%) Speculator Hedger
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Metals
SI 0.098 5.566 50.463 18.756 18.206 14.504 -39.746 14.375
GC -0.181 3.373 47.980 18.665 -12.187 32.076 5.366 39.932
HG -0.089 6.017 45.239 19.476 3.330 8.610 -8.761 12.037
PL 0.271 4.653 49.263 21.261 3.592 4.145 -6.251 4.756
Financials
ED 0.026 0.305 47.412 20.846 9.116 89.114 116.503 175.776
US 0.118 2.817 42.726 15.902 9.880 25.800 -14.834 37.501
Currencies
BP -0.041 2.854 45.683 21.905 0.175 12.372 0.921 18.023
SF -0.030 3.605 40.223 21.703 -5.402 13.995 9.268 21.061
CD -0.184 1.250 39.867 19.026 -0.706 11.593 -2.805 16.924
JY 0.321 3.437 41.916 19.267 -9.418 19.647 14.145 30.423
Soybean complex
S 0.019 5.248 52.636 17.201 12.258 21.934 -22.400 28.583
BO -0.138 5.076 45.700 21.194 3.253 15.518 -11.715 21.476
SM 0.228 5.887 46.122 21.390 3.275 10.331 -14.060 16.273
Stock Index
SP 1.087 3.941 44.075 14.095 -15.690 9.656 11.250 21.807
/pto
This table is divided into three panels. Panel A shows the summary statistics for futures returns, net
positions of hedgers and speculators, and sentiment index.  Panel B shows the correlation between all
futures returns, sentiment index, net positions of hedgers (speculators), and changes in net positions of
hedgers (speculators).  Panel C shows the summary statistics for information variables.  Net positions
(NP) are defined as the long positions less the short positions of a trader type on the basis of CFTC’s
COT reports, in units of 1,000 contracts.  The return is measured as the percentage change in settlement
prices of a futures contract over 1 month interval.  Corporate yield spread is the monthly yield on the
Lehman’s BAA-rated bonds less the yield on AAA-rated bonds.  Dividend yield is the monthly yield
on the S&P500index.  90-day T-bill is the monthly yield on the 3-month Treasury bills. Investor
sentiment is proxied the Consensus Index, in percent SI Ω ΔNPS(H) denotes the correlation between
sentiment index and changes in net positions of speculators (hedgers).  R Ω ΔNPS(H) denotes the
correlation between returns and changes in net positions of speculators (hedgers).  ΔNPH Ω ΔNPS
denotes the correlation between changes in net positions of speculators and hedgers. 
Table 4.6 
Descriptive summary statistics 
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Meats
PB 1.023 13.776 40.698 18.947 -0.347 1.745 -0.359 0.892
LH 0.386 9.473 43.059 15.222 2.580 5.916 -0.837 4.848
LC 0.089 3.822 49.659 15.109 5.348 9.582 -3.582 8.552
FC 0.121 3.274 47.737 18.275 1.443 2.426 0.811 1.803
Grains
W 0.024 6.617 48.753 19.659 5.342 10.093 -11.886 10.920
KW 0.126 6.475 48.753 19.659 1.139 3.500 -1.085 6.152
MW 0.094 5.996 48.753 19.659 -0.088 1.049 -0.447 1.995
C 0.010 6.123 51.155 19.421 23.667 43.289 0.724 50.876
Foods
SB 0.027 8.523 50.438 20.612 15.504 28.381 -25.751 35.622
CC -0.170 7.279 46.287 17.420 4.310 10.127 -10.928 12.416
KC 0.481 12.141 44.234 20.642 3.236 5.437 -7.761 7.005
Fibres
CT 0.149 6.514 47.505 18.638 -3.023 11.354 -0.315 12.664
LB 0.506 9.046 42.695 22.872 0.120 0.529 -0.298 0.701
Energy complex
CL 0.759 8.927 46.528 19.158 6.581 24.324 -7.297 33.617
HO 0.851 9.186 45.334 21.760 2.655 8.706 -15.478 13.844
Panel B : Correlations
    SI Ω ∆NPS SI Ω ∆NPH R Ω ∆NPS R Ω ∆NPH   ∆NPHΩ∆NPS      NPH Ω NPS
Metals
SI 0.155 -0.362 -0.083 -0.666 0.050 -0.448
GC 0.064 -0.412 -0.040 -0.609 0.115 -0.570
HG 0.178 -0.445 -0.011 0.026 -0.025 -0.429
PL -0.049 -0.504 -0.087 -0.610 0.254 -0.642
Financials
ED -0.066 -0.315 -0.159 -0.110 0.044 -0.619
US 0.115 -0.249 0.189 -0.086 0.047 -0.504
Currencies
BP 0.069 -0.444 0.027 -0.109 0.166 -0.186
SF 0.087 -0.406 -0.088 -0.121 0.038 -0.177
CD 0.070 -0.477 0.032 0.052 -0.061 -0.384
JY 0.083 -0.367 0.087 -0.627 -0.021 -0.276
Soybean complex
S 0.213 -0.506 0.165 -0.743 -0.123 -0.764
BO 0.462 -0.459 0.667 -0.674 -0.968 -0.975
SM 0.145 -0.444 0.074 -0.658 0.100 -0.521
/pto
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Stock Index
SP 0.068 -0.191 0.022 -0.325 -0.159 -0.494
Meats
PB 0.112 -0.146 0.078 0.002 -0.050 -0.094
LH 0.130 -0.380 0.039 -0.202 -0.031 -0.486
LC 0.226 -0.306 0.031 -0.340 0.020 -0.348
FC 0.046 -0.237 0.005 -0.441 0.076 0.207
Grains
W 0.201 -0.375 0.183 -0.540 -0.175 -0.349
KW 0.134 -0.317 0.126 -0.389 -0.056 -0.155
MW 0.127 -0.243 0.166 -0.319 -0.034 -0.013
C 0.177 -0.443 0.144 -0.646 -0.072 -0.569
Foods
SB 0.175 -0.480 -0.004 -0.582 0.098 -0.402
CC -0.086 -0.319 -0.240 -0.530 0.309 -0.589
KC 0.158 -0.474 0.033 -0.577 -0.170 -0.450
Fibres
CT 0.145 -0.511 0.057 -0.591 0.007 -0.409
LB 0.071 -0.179 0.038 -0.236 -0.139 -0.310
Energy complex
CL -0.028 -0.297 -0.028 -0.297 0.137 -0.422
HO 0.123 -0.440 0.083 -0.441 0.060 -0.286
Panel C: Summary Statistics and Description for Information Variables
Mean Std. Dev.    t-statistics
90 day Treasury bill Yield 5.004 1.177 50.139 ***
BAA-AAA Lehman's Corporate spread 2.067 3.321 7.337 ***
Dividend yield 2.322 0.802 34.160 ***
*** denotes  that parameter is significantly different from zero at 1%,5%,10% level.
/pto
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4.3 BEHAVIOUR 
 
4.3.1 Positive Feedback and Contrarian Behaviour 
 
 Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) showed that 
investors are most likely to condition their trades on past returns, exhibiting contrarian or 
positive feedback trading behaviour.  Further, Bessembinder and Chan (1992) and 
Bjornson and Carter (1997) showed that common information variables like T-bill yield, 
equity dividend yield and default premium have forecasting power in futures markets.  To 
test how lag investor sentiment, returns, and these information variables influence trading 
decisions by type of trader, the behaviour model used by Wang (2003) is adapted over the 
29 futures markets as follows: 
 
1+Δ tNP  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ tSI + 2ϕ tR + 3ϕ tyield Tbill + 4ϕ tAAA-BAA + 5ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ     (4.1) 
 
Δ 1+tNP  is the change in net positions of large speculators in month t+1.  A net position 
is defined as the long position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 
contracts.  Δ tSI  denotes the change in the Consensus index in month t. tR  is the futures 
return in month t, in percent.64  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, Divyieldt are the three 
information variables included in the model.65   
 
                                                          
 
64 To match with COT reporting dates, a month represents a 4-week interval (Tuesday–Tuesday).  
65 See Chapter 2, section 2.10 for more on information variables’ relevance to futures markets. 
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Changes in Net Positions, lag changes in Sentiment, Returns, and Information variables
Intercept ∆SI t R t Tbillyield t BAA-AAA t Divyield t
Panel A: Hedger
Metals
SI -5.417 -0.230 0.544 0.767 -0.202 0.958
(-3.203) (2.387)
GC 2.469 -0.544 2.973 -1.241 -1.130 2.884
(-3.029) (3.307)
HG -2.109 -0.034 -0.304 0.224 -0.222 0.636
(-2.203)
PL -2.137 -0.039 0.336 0.274 0.004 0.304
(-2.576) (4.020)
Financials
ED 23.633 -0.208 -24.229 -7.845 1.292 4.382
US 9.747 -0.084 0.153 -2.898 -1.023 2.800
Currencies
BP -4.653 0.124 -1.933 0.415 -0.293 1.439
SF -1.332 0.016 -1.617 -1.021 -0.667 3.328
(-3.227)
CD -2.017 -0.094 -4.690 0.523 -0.075 -0.525
(-1.697) (-4.866)
JY 0.887 -0.219 1.762 1.172 0.892 -3.717
(-1.982) (2.638)
Soybean complex
S 0.379 -0.179 -0.005 -0.807 -0.629 2.055
(-2.380)
BO -2.734 -0.086 0.375 0.179 -0.521 1.357
SM -0.350 -0.112 0.561 -0.468 -0.289 1.242
(-2.365) (2.825)
/pto
This table shows the results for testing the determinants of trading decisions for large hedgers.  ΔNPt+1 
represents the changes in net positions of large hedgers in month t+1.  A net position is defined as the long 
position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 contracts.  ΔSIt denotes the change in the 
Consensus index in month t. Rt is the futures return in month t, in percent.  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, 
Divyieldt are the three information variables included in the model.  The numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated 
behaviour type equation is  
1+Δ tNP  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ tSI + 2ϕ tR + 3ϕ tyield Tbill + 4ϕ tAAA-BAA + 5ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ  
Table 4.7.1 
Trading behaviour of large hedgers 
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Stock Index
SP -1.013 0.080 -0.076 0.019 0.554 -0.365
Meats
PB -0.230 -0.007 0.003 0.050 0.013 -0.014
(-2.795)
LH -0.103 0.001 -0.115 0.078 0.022 -0.126
(-3.915)
LC -0.863 -0.058 -0.084 0.430 0.265 -0.728
FC -0.144 -0.022 0.060 0.031 0.019 -0.026
(-4.551) (1.889)
Grains
W 2.396 -0.137 0.393 -0.603 -0.181 0.356
(-2.828) (2.822)
KW 0.057 -0.035 0.046 -0.202 0.018 0.293
(-1.846)
MW -0.013 -0.014 0.058 -0.060 -0.062 0.180
(-1.745) (2.248)
C 0.144 -0.525 0.988 -0.371 -0.197 0.902
(-3.072) (1.942)
Foods
SB -13.001 -0.356 0.684 1.981 -0.201 1.645
(-2.766) (2.221)
CC -0.806 -0.111 0.386 0.224 -0.136 0.037
(-2.847) (3.720)
KC -1.932 -0.018 0.180 0.728 0.259 -0.956
(3.495)
Fibres
CT -0.753 -0.153 0.377 -0.016 0.022 0.278
(-3.203) (2.476)
LB -0.186 -0.003 0.003 0.071 0.040 -0.109
(-1.977) (1.744)
Energy complex
CL 4.085 -0.140 0.802 -0.753 0.003 -0.525
(2.982)
HO 1.211 -0.185 0.407 -0.611 -0.270 0.850
(-4.557) (3.579)
Note: Only significant t ratios are reported. 
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Changes in Net Positions, lag changes in Sentiment, Returns, and Information variables
Intercept ∆SI t R t Tbillyield t BAA-AAA t Divyield t
Panel B: Speculator
Metals
SI 0.982 0.155 0.608 -0.065 0.097 -0.431
2.613 3.234
GC 2.185 0.743 -0.241 0.244 0.197 -1.627
5.548
HG 0.811 0.098 0.118 0.165 0.181 -0.808
3.509
PL 0.160 0.040 0.149 0.043 0.133 -0.298
3.086 2.112
Financials
ED -20.546 0.515 -29.123 5.454 2.211 -4.506
2.641 -1.888
US -3.332 0.071 0.211 0.097 -0.346 1.549
Currencies
BP 1.559 0.079 0.415 -0.133 0.109 -0.505
1.706
SF 0.804 0.054 0.423 -0.082 -0.115 -0.057
CD -0.048 0.187 -0.694 -0.062 -0.084 0.170
4.387
JY 2.843 0.022 1.254 -0.176 0.223 -1.328
2.774
Soybean complex
S -0.616 0.130 0.628 0.214 0.132 -0.337
2.133 2.949
BO 1.104 0.055 -0.171 -0.014 0.300 -0.776
SM -0.413 0.132 0.050 0.102 0.012 -0.034
4.661
/pto
This table shows the results for testing the determinants of trading decisions for large speculators.  ΔNPt+1 
represents the changes in net positions of large speculators in month t+1.  A net position is defined as the 
long position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 contracts.  ΔSIt denotes the change in 
the Consensus index in month t. Rt is the futures return in month t, in percent.  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, 
Divyieldt are the three information variables included in the model.  The numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated 
behaviour type equation is  
1+Δ tNP  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ tSI + 2ϕ tR + 3ϕ tyield Tbill + 4ϕ tAAA-BAA + 5ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ  
 
Table 4.7.2 
Trading behaviour of large speculators 
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Stock Index
SP -0.112 -0.047 0.373 0.112 -0.031 -0.278
Meats
PB 0.178 0.015 -0.002 0.003 0.044 -0.124
2.937
LH 0.830 0.028 0.047 -0.123 0.066 -0.184
LC 1.063 0.010 0.415 -0.396 -0.088 0.412
FC 0.344 -0.006 0.184 -0.075 -0.006 0.017
Grains
W -0.985 0.056 0.196 0.023 -0.075 0.444
1.849
KW -0.041 0.011 0.036 -0.047 -0.052 0.178
MW -0.026 -0.002 0.014 -0.008 0.000 0.021
C -0.804 0.330 0.543 -0.598 -0.178 1.565
2.448
Foods
SB 4.353 0.110 0.376 -0.884 -0.117 0.114
CC 0.990 0.068 0.285 0.104 0.220 -0.868
2.154 3.399
KC 0.344 0.050 -0.008 -0.011 0.021 -0.148
2.171
Fibres
CT 1.005 0.056 0.341 -0.102 0.061 -0.319
2.972
LB 0.167 0.002 0.004 -0.036 -0.011 0.009
Energy complex
CL 3.195 0.259 0.305 -1.171 -0.358 1.414
3.141
HO 1.142 0.091 0.093 -0.212 -0.008 -0.036
3.021
 
Note: Only significant t ratios are reported.
 
 
110
 Panel A shows that in 25 futures markets, hedgers will decrease their current net 
positions if the change of market sentiment is positive in the previous period.  The 
negative coefficients of Δ tSI  are significantly different from zero, for 18 of these 25 
markets at 10% significance level.  This can be intuitively explained by the fact that 
hedgers were mostly net short as shown previously in panel B of table 4.6.  On the other 
hand, large hedgers increase their current net positions if the futures prices have risen in 
the previous period in 20 markets.  Results are significant for 15 of these 20 markets at 
10% significance level.   Large hedgers significantly decrease their current net positions 
if the futures prices have risen in the previous period for gold, copper, Swiss francs, 
Canadian dollars, and live hogs only.  These findings are similar to Wang (2003) 
suggesting that large hedgers tend to exhibit positive feedback trading in US Futures 
markets.   
 
 While hedgers tend to reduce (increase) their current net positions, if market 
sentiment is bullish (bearish) in the previous period, Panel B shows that large speculators 
tend to increase (decrease) their current net positions if market sentiment is bullish 
(bearish) in the previous period.  Results are significantly positive for 15 markets at 10% 
significance level.  This result is also supported by De Bondt (1993) and Wang (2003) 
who found hedgers (speculators) respond negatively (positively) to market sentiment, 
after controlling for market risk.  Speculators also tend to increase their current net 
positions if futures prices have risen in the previous month, for 23 markets.  This is 
consistent with Brorsen and Irwin (1987) who argued that managed funds and pools 
attempt to buy after a price increase or sell after a price decrease using positive feedback 
trading systems, mainly in highly liquid financial and currency futures.  This is further 
supported by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) who found that sophisticated institutional 
investors pursue positive feedback strategies and achieve superior performance in the 
Finnish market.  However, results are significantly positive for only seven futures 
markets66, and significantly negative only for Eurodollars.67  Overall, the mixed findings 
                                                          
 
66 Japanese yen has the highest coefficient in explaining the effect of actual returns on one-month future net 
position.  This supports why the concentration of commodity pool trading (CPOs and CTAs) is not 
concentrated in smaller futures markets like livestock futures.   
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regarding the behaviour of large speculators in Panel B suggest that the monthly data 
interval is not synchronous enough to determine speculators’ trading decisions or that 
they are not momentum traders.   
Among the 29 markets, only the corporate spread coefficient for the lumber 
market is significantly different from zero at 10% significance level.  On average, the 
coefficient estimates for changes in T-bill yield and default premium are more likely to 
be negative than positive.  This finding is consistent with Bessembinder and Chan (1992) 
and Bjornson and Carter (1997) that expected inflation and default premium are 
associated with negative expected premiums, and therefore speculators cut back net 
positions.  The negative coefficients for changes in T-bill yield for T-bond futures and 
Eurodollars futures suggest that these assets provide a natural hedge to the types of risk.68  
Moreover, the effect of information variables on the trading decisions of speculators is 
larger in magnitude in T-bond, Eurodollars69, currency, and crude oil futures than in the 
other markets.  The effect of information variables on the trading decisions of hedgers in 
gold futures is also quite distinct, compared to other markets.  Overall, however, 
insignificant coefficients of information variables in both panels suggest that large 
hedgers and large speculators do not use these monthly yields in their trading decisions.  
This finding is inconsistent with Easley and O’Hara (2002) who supported that 
information variables help in determining returns.  One possible explanations for this 
inconsistency are that the authors of Easley and O’Hara (2002)  rely on private 
information rather than public information, and that the method differs in that these 
authors supported private information affects returns and not changes in net positions. 
 
4.3.2 Market Timing Test 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
67 Our trading determinant model fails to explain hedgers’ and speculators’ return effect on future net 
positions.  This can be explained due to the highly traded and most liquid Eurodollars market.  Since our 
model uses a monthly data interval, abnormal coefficient figures are obtained and disregarded for analysis. 
68 For example, Bodie and Rosansky (1980) showed that substantial benefits were available to investors by 
combining portfolios of commodities and stocks, because of their negative correlation arising from 
opposite inflation sensitivities. 
69 Eurodollars are one of the most actively traded contracts in the futures markets, and information 
variables (in both Panel A & B) like T-bill yield and dividend yield tend to have a larger effect in 
magnitude on these fixed income derivatives. 
 
 
 
112
 While Chatrath et al. (1997) showed that large speculators have been the most 
profitable group of traders in the 1980s and 1990s, Khoury and Perrakis (1998) argued 
that some large hedgers, particularly in some commodities in the United States, are as 
well informed as speculators.70  Both studies, while significant, fail to take the full decade 
as timeframe before concluding.  More importantly, there is huge debate that hedgers pay 
a premium to speculators like suggested in Keynes’s (1930) theory of normal 
backwardation, where two important assumptions are made - hedgers are net short, and 
speculators do not have forecasting ability.  While it has been found that hedgers are 
mostly net short, the second assumption about large speculators having no forecasting or 
market timing ability is yet to be tested in this study to support the existence of risk 
premium in the futures markets.  To test for market timing ability of large speculators or 
hedgers, Equation 4.2 is used as follows: 
 
1+tR  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ itNP + 2ϕ tyield Tbill + 3ϕ tAAA-BAA + 4ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ  (4.2) 
 
Results for the possible market timing ability are laid out in Table 4.8.1 for 
hedgers and Table 4.8.2 for speculators.  Table 4.8.1 results show that Δ itNP is positive 
and significant for silver, corn, cocoa and coffee; and negative and significant for copper, 
T-bonds, Japanese yen, soybean oil, crude oil and heating oil at 10% significance level.  
This suggests that any change in net positions of hedgers in the current period will 
increase the futures return of hedgers for silver, corn, cocoa and coffee, and decrease the 
futures return in copper, T-bonds, Japanese yen, soybean oil, crude oil and heating oil.  
The results are consistent with Wang (2003) only in cocoa, coffee, and Japanese yen.  
The non-significance in Eurodollars is also found in Bessembinder (1992) where hedging 
activity has only minor effects on the pricing of Eurodollar futures contracts.  Table 4.8.2, 
on the other hand, shows that Δ itNP is significant and positive only for wheat 
(Minnesota) and cocoa for large speculators.  The considerable inflows from managed 
futures funds and hedge funds in the 1990s can help explain the positive performance of 
                                                          
 
70 Refer to Chapter 2, section 2.6 (Large hedgers and speculators: an insight), section 2.4 (Hedging 
revisited) and section 2.5 (Speculators revisited) for detailed theories regarding these players roles and 
performance in markets. 
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speculators in the cocoa market, where these funds usually were net long.  (Mitchell and 
Gilbert, 1997 and Table 4.6).  Overall results of Δ itNP  from Table 4.8.2 support 
findings in Table 4.7.2 that speculators do not depend significantly on changes in net 
positions in the current month, for future monthly returns.  More importantly, it relates 
back to the normal backwardation theory where one of the assumption of risk premium 
rely on speculators not having any forecasting or market timing ability.   
 
Findings of Δ itNP from both Table 4.8.1 and 4.8.2 support Khoury and Perrakis 
(1998) that hedgers in silver, corn, and coffee properly change their net positions to 
increase their futures return in one-month timeframes, and hence better judge the 
direction of these markets than speculators.  More importantly, this reflects the fact that 
any existence of risk premium in those markets are highly reduced in that hedgers have 
market timing abilities and might act upon those to reach higher returns.  For copper, T-
bonds, Japanese yen, soybean oil, crude oil and heating oil, where Δ itNP of hedgers 
were significant and negative, the poor market timing ability is supported by Working 
(1953) who asserted that short hedgers tend to lose money to speculators on their hedge 
transactions in the futures market.71  Due to the non-significance of Δ itNP for 
speculators, a higher frequency data interval is recommended to test the market timing 
ability of speculators, who, by definition, change their net positions more frequently than 
hedgers to benefit from short-term fluctuations in price.  Further, the coefficients of T-bill 
yield for Eurodollars and T-bonds contracts are significantly positive (both for hedgers 
and speculators), supporting the previous findings that the T-bill yield affects fixed 
income derivatives more than other derivatives.   
 
                                                          
 
71 All these markets were net short as shown in Table 4.6 except Japanese yen. 
 
 
114
 
Market timing ability 
Intercept  ∆NPH Tbillyield t BAA-AAA t Divyield t
Panel A: Hedger
Metals
SI 4.028 0.080 -0.682 0.026 -0.260
1.995
GC -0.619 0.008 -0.001 0.014 0.188
HG 0.930 -0.108 -0.530 -0.356 1.040
-2.006
PL 4.273 0.047 -0.465 -0.155 -0.593
2.027
Financials
ED -0.427 0.000 0.097 0.025 -0.035
-3.189 3.703 1.899
US -1.809 -0.015 0.457 0.226 -0.359
-1.655 1.873 1.823
Currencies
BP -1.952 -0.001 0.395 0.077 -0.106
SF -1.699 -0.003 0.236 0.078 0.134
CD -0.996 -0.005 0.099 -0.059 0.190
-1.749
JY -0.268 -0.025 -0.337 -0.254 1.199
-2.047 -1.665 2.051
Soybean complex
S -0.681 -0.027 0.242 0.256 -0.455
BO 1.160 -0.050 -0.184 0.296 -0.454
-1.659
SM -1.011 -0.020 0.365 0.166 -0.401
/pto
This table provides the results for the market timing ability of large hedgers, over a one month period.
Δ itNP is the change in net positions of hedgers at time t, ∑ tθ represents the 3 information variables 
used, and 1+tR is the futures return in one month time.  The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the 
hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated behaviour type equation 
is  
1+tR  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ itNP + 2ϕ tyield Tbill + 3ϕ tAAA-BAA + 4ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ  
 
 
 
Table 4.8.1 
Market timing ability of large hedgers 
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Stock Index
SP 2.024 -0.001 -0.387 -0.239 0.623
Meats
PB 5.102 -0.703 -0.683 0.033 -0.387
LH 3.076 0.089 -0.362 -0.103 -0.317
LC 0.127 0.044 0.134 0.032 -0.332
FC 0.906 0.092 0.121 0.093 -0.694
Grains
W -0.295 0.020 -0.423 -0.327 1.367
KW -0.081 0.048 -0.485 -0.422 1.543
MW 0.605 -0.375 -0.566 -0.332 1.305
C 0.091 0.057 -0.006 0.071 -0.095
1.971
Foods
SB 5.675 -0.029 -1.038 -0.236 0.056
CC -0.103 0.237 -0.275 0.057 0.490
2.977
KC 5.346 0.406 -2.691 -1.295 4.838
2.544 -2.592 -2.455 2.391
Fibres
CT 0.779 0.068 -0.482 -0.304 1.007
LB 4.685 1.238 -1.311 -0.065 1.059
Energy complex
CL -3.713 -0.122 1.559 0.309 -1.674
-4.867 2.141
HO -4.217 -0.112 1.897 0.559 -2.359
-1.739 2.376
 
Note: Only significant t ratios are reported. 
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Market Timing Ability 
Intercept  ∆NPS Tbillyield t BAA-AAA t Divyield t
Panel B: Speculator
Metals
SI 3.771 -0.018 -0.637 0.016 -0.231
GC -0.600 0.019 -0.024 -0.002 0.245
HG 1.084 0.087 -0.535 -0.321 0.949
PL 4.247 0.045 -0.470 -0.166 -0.562
2.015
Financials
ED -0.429 0.000 0.098 0.026 -0.038
-3.218 3.756 1.961
US -1.968 0.002 0.503 0.242 -0.401
2.051 1.939
Currencies
BP -1.976 -0.023 0.398 0.076 -0.101
SF -1.691 -0.001 0.233 0.077 0.136
CD -1.002 0.014 0.096 -0.063 0.203
-1.769
JY -0.274 -0.012 -0.343 -0.266 1.224
-1.719 2.065
Soybean complex
S -0.659 0.030 0.246 0.259 -0.473
BO 1.238 0.053 -0.188 0.305 -0.488
SM -1.002 -0.024 0.379 0.174 -0.438
/pto
This table provides the results for the market timing ability of large speculators, over a one month period.
Δ itNP is the change in net positions of speculators at time t, ∑ tθ represents the 3 information variables 
used, and 1+tR is the futures return in one month time.  The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the 
hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated behaviour type equation 
is  
1+tR  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Δ itNP + 2ϕ tyield Tbill + 3ϕ tAAA-BAA + 4ϕ tDivyield + 1+tξ  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8.2 
Market timing ability of large speculators 
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Stock Index
SP 1.998 -0.018 -0.372 -0.234 0.599
Meats
PB 5.115 0.450 -0.693 0.024 -0.368
LH 3.256 -0.307 -0.375 -0.103 -0.363
LC 0.162 0.043 0.133 0.033 -0.343
FC 0.951 -0.178 0.126 0.104 -0.734
Grains
W -0.242 0.031 -0.431 -0.322 1.355
KW -0.089 0.315 -0.470 -0.381 1.460
MW 0.643 1.275 -0.534 -0.321 1.228
2.067
C 0.345 -0.004 -0.071 0.039 -0.035
Foods
SB 6.444 -0.038 -1.168 -0.244 -0.001
CC -0.696 0.235 -0.219 -0.032 0.725
2.513
KC 4.958 0.002 -2.617 -1.313 4.880
-2.462 -2.430 2.355
Fibres
CT 0.673 0.047 -0.476 -0.308 1.046
LB 4.725 -0.477 -1.300 -0.047 0.999
Energy complex
CL -3.848 -0.031 1.494 0.244 -1.399
1.892
HO -4.273 -0.126 1.951 0.589 -2.464
2.435
 
Note: Only significant t ratios are reported. 
 
 
4.3.3 Hedging Pressure Effects 
 
 In line with Bessembinder (1993) and De Roon et al. (2000), who found that 
futures risk premia72 are usually related with futures own-hedging pressure, an own- 
hedging pressure effect test is performed on the 29 futures markets.  For each futures 
                                                          
 
72 See Chapter 2, section 2.15 for more hedging pressure effects and risk premia in futures markets. 
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contract, a variable λ is created, based on CFTC’s reportable positions of hedgers in each 
market.  Assuming that λ is constructed from positions that by definition arise from 
hedge demand, it appears fair that this variable will proxy for the aggregate non-
marketable risks.  A similar model to De Roon et al. (2000) is used as follows: 
 
1+tR  =  0ϕ  + 1ϕ  λt + 1+tξ                   (4.3.1) 
 
where 1+tR   refers to the futures return, futures contract and 1ϕ  measures the sensitivity 
of the futures return to the hedging pressure variable in its own group.  λt   is the hedging 
pressure variable and is calculated as follows: 
 
             Number of short hedge positions – number of long hedge positions 
λt =     ______________________________________________                 
               Total number of hedge positions 
 
To allow for comparisons with previous studies73 and within this study, four groups are 
set up (financial, currency, minerals, and agricultural)74.  Results are reported in Table 
4.9.1.  
 
                                                          
 
73 De Roon’s data range from January 1986 to December 1984. 
74 From now on, all tables will be grouped into these four groups for consistency and comparison purposes. 
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Own hedging pressure effects
θ1 t (θ1)
Financial sp -6.330 -1.200
ed 1.311 2.999
us 0.809 0.186
Mineral gc -0.835 -0.662
si -7.245 -2.527
hg 2.895 1.120
pl -0.243 -0.151
cl 43.008 3.618
ho 9.235 1.010
Currency bp -0.016 -0.027
sf -0.335 -0.506
cd 0.336 1.053
jy 1.142 1.434
Agricultural w 4.308 1.300
kw 3.524 0.690
mw 2.196 0.454
corn 1.467 0.465
s 0.666 0.315
bo 0.507 0.245
sm -0.607 -0.195
pb 2.382 0.805
lh 2.147 0.671
lc -5.752 -2.542
fc -1.322 -1.257
sb 0.865 0.244
cc 6.279 1.180
kc -7.051 -1.042
ct 0.068 0.024
lb 3.036 1.617
This table shows the results for the own hedging pressure effects of the 29 Futures markets.  θ1 is the own 
hedging pressure variable and t(θ1) is the t ratio of own hedging pressure variable.  Rt+1 is the futures return 
in one month time, in percent.  Significant t ratios are shown in bold at 10% significance level.  Estimated 
equation used is 1+tR  =  0ϕ  + 1ϕ  λt + 1+tξ   
, where          
  Number of short hedge positions – number of long hedge positions 
λt =        ______________________________________________                 
               Total number of hedge positions 
 
Note: Only significant t ratios are reported. 
 
 Table 4.9.1 
Own Hedging Pressure Effects 
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Eurodollars, silver, crude oil, and live cattle futures markets exhibit significant 
own-hedging pressures at 10% significance level.  The positive hedging pressure for 
Eurodollars can be attributed to hedgers being net long, and also to the non-significant 
market timing  ability for speculators as shown in Table 4.8.275.  The own-hedging 
pressure effect test being negative for silver and live cattle can be explained from Table 
4.6 where hedgers are net short on average.  Speculators in the silver market who are long 
bear the risk and would be awarded for the risk premium as supported in Table 4.8.2 
where speculators exhibit no significant market timing ability.  For the crude oil market, 
while hedgers have been net short on average, as shown in Table 4.6, the hedging 
pressure variable is positive in Table 4.8.1.  This is similar to Chang (1985) who showed 
that futures prices on average rise when hedgers are short.  The significant risk premium 
is also supported by the poor market timing ability of speculators, which is one of the 
main assumption of the theory of normal backwardation.  Overall, the findings of own-
hedging pressures are inconsistent with De Roon et al. (2000) in most agricultural, 
interest and financial futures markets, but consistent with Bessembinder (1993) in these 
markets; that hedging pressure does not affect the risk premia, hence the futures returns at 
least on a monthly basis.  The findings are similar with the index futures market reporting 
insignificant own-hedging pressures in affecting risk premia. 
 
 To analyse the effects of hedging pressure from other futures markets on the 
futures risk premia, a cross-hedging pressure effect test is performed on the 29 futures 
markets76.  Assuming market betas of futures contracts being close to zero,77 four groups 
are set up (financial, currency, minerals, and agricultural).  An extension of Equation 
4.3.1 gives the following78: 
 
                                                          
 
75 One likely explanation is missing variables in equation 4.3.1.  Since it appears that the coefficient of 
information variables in equation 4.2 are quite significant, these are included in the hedging pressure effect 
test for ED.  With the introduction of the variable 
1yield Tbill +t in equation 4.3.1, the significance of 
1ϕ disappear. 
76 See Anderson and Danthine (1981) for more on cross-hedging pressure theories. 
77 See De Roon et al. (2000) where cross-hedging pressures within each group and not between the four 
groups were found. 
78 Similar to equation 2.2, but excluding the market return variable Rm.   See also footnote 34 and 35. 
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ϕ i, n (j) λ n, t (j)      +   )( 1jt+ξ        (4.3.2) 
 
 where i (i = 1, 2, 3K, n) refers to the futures market and j (j=1,..,4) refers to the specific 
group the futures market belong to.  ∑
=
N
n 1
ϕ  represent the coefficients of own- and cross-
hedging pressure variables for each futures market within each of the four groups.  Full 
results are reported in Appendix 4.9.2.   
  
 In the financial group, the Eurodollar is again found to have significant own-
hedging pressure effect, but disappears after accounting for 1yield Tbill +t  in equation 
4.3.2.  In the minerals group, silver again has significant own-hedging pressure, but also 
significant cross-hedging pressure from the copper market.  Similarly, platinum has 
significant cross-hedging pressures from the gold market.  In the crude oil market, 
significant cross-hedging pressures come from the heating oil, silver and gold market.  
For the currency markets, only Japanese yen has significant cross-hedging pressures from 
the Swiss francs.  For agricultural futures markets, 13 out of 16 markets have at least one 
cross-hedging pressure within the agricultural group79.  Similar findings were obtained in 
previous studies by De Roon et al. (2000) who investigated 20 futures markets, with 
different groups of markets. 
 
 Taking into account that the above results might also be explained by the 
traditional price pressure hypothesis, i.e. a shock in demand or supply causes a temporary 
price change, a price pressure effect test is carried out to show if the hedging pressures 
coefficients are still significant after controlling for price pressure.  To make the 
coefficient of hedging pressures variables and price pressure variables comparable, the 
hedging pressure and price pressure variables are normalized by scaling them down by 
their own standard deviation. This is shown as follows: 
                                                          
 
79 Further Wald test statistics that only the own-hedging pressure is relevant are rejected in 13 of the 16 
markets at ten per cent significance level. 
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1, +tiR  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ  )( ,
,
ti
ti
θσ
λ
 + 2ϕ  )( ,
,
ti
ti
θσ
θ
Δ
Δ
  +  1, +tiξ     (4.4) 
 
whereλ ti,  is the own-hedging pressure variable, θΔ ti ,  is the change in hedging 
pressure variable (price pressure), )( ,tiθσ  is the standard deviation of own-hedging 
pressure variable, and )( ,tiθσ Δ  is the standard deviation of change in hedging pressure 
variable.  Results are reported in Table 4.9.3.  After controlling for price pressures, the 
coefficients for own-hedging pressures for Eurodollars, silver, crude oil, and live cattle 
are still significant80 at 10% significance level.  Lumber also has a significant own-
hedging pressure variable after controlling for price pressures.  Noticeably too, markets 
like copper, heating oil, soybean oil, cocoa, and coffee exhibit significant price pressures, 
suggesting that the relation between returns and hedging pressure variables should be 
limited to futures markets, and should not be present in the spot markets.  Even though 
futures prices and the underlying values are related through the cost-of-carry relation, 
particularly in the case of commodities, it is unlikely to observe this effect in spot 
markets because price pressure is a temporary effect caused by shocks in demand and 
supply in the futures markets. 
                                                          
 
80 The introduction of the T-bill yield variable (t+1) gets rid of the significance of the own-hedging 
pressure variable for ED as previously supported. 
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Price Pressure Effects
δ1 t (δ1) δ2 t (δ2)
Financial sp -0.281 -0.784 -0.044 -0.127
ed 0.085 3.213 -0.026 -0.992
us 0.003 0.012 0.279 1.064
Mineral gc -0.150 -0.469 -0.132 -0.413
si -1.082 -2.084 -0.099 -0.192
hg 0.252 0.442 0.759 1.333
pl -0.108 -0.244 0.166 0.376
cl 1.601 2.018 2.372 2.989
ho -0.053 -0.061 1.671 1.922
Currency bp -0.136 -0.466 0.255 0.875
sf -0.125 -0.356 0.028 0.079
cd 0.049 0.400 0.129 1.047
jy 0.306 0.939 0.208 0.643
Agriculturals w 0.695 1.124 -0.015 -0.023
kw 0.284 0.459 -0.004 -0.007
mw -0.107 -0.188 0.623 1.081
corn 0.205 0.369 0.307 0.554
s 0.084 0.184 0.318 0.693
bo -0.195 -0.432 0.958 2.126
sm -0.108 -0.193 0.087 0.156
pb 0.654 0.513 0.832 0.646
lh 0.637 0.710 -0.237 -0.264
lc -0.693 -2.004 -0.099 -0.286
fc -0.376 -1.259 0.086 0.288
sb -0.051 -0.064 0.915 1.153
cc 1.186 1.867 -1.744 -2.755
kc 0.205 0.169 -2.535 -2.117
ct 0.206 0.339 -0.734 -1.208
lb 1.930 2.341 -1.623 -1.972
This table shows the results for the robustness of the hedging pressure effects tests of the 29 Futures
markets.  δ1 represents the normalized own hedging pressure variable (θ/σ(θ)).  δ2 represents the normalized 
change in hedging pressure variable (Δθ/σ(Δθ)), where θ is the own hedging pressure variable, and Δθ is 
the change in hedging pressure variable.  σ(θ) is the standard deviation of own hedging pressure variable, 
σ(Δθ) is the standard deviation of change in hedging pressure variable, t(δ1) is the t ratio of own hedging 
pressure variable, and t(δ2) is the t ratio of change in hedging pressure variable.  Rt+1 is the futures return in 
one month time, in percent.  Significant values of t ratios are shown in bold at 10% significance level.
Estimated equation used is 
1, +tiR  = 0ϕ + 1ϕ  )( ,
,
ti
ti
θσ
λ
 + 2ϕ  )( ,
,
ti
ti
θσ
θ
Δ
Δ
  +  1, +tiξ   
 
Note: Only significant t ratios are reported. 
 
Table 4.9.3 
Price Pressure Effect test 
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4.3.4 Destabilizing Features 
 
 By complementing behaviour and market timing abilities of large players, this 
study can shed some further light in terms of policy implications upon stringent 
regulation81 imposed upon speculators in the futures markets82.  For instance, evidence of 
feedback trading does not imply market destabilization if these traders incorporate 
fundamental information into prices.  Positive feedback trading together with negative 
performance of a trader type suggests that the trader type tends to push prices away from 
fundamental value, and thus destabilizes the market (Lakonishkok et al., 1992).  
 
 Earlier findings in this study show that hedgers exhibit positive feedback trading 
in silver, gold, platinum, Japanese yen, soybean meal, wheat, cocoa, sugar, coffee, cotton, 
crude oil and heating oil.  Speculators, on the other hand, exhibit similar behaviour for 
silver, platinum, Japanese yen, soybean, wheat, cocoa, and cotton.  Further findings also 
support poor market timing ability of hedgers for the copper, Treasury bonds, Japanese 
yen, soybean oil, crude oil and heating oil.  Significant positive market timing ability was 
displayed from speculators in wheat (Minnesota) and cocoa.  Adapting Lakonishkok et al. 
(1992), the above results suggest a need to reconsider the position limits imposed upon 
speculators in the crude oil, heating oil, and Japanese yen futures markets in the US.  In 
fact, positive feedback hedgers would be destabilizing if they lead institutions or 
investors to jump on the bandwagon and buy overpriced contracts and sell underpriced 
contracts, thereby contributing to a further divergence of prices away from fundamentals.  
Potentially, this means that large hedgers can have massive influence by holding 
relatively larger positions than other parties like speculators and small traders.  This is 
also substantiated where positive feedback trading behaviour is particularly driven by a 
belief of continuing trends as explained in the behaviour literature.  Particular emphasis 
should be made on the heating oil and Japanese yen futures market, since there is no 
significant risk premium (after controlling for price pressures) which are borne by 
                                                          
 
81 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000 (CFMA) for more details. 
82 See Chapter 2, section 2.8.2 regarding speculation position limits in the US 
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speculators83.  Hedgers are the positive feedback players with negative market timing 
abilities in the heating oil and Japanese yen markets, and as such there is a need for a 
review of the regulation regarding position limits imposed on speculators.  This is 
inconsistent with Taylor and Behrmann (1994) who suggested that large speculators have 
distorted commodity prices such that commodity futures markets no longer accurately 
reflect the economic realities of supply and demand.  The need for stringent regulation 
upon hedgers in these markets is further supported due to the decline in speculation in 
these markets (Dalvi et al., 1997).  This is also supported from Table 4.6, where net 
positions of speculators were less than net positions of hedgers, both for the mean and 
standard deviation figures.  Finally, but not least, the findings are further supported by 
Haigh et al. (2005) who found that hedgers’ rebalancing activities have a positive effect 
on the volatility of futures returns in energy markets like crude oil. 
 
 So far, the above sections have helped to shed light regarding the relationship of 
net positions, sentiment, information variables and returns; the trading determinants of 
large hedgers and large speculators; their market timing ability, and existence of risk 
premium in futures markets.  The following sections deal with the performance issues 
regarding returns, volatility, forecasting and, finally the events analysis section. 
 
 
4.4 PERFORMANCE 
 
4.4.1.1 Mean Equation 
 
 There is huge support of the use of mean equations from Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2000), Grundy and Martin (2001), De Bondt and Weber (1999), Arshanapali, Coggin, 
and Doukas (1998), Fama and French (1998), and Wang (2001, 2003).  Their usage 
extends from understanding relationships between returns and other variables, to 
                                                          
 
83 The existence of risk premium for crude oil suggests the risk-bearing potentials of speculators at some 
higher frequency data intervals.  This is also supported by the fact that speculators’ mean net positions are 
net long and hedgers’ mean net positions are net short.  The two mean (absolute) values are not far apart, 
suggesting a convergence towards equilibrium rather than disequilibrium of the effect of risk premium on 
expected prices. 
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volatility and forecasting models.  In line with Wang (2001, 2003), the study makes use 
of the following model: 
 
tR = 0ϕ + 1ϕ tSI + 2ϕ tNP + 3ϕ HPt-1+ 4ϕ tyield Tbill  
              + 5ϕ tAAA-BAA + 6ϕ tDivyield + tξ      (4.10.1) 
 
where tR is the monthly returns, tSI is the sentiment index, HPt-1 is the hedging pressure 
effect variable; tyield Tbill , tAAA-BAA  and tDivyield  are the three information 
variables.  A one-month lagged own-hedging pressure variable is added to the mean 
equation for the first time in the literature to account for the existence of risk premium in 
futures markets84.  The full results are reported in Table 4.10.1 and Table 4.10.2. 
 
 
                                                          
 
84 The lagged hedging pressure variable has been obtained after manipulating the return in Equation 4.3.1. 
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Intercept NP t SI t HP t-1 Tbillyield t BAA-AAA t Divyield t
Panel A : Hedger
Minerals
GC -4.338 -0.040 0.075 -8.219 0.126 -0.011 -0.045
-2.870 -4.850 3.742 -5.682
SI -3.477 -0.147 0.132 -15.399 0.453 0.093 -1.809
-3.555 4.770 -5.676 -1.951
HG -1.652 0.000 0.042 1.473 -0.582 -0.422 1.404
PL -4.893 -0.234 0.129 -5.564 0.388 0.092 -1.252
-2.798 -2.086 4.935 -3.872 -2.196
CL -8.943 -0.055 0.055 25.257 1.391 0.513 -0.607
-2.144 2.496
HO -16.063 -0.282 0.140 -20.934 1.383 0.268 0.286
-2.490 -4.592 3.930 -2.177
Financials
SP -2.123 -0.065 0.145 -37.600 -0.307 0.156 -1.417
-2.683 6.147 -4.887
ED -0.358 0.000 0.004 -0.095 0.027 0.003 0.032
-2.732 3.290
US -3.033 -0.010 0.028 -6.073 0.431 0.194 -0.245
-2.375 1.826 1.862 1.998
Currencies
BP -5.331 0.050 0.077 -0.338 0.292 -0.015 0.123
-3.277 3.120 4.403
SF -4.493 0.035 0.067 -0.836 -0.013 -0.119 0.688
-2.554 1.800 3.318
CD -1.053 0.016 0.017 0.456 0.035 -0.031 0.038
-1.970 1.724 2.401
/pto
This table shows the results for the mean equation for large hedgers.  Rt is the futures return in month t, in 
percent.  NPt represents the net positions of large hedgers in month t.  A net position is defined as the long 
position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 contracts.  SIt denotes the Consensus index 
in month t.  HPt-1 is the lagged own hedging pressure variable.  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, Divyieldt are the 
three information variables included in the model.  All variables are differenced until they are stationary. 
The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% 
significance level.  Estimated mean equation is 
tR = 0ϕ + 1ϕ tSI + 2ϕ tNP + 3ϕ HPt-1+ 4ϕ tyield Tbill  
              + 5ϕ tAAA-BAA + 6ϕ tDivyield + tξ   
 
Table 4.10.1 
Mean equation of large hedgers 
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JY -0.720 -0.074 0.056 -3.873 -0.221 -0.136 0.244
-6.469 4.109 -4.327
Agriculturals
W -13.035 -0.199 0.191 -9.808 0.023 -0.093 1.412
-5.349 -4.142 8.162 -3.281 1.647
KW -12.637 -0.177 0.214 -12.180 0.312 -0.091 0.384
-5.120 -1.936 8.658 -2.209
MW -10.809 -0.909 0.176 -7.312 0.164 0.063 0.445
-4.320 -3.835 7.474
C -5.723 -0.074 0.143 -23.429 -0.269 0.041 -0.241
-2.642 -5.176 5.209 -6.595
S -8.442 -0.203 0.105 -27.585 0.219 0.171 0.796
-3.873 -7.410 4.541 -8.909
BO -4.703 -0.133 0.120 -14.068 -0.260 0.076 0.196
-2.584 -5.345 6.889 -6.487
SM -7.008 -0.207 0.133 -18.726 -0.681 -0.215 2.059
-3.083 -5.441 5.511 -6.566 3.201
PB -3.671 2.168 0.252 2.554 -1.358 -0.096 0.701
-0.596 3.799
LH -8.673 0.209 0.343 1.361 -1.197 -0.381 0.490
-2.115 7.066 -1.779
LC -6.800 -0.044 0.107 -12.427 0.519 0.277 -0.370
-4.004 6.036 -3.495 1.818 1.646
FC -4.291 -0.590 0.094 -5.511 0.369 -0.019 -0.855
-2.806 -3.341 7.204 -4.405 1.580 -1.933
SB -7.045 -0.113 0.200 -19.184 -0.442 0.044 -0.365
-2.033 -3.908 5.434 -4.635
CC -16.105 -0.211 0.263 -31.505 0.463 -0.014 1.034
-5.027 -2.676 5.243 -5.458
KC -17.695 -0.721 0.289 -21.982 0.870 -0.528 0.169
-4.862 -4.231 6.044 -4.481
CT -9.709 -0.204 0.176 -14.002 0.131 -0.088 0.480
-3.927 -3.712 7.287 -4.660
LB -7.067 -0.079 0.235 0.500 -0.447 0.156 -0.293
-1.716 9.272
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Intercept NP t SI t HP t-1 Tbillyield t BAA-AAA t Divyield t
Panel B : Speculator
Minerals
GC -7.892 -0.002 0.129 -5.303 0.201 0.012 0.131
-5.395 6.683 -4.065
SI -5.242 -0.122 0.201 -3.060 -0.156 -0.326 0.127
-2.149 -3.051 10.576
HG -2.114 -0.092 0.044 4.091 -0.565 -0.460 1.533
1.654 -1.734
PL -5.028 -0.081 0.156 -3.195 0.157 0.048 -0.830
-2.752 9.580 -2.671
CL -10.708 -0.045 0.100 47.531 1.463 0.388 -0.577
-1.531 3.484 3.145
HO -15.149 -0.007 0.228 -1.721 1.260 0.111 -0.306
-2.288 7.418
Financials
SP -3.434 0.006 0.149 -18.700 -0.104 0.111 -1.154
6.195 -2.055
ED -0.374 0.000 0.005 0.621 0.028 0.005 0.022
-2.840 3.752
US -2.945 0.000 0.034 -2.345 0.433 0.197 -0.381
-2.087 2.520 1.931 2.111
Currencies
BP -4.018 -0.012 0.051 -0.649 0.274 -0.029 0.147
-2.681 3.647
SF -3.491 -0.015 0.047 -1.047 0.054 -0.068 0.509
-2.194 3.101 /pto
This table shows the results for the mean equation for large speculators.  Rt is the futures return in month t, 
in percent.  NPt represents the net positions of large speculators in month t.  A net position is defined as the 
long position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 contracts.  SIt denotes the Consensus 
index in month t.  HPt-1 is the lagged own hedging pressure variable.  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, Divyieldt are 
the three information variables included in the model.  All variables are differenced until they are 
stationary.  The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is 
zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated mean equation is 
tR = 0ϕ + 1ϕ tSI + 2ϕ tNP + 3ϕ HPt-1+ 4ϕ tyield Tbill  
              + 5ϕ tAAA-BAA + 6ϕ tDivyield + tξ   
 
Table 4.10.2 
Mean equation of large speculators 
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CD -1.036 0.001 0.010 0.110 0.055 -0.041 0.111
-1.757 1.684
JY -4.728 -0.033 0.113 -0.091 -0.233 -0.021 0.512
-3.582 -1.677 8.840
Agriculturals
W -14.512 -0.021 0.241 -3.286 0.412 -0.047 0.670
-5.848 10.616
KW -13.493 0.032 0.226 -6.972 0.415 -0.156 0.380
-5.442 9.543
MW -10.458 0.310 0.192 0.498 0.227 -0.011 0.050
-4.047 8.464
C -11.308 0.009 0.238 -11.249 -0.187 0.088 -0.105
-5.053 10.902 -4.233
S -13.291 -0.012 0.218 -4.754 0.172 0.027 0.802
-5.790 10.529 -1.723
BO -2.979 0.151 0.135 -12.399 -0.454 0.056 -0.041
-1.573 4.646 8.354 -5.747
SM -8.015 0.013 0.204 -8.600 -0.561 -0.266 1.451
-3.434 10.479 -2.748 1.850
PB -4.530 -0.741 0.246 0.513 -1.111 -0.288 0.502
-0.734 3.628
LH -7.221 -0.313 0.329 3.602 -1.154 -0.424 0.320
-1.587 7.723 -1.709
LC -7.105 -0.013 0.115 -10.250 0.551 0.315 -0.474
-4.371 6.942 -3.643 1.922 1.811
FC -4.855 -0.158 0.107 -2.786 0.476 0.044 -1.149
-3.550 9.318 -3.395 2.047 -2.303
SB -12.805 -0.061 0.297 -4.191 0.574 0.293 -1.734
-3.786 -2.347 9.738 -1.329 1.134 1.285 -1.996
CC -16.859 -0.034 0.322 -16.008 0.248 -0.062 1.063
-5.321 9.076 -2.462
KC -16.772 0.029 0.406 -13.951 -0.057 -0.301 1.089
-4.044 10.308 -3.232
CT -14.023 0.008 0.245 -7.732 0.284 -0.100 0.631
-5.965 10.413 -3.149
LB -7.418 -0.997 0.239 1.070 -0.373 0.194 -0.391
-1.806 9.618
 
Note: Only significant t ratios are reported. 
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 Tables 4.10.1 and 4.10.2 report the regression of the mean equation for hedgers 
(Panel A) and speculators (Panel B).  In minerals, agriculturals and currencies, hedgers’ 
returns are more significantly associated with the level of net positions.  Twenty-two out 
of these 26 markets have significant net positions variables after having regressed the 
mean equation at 10% significance level.  Eighteen out of these 22 net positions variables 
have a negative coefficient.  This is consistent with the early findings of negative 
correlations between returns and changes in positions of hedgers (R Ω ∆NPH).  As for 
speculators, only four out of the 29 markets show significance in net position variables.  
This is also consistent with the low correlation between returns and changes in positions 
of speculators (R Ω ∆NPS), and also supports the highly negative correlation between 
hedgers’ and speculators’ net positions.  Soybean meal, for instance, has a high negative 
correlation of -0.975 between its hedgers’ and speculators’ net positions.  While its 
hedgers exhibit a significant negative sign of -0.133 in its NP variable, a positive sign is 
observed for speculators (0.151) when regressing the mean equation.   
 
 As for the sentiment index, both hedgers’ and speculators’ returns are highly 
associated with the level of sentiment index.  For hedgers, 27 out of 29 markets exhibit a 
significant positive sign, while for speculators, all markets exhibit a significant positive 
sign at 10% significance level.  This is inconsistent with Clarke and Statman (1998) who 
found no statistical significance between sentiment and S&P500 returns.  However, the 
results can be explained by the herding behaviour of speculators (Corsetti et al., 2001), 
but also with the fact that 1990s have been scheduling significant bullish behaviour in the 
US.  In relation to the hedging pressure effects, significance is observed mainly in 
agricultural markets, and these support earlier findings of own- and cross-hedging 
pressures by De Roon et al. (2000) and Keynes (1930).  Information variables, however, 
do not have much significance in affecting hedgers’ and speculators’ returns.  Only 11 
and 12 markets have significant information variables for hedgers and speculators. These 
findings are inconsistent with Chatrath et al. (1997) and Easley and O’Hara (2002) who 
support that information variables like dividend yield, corporate spread and Treasury bill 
yield help in determining returns.  This suggests that such large players do not take much 
consideration of information variables in determining their returns. 
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4.4.1.2 Decomposed Mean Equation  
 
 Important ARMA models (Schwert, 1989; Jiang and Chiang, 2000; and Chatrath 
et al., 1999) have helped to get expected and unexpected components of market volatility, 
trading activity and returns.  In line with Schwert (1989), this study makes use of an 
ARMA model to decompose the mean equation variables into expected and unexpected 
components.  Variables decomposed are net positions of hedgers and speculators, 
sentiment index and information variables.  An extension of Equation 4.10.1 gives the 
decomposed mean equation as follows: 
 
tR = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP  
 + 5ϕ HPt-1 + 6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ  Unexp tyield Tbill  
+ 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA  
+ 10ϕ Exp tDivyield + 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield + tξ        (4.10.2) 
 
 
 Similar to Thomakosi and Wang (2003) and Daigler and Chen (1999), 
autocorrelations (AC) and partial autocorrelations (PAC) are used in selecting an ARIMA 
specification85.  The Akaike information criteria (AIC) provides a guide for the 
appropriate lag order selection86.  In line with Tam and Reinsel (1998), if autocorrelations 
appear to have a seasonal pattern87, SMA (Seasonal Moving Average) and SAR 
(Seasonal Autoregressive) are included in the ARMA model structure.   Diagnostic tests 
using correlograms and Breusch-Godrey LM test88  help to assess the structure of the 
ARMA model (Sadorsky, 2003; Yang et al., 2001).  Results for optimal lag selection 
(including seasonal variables), Q statistics and Breusch-Godrey LM test support an 
optimized model structure of the mean equation, without autocorrelation in variables.  
Ljung-Box Q test statistics and Breusch-Godfrey LM tests are again used, together with 
ARCH LM test, to check if the residuals from the mean equation are uncorrelated with 
                                                          
 
85 See Appendix 6.5.7 for more details. 
86 R-squared values are also initially looked at, but, as expected, give too low values to be considered for 
inferencing. 
87 See Appendix 6.5.8 for estimating ARMA models (differencing and ARMA terms (including seasonal)) 
88 See Appendix 6.5.10 for Breusch-Godfrey LM test. 
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past residuals89 (McKenzie and Holt, 2002).  Results for these residuals tests support the 
series have white noise properties and can be found in Appendix 6.11 (Table 4.10.6).  
Full results of the decomposed mean equation are provided below in Table 4.10.3 and 
Table 4.10.490.  Results are reported at 10% significance level. 
 
 
 
Intercept            NP t            SI t HP t-1      Tbillyield t         BAA-AAA t           Divyield t
Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp.      Exp Unexp.       Exp Unexp.       Exp Unexp.
Panel A : Hedger
Minerals
GC -9.68 -0.02 -0.02 0.19 -0.03 -5.90 4.24 1.46 0.90 0.50 -11.46 0.52
-5.36 -1.98 5.06 -3.95 1.88
SI -13.43 -0.11 -0.02 0.28 -0.05 -9.54 5.13 0.99 1.54 1.76 4.46 -1.51
-5.87 -2.23 6.52 -2.14 -3.97 3.89
HG -8.60 0.11 -0.01 0.21 0.14 3.88 27.37 -2.65 0.90 -0.13 -2.02 -18.71
-2.16 2.22 3.79 1.72 -3.83
PL 1.05 0.11 -0.04 0.15 0.16 -0.80 -4.18 3.22 -0.85 0.08 -18.55 1.00
2.52 8.00
CL -17.27 0.03 -0.02 0.35 0.00 33.02 16.84 -0.33 -1.37 -1.48 -104.97 13.18
-4.77 4.49 3.38 -2.50 2.30
HO -29.06 -0.30 0.11 0.55 0.07 -9.19 -23.91 -0.67 -0.07 -0.81 -37.45 6.21
-6.33 -2.71 4.65 /pto
This table shows the results for the decomposed mean equation for large hedgers.  Rt is the futures return in 
month t, in percent.  NPt represents the net positions of large hedgers in month t.  A net position is defined 
as the long position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 contracts.  SIt denotes the 
Consensus index in month t.  HPt-1 is the lagged own hedging pressure variable.  Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt, 
Divyieldt are the three information variables included in the model.  All variables are differenced until they 
are stationary.  NPt, SIt, Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt,  and Divyieldt are decomposed using ARMA model 
specifications.  Autocorrelations (AC) and partial autocorrelations (PAC) are used in selecting an ARIMA
specification.  The Akaike information criteria (AIC) is used to select the appropriate lag order.  SMA
(Seasonal Moving Average) and SAR (Seasonal Autoregressive) variables are included in the ARMA
model if autocorrelations appear to have a seasonal pattern.  Diagnostic tests using correlograms and 
Breusch- Godrey LM test are used to assess the structure of the ARMA model. Ljung-Box Q test statistics 
are again used to check if the residuals from the model are nearly white noise, i.e, no serial correlation left 
in the residuals.  The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter 
is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated mean equation is  
tR = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP + 5ϕ HPt-1+ 
6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ Unexp tyield Tbill  + 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA  + 
10ϕ Exp tDivyield + 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield +  
 
                                                          
 
89 See Appendix 6.5.9 for Ljung-Box Q statistics specification, Appendix 6.5.12 for ARCH LM test. 
90 Since, standard inference procedures do not apply to regressions that contain an integrated dependent 
variable or integrated regressors (like in ARMA), stationary testing is also performed on the mean 
equations, and residuals were found stationary. 
Table 4.10.3 
Decomposed mean equation for large hedgers 
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Financials
SP -9.39 -0.07 -0.02 0.24 0.02 -27.43 2.24 2.10 -0.97 -0.08 64.81 2.21
-4.06 -2.11 5.84 -3.28 2.56
ED -0.65 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.26 -3.06 -0.18 0.05 0.01 -1.48 0.08
-3.43 3.46 -2.92 -2.02
US -3.54 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.93 -12.25 -0.46 -0.40 -0.17 -6.51 2.31
-2.46 2.53 3.97
Currencies
BP -11.23 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.05 -1.07 -1.29 -1.68 0.16 -0.19 -14.51 5.87
-5.05 3.62 5.07 4.28 3.13
SF -5.58 -0.03 -0.06 0.14 0.05 -1.57 -3.81 -1.89 0.83 -0.10 -3.77 4.65
-2.52 -4.07 2.90 2.46 -2.37
CD -1.49 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.07 2.78 -0.09 0.67 -0.14 -1.71 -1.30
-2.26 -2.45 2.07 4.69 -0.20
JY -7.50 -0.05 0.00 0.20 -0.02 -1.11 -4.91 3.51 0.93 0.32 10.86 -0.45
-4.37 -2.86 5.51 3.41
Agriculturals
W -9.21 -0.58 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -7.33 -18.30 0.68 0.43 0.05 33.27 -0.69
-3.45 -6.38 -2.31
KW -4.44 2.85 0.12 0.11 -0.01 8.97 -21.86 -0.57 0.87 0.41 40.94 5.29
-1.74 5.00 2.18
MW -7.43 -2.09 0.50 0.14 0.00 -8.75 -12.24 -2.81 1.36 0.48 22.84 2.14
-2.77 -5.06 1.75 2.68
C -5.01 -0.09 0.00 0.08 0.16 -21.35 -14.05 -1.24 -1.14 -0.46 -22.90 -0.25
-1.73 -5.05 5.57 -4.93 -1.50
S 6.34 -0.19 -0.03 -0.15 -0.01 -13.84 0.85 -1.29 -2.02 -0.07 13.14 0.53
2.18 -7.89 -2.79 -5.05
BO -21.14 -0.10 0.00 0.45 -0.04 -7.92 -9.34 -1.10 -1.85 0.69 1.48 1.67
-10.09 -3.78 9.45 -1.74 -4.44 1.74
SM -10.32 -0.38 0.07 0.18 -0.03 -21.50 0.95 -0.97 1.28 0.32 -0.71 3.86
-4.79 -9.43 2.00 3.75 -1.71 -7.35
PB -24.31 2.04 1.99 0.63 0.22 1.77 -11.14 0.28 10.47 0.13 -44.02 4.67
-3.44 3.65 3.07 2.09
LH -11.86 -0.99 -0.25 0.25 -0.14 -4.74 -44.85 6.17 6.24 1.28 -27.08 7.85
-1.74 -5.04 -2.43 -1.85 2.24 1.94
LC -13.74 -0.10 -0.01 0.28 0.02 -10.23 -0.44 -1.30 0.94 -0.03 -6.26 4.99
-4.78 4.91 -2.84 1.80
FC -13.50 1.28 -0.25 0.28 -0.03 -2.20 4.31 0.67 -1.85 -0.18 9.73 -1.58
-6.98 1.93 6.69 -1.68 -1.97
SB -4.96 -0.13 0.03 0.08 0.02 -6.66 -5.77 1.97 1.70 1.55 58.68 9.39
-3.13 2.13
CC -8.52 -0.37 0.21 0.15 0.01 -24.73 -21.43 -4.54 3.82 0.17 -7.77 12.56
-1.65 -3.39 2.28 -3.14 -1.79 1.66
KC -33.64 -0.17 0.03 0.86 0.05 -14.48 14.51 -0.73 3.77 0.81 60.19 -10.59
-4.86 6.10 -2.32
CT -9.67 -0.58 0.04 0.22 -0.04 -19.07 1.85 -1.37 -1.35 0.29 43.11 10.08
-2.08 -6.68 2.27 -5.21 1.87
LB -65.83 -1.29 0.41 1.54 0.01 -0.28 -7.79 -4.81 -9.67 -1.05 23.29 1.74
-6.60 6.52 -1.70
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Intercept              NP t              SI t HP t-1      Tbillyield t         BAA-AAA t            Divyield t
       Exp Unexp.        Exp Unexp.      Exp Unexp.         Exp Unexp.       Exp Unexp.
Panel B : Speculator
Minerals
GC -11.05 0.00 0.00 0.22 -0.01 -5.19 2.57 1.12 0.50 0.45 -11.29 1.03
-3.72 3.86 -4.51 1.67
SI -12.36 0.00 0.04 0.32 -0.05 -7.70 5.88 1.32 1.42 1.83 -0.89 -1.27
-5.35 7.58 -1.87 -2.88 4.05
HG -6.47 -0.08 0.13 0.15 0.13 3.29 22.11 -3.33 1.59 -0.23 1.03 -18.39
-1.95 2.04 4.04 -3.91
PL -4.79 -0.02 -0.19 0.12 0.16 -3.08 -6.81 3.53 -1.09 0.12 -13.26 2.41
-1.83 -2.33 1.98 9.18 -2.27
CL -17.11 0.10 -0.25 0.33 0.02 28.49 16.71 0.96 -2.30 -1.37 -115.01 11.35
-4.49 -2.68 3.85 2.77 -2.91 1.96
HO -33.19 0.04 0.04 0.73 0.05 -0.93 -17.04 0.65 -0.79 -0.79 -32.03 4.67
-6.16 5.54
Financials
SP -9.25 0.04 -0.06 0.25 0.03 -13.66 3.42 1.50 -0.33 -0.21 62.00 1.14
-3.95 6.11 -1.99 2.27
ED -0.68 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -3.05 -0.17 0.03 0.01 -1.52 0.10
-4.61 4.39 -2.84 -1.92
US -3.54 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.47 -11.91 -0.38 -0.54 -0.13 -6.76 1.68
-2.49 2.67 4.36
/pto
This table shows the results for the decomposed mean equation for large speculators.  Rt is the futures 
return in month t, in percent.  NPt represents the net positions of large speculators in month t.  A net 
position is defined as the long position less the short position of a trader type, in units of 1,000 contracts.
SIt denotes the Consensus index in month t.  HPt-1 is the lagged own hedging pressure variable.  Tbillyieldt, 
BAA-AAAt, Divyieldt are the three information variables included in the model.  All variables are 
differenced until they are stationary.  NPt, SIt, Tbillyieldt, BAA-AAAt,  and Divyieldt are decomposed using 
ARMA model specifications.  Autocorrelations (AC) and partial autocorrelations (PAC) are used in
selecting an ARIMA specification.  The Akaike information criteria (AIC) is used to select the appropriate
lag order.  SMA (Seasonal Moving Average) and SAR (Seasonal Autoregressive) variables are included in
the ARMA model if autocorrelations appear to have a seasonal pattern.  Diagnostic tests using 
correlograms and Breusch- Godrey LM test are used to assess the structure of the ARMA model. Ljung-
Box Q test statistics are again used to check if the residuals from the model are nearly white noise, i.e, no 
serial correlation left in the residuals.  The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that 
the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated mean equation is  
tR = 0ϕ + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP + 5ϕ HPt-1+ 
6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ Unexp tyield Tbill  + 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA  + 
10ϕ Exp tDivyield + 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield + tξ  
 
 
 
Table 4.10.4 
Decomposed mean equation for Large speculators 
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Currencies
BP -6.83 -0.05 0.01 0.15 0.05 -0.41 -1.77 -2.50 -0.35 -0.24 -7.05 6.12
-4.06 4.06 4.30 -1.94 3.02
SF -6.10 -0.07 -0.03 0.14 0.06 -1.49 -7.79 -2.40 0.14 0.30 -8.01 6.09
-3.35 3.23 4.19 -2.29 -1.91 2.11
CD -1.80 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.06 3.82 -0.05 0.70 -0.11 -1.42 -1.79
-2.35 2.31 6.01 -1.84
JY -10.34 0.06 0.05 0.26 0.00 -0.21 -13.25 3.94 1.29 0.48 12.59 1.04
-8.13 1.74 2.67 8.71 3.54
Agriculturals
W -5.97 0.69 -0.16 0.12 -0.01 2.11 -24.50 -0.45 -0.79 0.15 49.33 -1.31
-2.26 2.47 -1.98 2.32 1.77
KW -3.72 -1.22 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 -1.01 -22.25 -1.55 -0.15 0.19 53.74 2.71
-2.41 1.96
MW -4.33 1.38 0.85 0.10 -0.01 0.90 -6.36 -1.96 1.59 0.38 35.06 1.52
1.81
C -10.49 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.26 -9.11 -19.64 -1.90 -1.56 -0.44 -22.84 -0.28
-3.63 3.34 9.33 -2.47
S 1.24 0.05 0.20 -0.03 -0.02 1.56 3.48 0.42 -3.45 0.39 29.70 1.07
5.29
BO -24.40 -0.43 -0.03 0.54 0.01 -4.80 -8.58 -1.47 -1.37 0.73 6.24 1.84
-11.30 11.85 -2.48 1.75
SM -8.64 0.05 0.19 0.20 -0.02 -5.20 -1.42 0.18 -2.35 0.37 -0.03 2.59
-3.71 2.77 4.06
PB -28.24 -0.83 -1.39 0.71 0.20 -0.42 -9.48 0.85 8.38 0.17 -40.02 2.19
-3.50 3.62 2.81 1.63
LH -21.40 -0.43 0.61 0.51 -0.09 6.63 -37.71 9.04 6.27 1.48 -38.22 9.77
-3.31 2.80 3.24 1.65 2.81 1.79
LC -15.03 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.02 -7.37 -1.31 -1.37 0.93 -0.01 -8.08 4.73
-5.83 6.07 -3.07 1.69
FC -12.61 0.34 0.61 0.26 -0.02 -1.18 -0.78 0.73 -1.50 -0.16 13.52 -2.18
-6.97 3.03 6.84
SB -10.79 -0.07 0.06 0.24 -0.01 3.11 -10.15 2.13 0.61 1.71 61.22 9.56
-3.29 3.97 2.52
CC -18.95 0.61 -0.17 0.43 0.02 -14.42 -29.00 -3.20 2.46 0.03 -11.67 17.52
-4.49 2.57 4.28 2.45
KC -27.28 0.79 0.27 0.68 0.03 -19.14 22.53 0.19 4.01 0.95 63.86 -12.39
-3.61 1.82 4.29 -3.06
CT -13.84 0.27 -0.12 0.32 -0.02 -7.98 -15.07 -3.14 -4.10 -0.33 42.60 11.37
-3.70 3.57 4.32 -2.24 1.67
LB -68.64 2.48 4.48 1.61 0.01 -0.05 -1.90 -4.43 -9.71 -1.02 14.61 0.57
-7.32 2.51 7.36 -1.86
 
 
 
137
Findings from Table 4.10.3 show that in 17 markets, expected components of net 
positions of hedgers are significantly related to the actual futures returns at 10% 
significance level.  Importantly, 15 of these 17 markets are from the agricultural group, 
and exhibit a significant negative sign.  Expected components of net positions are 
positive and significant only in feeder cattle and wheat (Kansas).  The presence of 
significant negative signs on expected net positions is consistent with earlier findings in 
Table 4.6 where net positions of hedgers exhibit a negative relationship towards returns.  
Unexpected components of net positions for hedgers are significant only in six cases, 
where gold and Swiss francs exhibit a negative sign.  The difference in significance 
between expected and unexpected components for net positions of hedgers suggest that 
hedgers are informed players by adjusting their net positions more often at the start of the 
trading month rather than in a noisy way all throughout the month91.  This result can be 
compared with Table 4.10.4, where the unexpected component of net positions of 
speculators is significant in 10 futures markets92 at 10% significance level.  Six out of 
these 10 markets exhibit a significant positive sign, supporting the finding in Table 4.6 
that speculators’ net positions and returns are positively related.  This tends to be also the 
case for the expected component of net positions of speculators, where in five out of six 
markets a positive significant sign is displayed.  The mere positive significance of the 
expected component for net positions for speculators suggests that these players are less 
informed than hedgers.  This is further supported by more significance (both negative and 
positive) of unexpected net positions for speculators compared to hedgers, suggesting 
speculators are traders who change their net positions more often than hedgers all 
throughout the month to get higher returns. These findings also support Canoles et al. 
(1998) that both hedgers and speculators are financially sophisticated, well-educated, 
well-capitalized, and that hedgers are better informed in setting better expected net 
positions to determine actual returns.  The poor significance of expected net positions, 
and the greater significance of unexpected net positions of speculators in determining 
                                                          
 
91 This is in contrast to uninformed noisy traders or small traders who tend to lose in futures markets. 
92 Note again that some of the net positions of speculators are differenced series.  See Appendix 4.10 for 
more details. 
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returns, support Murrell (1979) and Hyde (1978) that speculators can be in the market for 
recreational utilities and not only higher returns or profits.   
 
 Moreover, expected sentiment variables are positive and significant for both 
players in most markets.  Unexpected sentiment variables are significant for hedgers in 
13 markets and significant for speculators in 10 markets.  In eight similar markets, 
unexpected sentiment is significantly positive for both hedgers and speculators93.  Live 
hogs, soybean meal, soybean oil, feeder cattle and silver display a significant negative 
unexpected sentiment variable for hedgers, while only live hogs and silver have a 
significant negative unexpected sentiment variable for speculators.  Overall, findings of 
sentiment over returns showing a positive relationship are consistent with the herding 
behaviour of speculators, and bullish trend in the 1990s.  Also, consistent with Table 
4.10.1 and 4.10.2, the lagged hedging pressure variable is significant and negative mostly 
in agricultural markets.   
  
 Results for information variables were mixed.  Only live hogs (Eurodollars) 
exhibited a significant and negative expected T-bill yield coefficient for hedgers 
(speculators).  Unexpected T-bill yield had a significant and positive effect for hedgers 
and speculators in Japanese yen and live hogs.  Unexpected T-bill yield had a negative 
effect on hedgers’ return in Eurodollars and cocoa, and a negative effect on speculators’ 
return in Eurodollars, British pounds and Swiss francs.  It can be observed that T-bill 
yield not only has more effect on financial and currency groups, but also that speculators’ 
returns are more affected by unexpected changes in T-bill yield.  This supports the fact 
that speculators are more reliant on adjusting their returns all throughout the month based 
on changing variables like T-bill yield. 
 
  Expected corporate spread had a significant positive effect only on hedgers’ 
return in pork bellies and live hogs, and a significant negative effect only on both 
                                                          
 
93 Since the same sentiment data is used for both hedgers and speculators, the relationship between 
sentiment and return should normally be the same when regressing the mean equation.  Any difference is 
due to net positions being different, which eventually affect sentiment variables differently. 
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hedgers’ and speculators’ return in lumber.  Unexpected corporate spread has had a 
positive effect on both players’ return in gold, silver, soybean oil and sugar.  Interestingly 
too is that the expected dividend yield has had a negative effect on crude oil, and a 
positive effect on S&P500 futures for both players.  This is consistent with crude oil and 
market dividend yield bearing a negative relationship, and that the market dividend yield 
has been increasing over the 1990–2000 period resulting in higher returns.  Further, 
unexpected dividend yield has had a significant positive effect for hedgers in crude oil, 
British pounds, live cattle and cotton; and a significant positive effect for speculators in 
crude oil, British pounds, Swiss francs, live cattle, cocoa and cotton.  Unexpected 
dividend yields were negative, however, for copper for hedgers; copper and Canadian 
dollars for speculators.  Results not only support that dividend yield tends to affect crude 
oil, major financials and currencies more than agriculturals, but that speculators’ returns 
are more positively affected by unexpected dividend yield changes.  Mainly to financials, 
minerals and currencies, findings of decomposed information variables suggest that 
unexpected T-bill yield appears to be more significant to returns for speculators, and 
unexpected corporate spread and dividend yield appears to be more positively significant 
to returns of speculators.  These again support that speculators’ returns are based also on 
changing (unexpected) components of information variables all throughout the month, 
hence, their volatile trading habits. 
 
 
4.4.2 Volatility  
4.4.2.1 Idiosyncratic Volatility and Decomposed Variables 
 
While studies such as Roth et al. (2003) show a positive relation between 
volatility and open interest for both hedgers and speculators, Foster (1995) found that 
volume and volatility are positively related and that these variables are endogenous to the 
system.  Others like Chatrath et al. (1999) found that information variables also play an 
important role in the volatility spillover across markets94.  In line with Lopez (2001), it 
                                                          
 
94 See Chapter 2, section 2.16 for more details on volatility. 
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can be shown by using Equation 4.10.2, that 
2
tξ  is an unbiased estimator of 2tσ  as 
follows: 
 
tR = μ t + tξ ,   tξ  = tt zσ ,  tz ~ N(0,1) 
, where the conditional mean μ t  = E [ ]1| −ΩttR  
, 1−Ωt is the information set available at time t-1, 
, tξ  is the innovation term, 
, tσ is its conditional variance, 
 
    
2
tξ = E [ ]12 | −Ωttξ   
 = 
2
tσ .E [ ]12 | −Ωttz   
 = 
2
tσ            (4.11.1) 
 
To know the relationship between net positions of players, sentiment index, hedging 
pressure, information variables and idiosyncratic volatility, Equation 4.11.2 is regressed 
as follows, and full results are reported in Table 4.11.1 and 4.11.295. 
 
2
tσ = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP  
 + 5ϕ HPt-1 + 6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ  Unexp tyield Tbill  
+ 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA  
+ 10ϕ Exp tDivyield + 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield + tξ    (4.11.2) 
 
 
Table 4.11.1 shows the volatility equation for hedgers.  Expected net positions are 
negative and significant for S&P500 and wheat (Chicago), and positive and significant 
for soybean oil and wheat (Minnesota); while unexpected net positions are significantly 
negative for S&P500 and Swiss francs and significantly positive for Canadian dollars and 
sugar only.  This supports the results earlier that hedgers are informed players in the 
                                                          
 
95 All results are reported at 10% significance level.  Only significant t ratios are showed.   
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futures markets, where unexpected net positions add to volatility in Canadian dollars and 
sugar only.  Expected sentiment is negative and significant only for platinum; while 
unexpected sentiment is significantly negative for British pounds and positive for feeder 
cattle.  The lagged hedging pressure variable is significant and positive for platinum and 
soybean meal; and significant and negative for Japanese yen and sugar.  While Japanese 
yen did not exhibit significant risk premium in the decomposed mean equation (Table 
4.10.3), the lagged hedging pressure variable tends to reduce the volatility for hedgers 
when looking at the volatility equation.  Therefore, the negative coefficient for Japanese 
yen supports the claim made earlier in the destabilizing feature section where there is a 
need to reconsider the position limits of speculators in that market.   
 
 Expected Treasury bill yield is negative and significant for British pounds and 
positive for corn and soybean oil.  Unexpected Treasury bill yield is significant and 
negative only for British pounds and heating oil.  Expected corporate spread is significant 
and positive for copper, wheat (Minnesota) and corn; while unexpected corporate spread 
is significant and positive for Treasury bonds, soybean oil, and negative for Canadian 
dollars.  Expected dividend yield is significant and negative for S&P500 futures and 
positive for feeder cattle futures.  Unexpected dividend yield have no significance to 
volatility in any market.  This not only suggests that the market (S&P500) overall trend 
was predictable at the start of the month96, but also that dividend yield does not have 
significant effect upon the volatility of informed players like hedgers. 
 
 In contrast, Table 4.11.2 shows that expected net positions for speculators are 
significant and positive for Swiss francs, wheat (Chicago, Minnesota) and coffee; and 
significant and negative for cocoa only.  Unexpected net positions are significant and 
positive for Canadian dollars and lumber; and negative for wheat (Kansas) and live hogs.  
This suggests that net positions of hedgers (expected and unexpected) tend to have less 
effect on volatility compared to speculators’ net positions (expected and unexpected) 
                                                          
 
96 This is also supported by the fact that the expected dividend yield was significant and negative in 
reducing the volatility in S&P500 futures market. 
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which tend to add to volatility97.  This is consistent with the Shalen (1993) and Chen et 
al. (1995) models, where speculators’ volatility is positively associated with trading 
demand (measured as net positions).  The negative impact of trading demand on volatility 
for hedgers in S&P500 and wheat (Chicago) can be explained due to hedgers’ net 
positions having a negative impact over returns in both markets (as shown in Table 4.6), 
and also due to the fact that volatility is measured as the squared residual from the mean 
equation, where net position is a significant variable in determining returns, as seen in 
Table 4.10.1. 
 
 Expected sentiment for speculators has significant positive effects on the volatility 
of silver, copper and Japanese yen; and significant negative effects on the volatility of 
platinum and soybean.  Unexpected sentiment is significant and positive for live hogs and 
feeder cattle, and negative for Treasury bonds and British pounds.  Comparing the 
expected and unexpected sentiment for both players, it appears that expected sentiment 
has led to an increase in volatility of speculators.  This can be explained by trend-chasing 
behaviour in the 1990s which resulted in an increase in trading activity and thus volatility 
levels (Wang, 2003).  Further, the number of significant expected and particularly 
unexpected variables affecting volatility can be found within the currencies group for 
both players, supporting the fact the foreign exchange markets are among the most 
actively traded contracts in the US98. 
 
 Expected Treasury bill yield is negative and significant for feeder cattle and 
British pounds, and positive for soybean oil and pork bellies.  Unexpected Treasury bill 
yield is negative and significant for heating oil and pork bellies.  Expected corporate 
yield spread is not significant in any market for speculators, while unexpected corporate 
yield spread is significant and negative only in Japanese yen and soybean oil.  This 
contrasts with hedgers, where expected corporate yield spread tends to have a positive 
effect on volatility.  Expected dividend is positive and significant only in wheat (Kansas), 
                                                          
 
97 However, it is important to understand that idiosyncratic volatility is always a positive number since it is 
the squared residual from the mean equation.  Regressing positive values of volatility against net positions 
of hedgers (which are net short overall) would lead to a negative net position coefficient. 
98 See Appendix 6.2 for 25 largest trading US Exchange Traded contracts.  
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and unexpected dividend was significant and positive for sugar and soybean.  This again 
contrasts with hedgers where unexpected dividend yield is not significant in any market.  
The above overall findings support that information variables do not significantly affect 
volatility of large hedgers and large speculators. 
 
 
 
Volatility Equation:
Intercept          NP t               SI t HP t-1     Tbillyield t          BAA-AAA t           Divyield t
Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp.
Panel A : Hedger
Minerals
GC -5.435 0.212 0.024 0.211 0.502 1.794 -35.591 21.151 -1.649 0.473 -21.310 -22.982
SI -12.785 -0.083 -0.022 0.533 0.006 -2.646 13.249 0.448 -12.365 0.594 82.526 -21.001
HG 9.351 -0.337 -0.991 0.496 -0.110 -22.237 67.733 -13.398 27.236 -5.977 82.134 43.229
2.054
PL 41.158 1.011 -0.112 -0.580 0.112 13.709 -3.824 -9.961 -6.810 0.055 44.499 -24.164
2.363 -1.844 1.759
/pto
This table shows the volatility equation for large hedgers.  Volatility is the squared residuals obtained from
the mean equation, as shown below.   Net positions of hedgers, sentiment data, treasury bill yield, corporate
spread, dividend yield are decomposed into expected and unexpected variables using ARMA
specifications.  A lagged hedging pressure variable is also regressed against volatility.  The numbers in 
italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level. 
Estimated idiosyncratic volatility equation is  
2
tσ = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP + 5ϕ HPt-1 + 
6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ  Unexp tyield Tbill + 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA + 
10ϕ Exp tDivyield + 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield + tξ  
, where the volatility measure 2tσ is derived from the following mean equation: 
tR = μ t + tξ ,   tξ  = tt zσ ,  tz ~ N(0,1) 
, where the conditional mean μ t  = E[ ]1| −Ω ttR  
, 1−Ω t is the information set available at time t-1, 
, tξ  is the innovation term, 
, tσ is its conditional variance, 
    
2
tξ = E [ ]12 | −Ω ttξ   =  2tσ .E [ ]12 | −Ω ttz    =  2tσ    
 
Table 4.11.1 
Volatility equation for large hedgers 
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CL -265.195 -0.064 -0.490 5.390 -0.478 -547.545 -1313.354 -48.780 -93.662 -51.468 -3529.056 396.573
HO -40.956 0.723 1.220 1.521 0.102 -26.033 -752.937 -114.887 -99.405 -27.615 -1251.436 93.661
-2.089
Financials
SP 22.882 -0.279 -0.362 -0.306 -0.009 -12.283 -32.269 -4.459 2.872 1.307 -143.906 4.389
2.171 -2.457 -2.583 -1.731
ED 1.149 0.147 0.012 0.141 -0.084 14.382 -1.006 -5.290 -2.046 -0.638 -55.348 12.406
US 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.173 0.394 0.081 0.043 0.014 -0.596 0.012
1.649
Currencies
BP -0.897 0.227 -0.001 0.126 -0.102 2.470 -40.694 -12.975 2.779 -2.101 10.508 -4.853
-1.667 -1.656 -1.655
SF -12.087 0.080 -0.113 0.514 -0.054 -6.530 15.762 -2.055 4.091 -0.601 108.333 -20.898
-1.730
CD 2.464 -0.007 0.020 -0.036 0.001 -0.572 1.414 -0.804 -0.074 -0.522 -4.474 0.064
2.600 1.772 -2.617
JY -9.144 0.056 0.002 0.310 0.106 -7.353 -54.576 -4.704 -5.324 -1.138 30.519 -18.315
-1.850
Agriculturals
W 27.092 -2.099 -0.489 -0.150 -0.395 -21.124 -10.537 -2.147 36.178 3.553 444.922 51.812
-2.326 1.721
KW 13.536 -1.926 -0.389 0.517 -0.370 107.565 -138.352 -29.707 34.725 3.282 375.077 41.696
MW 2.165 9.412 5.040 0.814 -0.872 37.098 -61.942 -25.037 44.828 -1.282 430.909 -9.287
1.828 1.996
C -11.565 0.200 0.183 0.567 0.336 15.857 117.768 -10.067 12.393 3.494 -87.750 -41.905
1.695 1.668
S 5.834 0.063 0.263 0.166 -0.051 4.785 -38.973 13.046 -3.698 -2.155 -95.563 39.004
BO 2.826 0.261 0.031 0.314 0.003 -8.741 86.490 -0.034 1.184 2.278 47.383 10.515
2.392 2.040 2.262
SM 2.894 0.174 0.066 0.166 -0.158 36.367 -0.584 10.909 -29.149 -3.073 -113.805 -22.794
2.066
PB 382.897 -20.169 -5.743 -5.660 1.504 63.992 928.344 -50.260 76.568 -15.878 3.544 -39.070
1.998
LH -3.547 5.299 -2.964 1.545 0.881 28.742 276.368 -1.837 53.782 9.064 -1064.175 76.672
LC -12.264 -0.099 0.274 0.485 -0.113 4.012 -10.356 0.331 3.551 2.816 80.026 17.201
FC 9.882 -2.748 -1.875 -0.017 0.095 7.095 -24.234 -2.767 3.527 0.703 86.853 4.630
1.790 1.829
SB 54.348 0.026 0.632 0.442 0.645 -113.082 -187.005 18.093 24.332 -5.556 135.696 74.024
2.241 -2.363
CC -0.301 -1.818 1.286 1.049 -0.052 -238.856 192.605 2.866 35.015 -2.912 -87.923 4.800
KC -23.937 -0.401 1.087 3.368 -0.443 -23.232 413.284 212.959 14.690 13.719 546.731 39.920
CT 36.309 -0.377 0.095 -0.210 0.155 34.549 -122.693 6.426 27.446 -3.093 106.348 -22.697
1.726
LB -140.664 15.009 -1.665 4.646 0.065 25.137 87.658 13.335 27.161 8.935 -2.802 41.511
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Volatility Equation
Intercept       NP t        SI t HP t-1      Tbillyield t         BAA-AAA t               Divyield t
Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp. Exp Unexp.
Panel B: Speculator
Minerals
GC -24.417 -0.519 -0.371 0.483 0.608 14.797 -82.531 15.158 -1.601 1.049 -45.841 -3.690
SI -15.514 -0.139 -0.252 0.662 0.066 2.985 7.901 -2.328 -7.068 0.576 75.333 -17.806
2.110
HG -14.278 -0.863 -0.808 1.108 0.216 -14.952 185.876 -14.038 14.339 -5.728 27.231 18.558
2.495
PL 43.044 1.022 -0.069 -0.624 0.108 14.199 -5.029 -9.604 -7.398 0.220 47.865 -18.972
2.343 -1.883 1.757
/pto
This table shows the volatility equation for large speculators.  Volatility is the squared residuals obtained 
from the mean equation, as shown below.   Net positions of speculators, sentiment data, treasury bill yield, 
corporate spread, dividend yield are decomposed into expected and unexpected variables using ARMA
specifications.  A lagged hedging pressure variable is also regressed against volatility.  The numbers in 
italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level. 
Estimated idiosyncratic volatility equation is  
2
tσ = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ Exp tSI + 2ϕ Unexp tSI + 3ϕ Exp tNP + 4ϕ Unexp tNP + 5ϕ HPt-1 + 
6ϕ Exp tyield Tbill + 7ϕ  Unexp tyield Tbill + 8ϕ Exp tAAA-BAA + 9ϕ  Unexp tAAA-BAA + 
10ϕ Exp tDivyield+ 11ϕ  Unexp tDivyield+ tξ  
, where the volatility measure 2tσ is derived from the following mean equation: 
tR = μt + tξ ,   tξ  = tt zσ ,  tz ~ N(0,1) 
, where the conditional mean μt  = E[ ]1| −ΩttR  
, 1−Ωt is the information set available at time t-1, 
, tξ  is the innovation term, 
, tσ is its conditional variance, 
    
2
tξ = E [ ]12 | −Ωttξ   =  2tσ .E [ ]12 | −Ωttz    =  2tσ    
Table 4.11.2 
Volatility equation of large speculators 
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CL -324.699 -5.338 -1.523 7.011 -0.161 -637.533 -1014.352 -45.498 -97.082 -48.698 -3545.714 388.938
HO -61.578 -3.400 -2.219 2.106 -0.289 13.672 -709.652 -139.631 -50.586 -29.394 -1070.650 125.594
-2.144
Financials
SP 23.042 -0.004 -0.082 -0.312 0.003 39.347 -48.943 -5.349 4.616 1.787 -119.030 -7.806
ED 0.048 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.035 0.342 0.076 0.053 0.015 -0.629 0.001
US 4.277 -0.100 -0.152 0.051 -0.103 5.256 3.075 -5.192 0.676 -0.023 -48.386 5.673
-1.840
Currencies
BP -2.089 -0.143 0.005 0.166 -0.113 -0.014 -50.075 -15.092 4.356 -2.133 13.739 -4.353
-1.750 -1.859 -1.694
SF -17.397 0.481 0.112 0.672 -0.057 -9.769 51.706 -2.995 5.557 0.140 72.855 -10.551
2.189 -1.651
CD 2.882 0.026 0.022 -0.043 -0.003 -0.537 3.283 -1.043 -0.053 -0.594 -1.498 -0.298
2.276 1.700
JY -3.982 -0.187 0.011 0.202 0.045 -9.716 -38.409 -6.700 -1.040 -1.677 30.519 -10.745
2.134 -2.393 -2.853
Agriculturals
W 39.017 4.688 -1.156 0.312 -0.425 -26.907 -104.566 -14.656 16.204 5.004 697.312 -23.677
1.747 1.683 2.136
KW -1.869 7.235 -5.788 0.997 -0.644 166.607 -121.909 -22.273 48.202 1.780 440.535 -42.827
-1.655
MW 25.675 14.921 2.891 0.302 -0.447 -44.918 -112.938 -13.564 27.712 2.735 330.196 -10.267
1.855
C -2.881 -0.002 -0.029 0.449 -0.004 -13.373 117.107 -4.109 11.684 2.154 -85.901 -29.619
S 53.011 0.348 0.056 -0.556 -0.098 -15.295 -2.035 6.313 -17.846 -5.054 88.276 71.243
2.897 -1.669 2.569
BO 15.252 9.701 0.028 0.045 -0.123 -18.164 90.097 4.372 -0.180 3.159 37.393 10.277
1.767 3.075
SM 28.317 -1.093 0.620 -0.098 -0.156 57.732 64.244 -2.434 -31.785 -9.981 237.944 -8.023
1.740
PB 428.541 -24.089 18.211 -6.732 0.976 100.079 1250.519 -3.276 62.971 -4.393 518.192 -96.832
2.072 1.775
LH 77.765 -5.266 -3.526 -0.197 1.658 69.451 207.248 8.438 26.548 6.087 -1082.530 107.844
-1.746 1.952
LC -10.511 -0.195 -0.029 0.479 -0.107 11.269 7.247 2.206 3.090 2.982 94.307 14.641
FC 9.164 1.341 -0.243 -0.032 0.110 5.424 -46.236 -0.640 2.019 -0.327 70.345 0.811
2.147 1.775 -1.988
SB 65.351 0.103 -1.173 0.285 0.392 -126.700 -2.628 6.234 44.742 -2.094 -66.825 120.731
-1.931 1.830
CC -15.929 -5.891 -0.863 1.785 -0.116 -169.390 260.965 19.956 16.047 -7.817 76.029 -33.352
-1.816
KC 19.033 17.744 -1.433 1.763 -0.733 -163.552 546.021 224.628 22.571 13.808 895.653 31.666
2.247
CT 19.702 0.002 -1.097 0.409 -0.052 68.151 -5.524 12.831 -2.918 -7.470 419.045 -74.944
LB -50.977 -33.365 28.217 2.466 -0.199 4.431 69.095 23.479 26.490 9.736 -22.215 40.359
1.721
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4.4.2.2 Decomposed Volatility Equation 
 
 French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) extended Merton’s work by dividing 
market volatility variables into expected and unexpected components using ARMA 
models.  In line with these authors, the volatility equation for each futures market is 
decomposed in expected and unexpected volatility.  The idiosyncratic volatility 2tσ  
obtained from Equation 4.11.1 is regressed as follows: 
 
+= 02 ϕσ t 1ϕ  Exp  2tσ + exp2Unϕ  2tσ + tε     (4.12.1) 
 
 
 The results in Table 4.12 are arrived at after decomposing the idiosyncratic 
volatility into an expected and unexpected component.  ARMA model specification is 
used together with Ljung-Box Q statistics and Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test 
to arrive at uncorrelated expected and unexpected volatility99.  Results for Q statistics and 
LM test are provided in Appendix 6.12.  Findings from Table 4.12 reveal that expected 
volatility for hedgers is significant in 21 markets, with 14 being positive and seven being 
negative at 10% significance level.  All minerals like crude oil and heating oil have a 
positive expected volatility, suggesting that hedgers in these markets set a risk level at the 
start of the month, which will have a positive net effect of total risk for the whole month.  
This also supports previous findings like Haigh et al. (2005) and NYMEX (2005) that in 
these markets, hedgers’ trading activity is volatile and requires more need of attention 
when it comes to CFTC’s position limits.  Regarding unexpected volatility, only soybean 
exhibits a significant unexpected volatility component.  Speculators, on the other hand, 
have 22 markets with significant expected volatility.  Seventeen out of these 22 markets 
exhibit positive expected volatility.  While speculators also have significant positive 
expected volatility for crude oil and heating oil, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger 
for hedgers, suggesting more active trading, particularly at the start of the month.   
                                                          
 
99 An ARCH effect test is also performed on Equation 4.12.1.  However, due to correct model specification 
using ARMA, the correlograms of squared residuals are invalid due to insufficient variation in the data.  
This can also be explained by the high R2 value of Equation 4.12.1. 
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Volatility Equation: Hedgers Speculators
Intercept Expected Unexpected Intercept Expected Unexpected
Minerals
GC -50.185 8.322 0.000 -44.351 7.288 0.000
-208.976 204.763 -164.916 171.218
SI 420.257 -25.397 0.008 -452.753 28.835 0.000
11.937 -11.652
HG -83.024 4.036 0.000 -30.071 2.087 -0.051
-16.591 23.092 -2.122 3.882
PL -166.120 16.403 0.000 -235.891 23.258 0.000
-56.338 63.198 -109.716 121.145
CL -2149.937 35.211 0.000 -2208.169 37.519 0.000
-5.650E+13 5.750E+13 -1.710E+14 1.740E+14 -6.165
HO 6.087 0.869 0.045 -107.013 2.895 0.002
2.175 -2.576 3.440
/pto
2
tσ 2tσ 2tσ 2tσ
This table shows the decomposed idiosyncratic volatility equation for large hedgers and speculators. 
Volatility is the squared residuals obtained from the mean equations, as shown in equation 4.11.1.  The 
idiosyncratic volatility is decomposed into expected volatility and unexpected volatility using ARMA
specifications and tested for serial correlation using Ljung- Box Q statistics and Breusch Godfrey LM test. 
The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% 
significance level.  Estimated decomposed idiosyncratic volatility equation is  
+= 02 ϕσ t 1ϕ  Exp  2tσ + exp2Unϕ  2tσ + tε  ,  
, where the volatility measure 2tσ is derived from the following mean equation: 
tR = μ t + tξ ,   tξ  = tt zσ ,  tz ~ N(0,1) 
, where the conditional mean μ t  = E [ ]1| −ΩttR  
, 1−Ωt is the information set available at time t-1, 
, tξ  is the innovation term, 
, tσ is its conditional variance, 
    
2
tξ = E [ ]12 | −Ωttξ   =  2tσ .E [ ]12 | −Ωttz    =  2tσ    
Table 4.12 
Decomposed idiosyncratic volatility for hedgers and speculators 
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Financials
SP -19.264 3.240 0.000 -2.466 1.403 0.031
-10.189 12.234
ED 0.029 0.482 0.074 0.028 0.502 0.086
US -12.735 3.033 0.001 -21.037 4.357 -0.013
Currencies
BP -28.531 6.542 0.000 -32.792 7.022 0.000
-89.646 97.364 -1.240E+15 1.350E+15
SF 723.904 -91.080 0.000 164.933 -18.396 0.000
3.170E+13 -3.140E+13 1.360E+14 -1.310E+14
CD -10.093 10.445 -0.002 62.456 -19.976 0.264
-34.349 37.751 4.719 -1.720
JY 1.425 0.743 -0.038 -29.213 5.936 0.000
-5.940E+14 6.730E+14
Agriculturals
W -114.279 4.732 0.000 -116.986 4.080 0.000
-2.600E+15 3.250E+15 -2.079 -6.370E+14 7.900E+14
KW 1570.486 -47.443 0.000 -5210.247 141.731 0.000
6.750E+13 -6.650E+13 -1.841 -1.110E+13 1.120E+13
MW 564.163 -18.521 0.000 372.979 -10.412 0.000
1.100E+14 -1.070E+14 1.936 1.540E+15 -1.450E+15
C 217.767 -12.127 0.000 1861.842 -95.923 0.000
2.920E+14 -2.750E+14 7.150E+12 -7.090E+12
S 13.507 0.175 -0.197 22.843 -0.134 -0.086
-2.897 2.928
BO 14.241 -0.285 0.144 -31.486 3.643 0.001
2.615 -2.400 3.335
SM -110.925 7.500 0.000 -138.621 6.298 0.000
-5.470 6.451 -516.004 790.672
PB -766.399 5.998 0.010 -868.429 6.697 0.000
-6.948 8.303 -6.140E+14 6.910E+14
LH 39942.280 -586.142 0.000 -5272.522 74.291 0.000
5.960E+10 -5.950E+10 -7.030E+12 7.090E+12
LC 137.703 -11.477 0.001 136.214 -11.217 0.001
50.675 -50.773 32.953 -32.526
FC 26.508 -2.883 0.014 -15.005 3.396 -0.009
2.781 -2.159 -2.097 2.998
SB -88.665 2.545 0.023 -65.441 2.097 0.000
-2.643 3.884 -2.095 3.460
CC -1842.037 46.947 0.000 -4065.788 92.975 0.000
-1.510E+13 1.540E+13 -3.150E+12 3.180E+12
KC -99.773 1.914 0.008 -99.323 1.941 0.010
-6.289 12.786 -4.586 8.874
CT 913.833 -36.873 0.011 6735.471 -204.139 0.002
16.780 -16.680
LB -59.406 2.098 0.006 -30.869 1.604 -0.002
-4.030 6.368 -2.145 4.766
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4.4.3.1 GARCH Volatility Model 
 
In line with Bollerslev (1986), a GARCH (1, 1) model is employed and expressed as:  
+= 02 ϕσ t 1ϕ 21−tξ   + 2ϕ 21−tσ + tε      (4.13) 
 
The GARCH process is analogous to an ARMA representation.  Restrictions like 0ϕ >0 
and 1ϕ  and 2ϕ ≥0 are usually imposed to ensure a positive variance (see Bollerslev 
(1986).  These restrictions in GARCH models are relaxed, since any model can have a 
positive and negative coefficient attached to any variable.  This is supported by Nelson 
and Cao (1992) and Hwang and Pereira (2006) who supported that Bollerslev (1986) 
non-negative restrictions are too restrictive and negative estimates can be found in 
practice.  An additional restriction is that both ARCH and GARCH models assume 
symmetry in the distribution of asset returns100.  To ensure that the GARCH model is 
white noise and efficient, the correlograms of squared residuals and an ARCH LM test 
are carried out, and presented in Appendix 6.13. Full results for GARCH volatility 
models are reported in Table 4.13 at 10% significance level. 
 
 News about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of the 
squared residual from the mean equation 21−tξ , is significant in 13 markets for hedgers, 
where nine out of the 13 markets are from the agricultural group.  In 10 markets, news 
about volatility from the previous month is positive, suggesting that the ARCH term is 
quite important in determining current volatility levels for hedgers, particularly for 
agricultural futures markets.  Only in Canadian dollars, live cattle and pork bellies, has 
previous news about volatility reduced current volatility levels.  On the other hand, the 
GARCH term 21−tσ is significant in 24 markets, where 14 markets are from the 
                                                          
 
100 See Chapter 2, section 2.16.1.5 for more details on the assumptions behind symmetrical models such as 
GARCH and PARCH. 
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agricultural group.  As expected, 2ϕ ≥0, except for soybean oil101.  This is consistent with 
Yang and Brorsen (1993) who found GARCH effects in 13 out of 15 futures markets 
studied.   
 
 In contrast, speculators’ volatility tends to be affected by news about volatility 
from the previous month.  In fact, 21−tξ is significant for 18 of the markets, where all 
three financials, three currencies, three minerals and nine agriculturals volatility are 
affected by the previous month’s news on volatility.  Fifteen out of these 18 markets 
exhibit a significant positive effect on current volatility, whereas only Canadian dollars, 
Swiss francs and live cattle exhibit a negative effect on current volatility.  This supports 
the fact that large speculators are more geared towards trend-chasing behaviour, and 
noise trading where news from previous period affects current volatility levels.  Further, 
the GARCH term 21−tσ is significant for speculators in 20 markets, where only wheat 
(Chicago) exhibits a negative effect on current volatility.   
 
 Further, in line with Bollerslev, Chow and Kroner (1992) who showed that the 
persistence of shocks to volatility depends on the sum of 1ϕ  and 2ϕ , the findings in Table 
14.3 supports that hedgers’ volatility in Treasury bonds and coffee; and speculators’ 
volatility in gold and S&P500 futures, have experienced increasing volatility persistence 
to shocks over the 1990s.  In contrast, in all the remaining markets, hedgers’ and 
speculators’ volatility has shown a tendency to decay over time in response to shocks 
over the 1990s102.  This supports that both players are informed and react well to news 
volatility.     
                                                          
 
101 In addition, it is suspected higher GARCH (p,q) order models will lead to positive forecasted lagged 
variance.  Testing for GARCH (2,1) confirms that hypothesis. 
102 However, a significant impact of volatility on the stock prices can only take place if shocks to volatility 
persist over a long time (Poterba and Summers, 1986). 
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GARCH volatility equation
 Hedger  Speculator
Intercept Intercept
Minerals
GC 6.310 0.084 -0.088 0.356 0.533 0.605
4.936
SI 2.910 0.190 0.645 9.942 0.455 0.013
1.648 3.630 3.125 3.515
HG 32.322 0.048 0.005 8.659 -0.001 0.744
PL 2.163 0.334 0.516 2.225 0.332 0.507
3.530 1.712 3.842
CL 6.420 0.046 0.766 6.656 0.070 0.745
5.192 5.645
HO 4.330 0.013 0.835 5.512 0.067 0.780
6.688 5.365
Financials
SP 2.031 0.308 0.530 0.157 0.159 0.848
1.689 1.740 3.051 2.008 11.147
ED 0.008 0.090 0.819 0.007 0.088 0.821
1.740 10.227 1.764 9.814
US 0.020 -0.035 1.040 4.231 0.610 -0.043
10.086 5.006 1.726
Currencies
BP 0.005 -0.026 1.018 -0.006 -0.015 1.006
8.585 12.209
SF 1.132 -0.044 0.947 2.826 -0.070 0.827
20.392 2.017 -3.193 5.950
CD 0.074 -0.087 1.040 0.064 -0.083 1.046
2.863 -2.754 26.838 2.341 -2.586 24.536
JY 4.302 0.312 -0.097 4.874 0.351 -0.002
2.950 2.950 1.862
/pto
2
1−tξ 21−tσ 21−tξ 21−tσ
This table shows the results of using a GARCH (1, 1) volatility model to estimate the conditional variance
and mean equation for both hedgers and speculators.  Only the intercept, ARCH and GARCH term of the
volatility equation are provided below.  The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that 
the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated symmetric GARCH volatility equation 
is  
+= 02 ϕσ t 1ϕ 21−tξ   + 2ϕ 21−tσ + tε  
Table 4.13 
GARCH volatility equation for hedgers and speculators  
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Agriculturals
W 6.650 0.092 0.590 41.534 0.062 -1.066
2.026 6.703 1.773 -9.246
KW 2.149 0.126 0.781 2.957 0.129 0.749
8.446 1.781 5.847
MW 2.192 0.070 0.818 2.673 0.138 0.742
4.894 4.471
C 3.144 0.008 0.813 6.215 0.030 0.657
2.702
S 6.471 0.297 0.115 9.084 0.228 0.147
2.976 2.109 2.381
BO 11.847 0.343 -0.442 7.123 0.346 -0.082
4.643 3.308 -3.257 2.833 2.706
SM 3.193 0.175 0.585 3.159 0.113 0.700
2.185 3.364 4.129
PB 8.402 -0.071 1.031 102.558 0.421 0.015
3.346 -1.840 20.220 3.748 1.997
LH 1.342 0.116 0.876 1.637 0.117 0.867
1.645 13.652 13.903
LC 5.724 -0.072 0.544 5.817 -0.074 0.552
1.792 -5.385 1.706 1.865 -5.703 1.850
FC 0.527 0.044 0.853 0.406 0.055 0.876
6.362 7.414
SB 6.349 0.429 0.454 4.452 0.206 0.696
2.129 3.228 3.551 2.038 3.870
CC 2.867 0.097 0.778 3.544 0.066 0.798
2.954 4.329
KC 15.789 1.104 0.015 30.952 0.871 -0.045
4.428 3.269 4.090 2.847
CT 2.312 0.176 0.730 2.537 0.206 0.706
5.283 1.758 4.470
LB 5.228 0.370 0.571 3.975 0.221 0.712
1.923 3.352 2.817 6.879
 
4.4.3.2 Power ARCH (PARCH) Volatility Model 
 
 In line with Davidian and Carroll (1987) who argue that standard deviation 
specifications are more robust than variance specifications, a Taylor (1986) and Schwert 
(1989) standard deviation volatility model is constructed as follows: 
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δσ t  = 0ϕ    +   ∑= −− −
p
i
ititi i
1
)( δξγξϕ   +  δσϕ jt
q
j
j −=
∑
1
 + tε   (4.14.1) 
, where δ>0, γ i 1≤  for i = 1,K,  r, and γ i  = 0 for all i > r, r ≤  p. 
 
Substituting δ=1, i=j=1 and γ i  = 0 in equation 4.14.1, results in a symmetrical PARCH 
model as follows: 
tσ = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ 1−tξ   + 2ϕ 1−tσ + tε      (4.14.2) 
 
Note that if δ=2, and γ i  = 0 for all i, the PARCH model is simply a standard GARCH 
specification.  The correlograms of squared residuals and an ARCH LM test supporting 
the model is white noise and efficient are presented in Table 4.16 of Appendix 6.13.  
Output for the Taylor-Schwert volatility model can be found in Table 4.14.   
 
 
PARCH volatility equation
      Hedger   Speculator
Intercept Intercept
Minerals
GC 3.083 -0.235 0.471 4.468 0.165 -1.055
8.067 -11.637
SI 1.020 0.189 0.599 2.535 0.498 -0.011
1.833 2.632 3.883 5.766
HG 5.248 0.037 0.073 1.924 -0.020 0.685
/pto
it−ξ it−ξ1−tσ 1−tσ
This table shows the results of using a PARCH volatility model to estimate the conditional variance and 
mean equation for both hedgers and speculators.  Only the intercept, lagged error residual and lagged 
volatility term of the volatility equation are provided below.  The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant 
to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level.  Estimated symmetric 
PARCH volatility equation is  
δσ t  = 0ϕ    +   ∑= −− −
p
i
ititi i
1
)( δξγξϕ   +  δσϕ jt
q
j
j −=
∑
1
 + tε   
, where δ>0, γ i 1≤  for i = 1,K ,  r, and γ i  = 0 for all i > r, r ≤  p. 
Substituting δ=1, i=j=1 and γ i  = 0 in the above equation, results in a symmetrical PARCH model as 
follows: 
tσ = 0ϕ  + 1ϕ 1−tξ   + 2ϕ 1−tσ + tε  
 
Table 4.14 
PARCH volatility equation for hedgers and speculators. 
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PL 0.774 0.317 0.520 5.982 -0.087 -0.739
2.190 2.037 3.303 -2.069 -1.946
CL 0.835 0.095 0.789 14.636 0.056 -1.026
6.082 4.600 -11.369
HO 5.585 0.674 -0.276 0.662 0.095 0.818
5.966 4.010 -2.943 1.969 8.629
Financials
SP 0.557 0.274 0.615 1.490 0.571 0.113
2.258 4.002 2.700 4.454
ED 0.027 0.080 0.844 0.027 0.074 0.849
1.824 9.364 8.098
US 2.068 -0.373 0.549 1.732 -0.441 0.716
2.556 -3.360 4.083 -3.782 3.414
Currencies
BP 0.152 0.187 0.796 0.030 0.063 0.936
3.141 10.266 24.347
SF 1.628 0.190 0.373 1.428 0.246 0.391
1.660 1.805 1.842
CD 0.048 -0.084 1.031 0.051 -0.092 1.037
2.256 -2.164 24.531 1.989 -2.363 23.230
JY 0.069 -0.082 1.034 2.294 0.420 -0.176
-1.662 45.221 3.047 3.326
Agriculturals
W 8.404 0.084 -0.907 2.717 0.061 0.390
4.279 -3.164
KW 0.326 0.145 0.819 6.411 -0.355 -0.089
2.085 8.696 4.328 -10.839
MW 4.769 -0.280 0.047 0.671 0.183 0.715
4.652 -7.322 2.216 4.174
C 4.260 -0.255 0.157 1.505 0.017 0.649
2.363 -8.276
S 1.802 0.261 0.237 2.134 0.213 0.265
2.270 2.802 1.640 1.662
BO 3.228 0.334 -0.286 2.523 0.363 -0.123
3.390 3.566 2.741 3.449
SM 6.515 -0.044 -0.693 6.801 -0.022 -0.597
5.837 -2.749 2.084
PB 7.101 0.319 0.198 0.641 -0.105 1.031
3.095 2.229 2.995 15.116
LH 15.145 0.032 -1.061 15.137 0.093 -1.056
6.617 -5.787 9.787 -14.720
LC 0.218 -0.114 1.025 3.078 -0.231 0.239
2.007 -2.531 34.308 2.851 -4.148
FC 0.032 -0.058 1.027 1.055 -0.031 0.607
28.534
SB -9.967 -0.044 0.731 0.897 0.171 0.722
-2.188 1.901 3.760
CC 9.909 -0.033 -0.924 2.060 0.064 0.551
11.556 -6.828
KC 3.455 0.773 -0.037 0.199 -0.060 1.028
4.393 4.596 1.782 25.818
CT 7.900 -0.301 -0.417 6.578 -0.009 -0.359
3.460 -16.830
LB 1.117 0.401 0.527 1.478 0.588 0.349
3.306 3.231 2.210 4.879 2.522
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  Volatility or the proxy measure of risk is measured as the standard 
deviation tσ under the PARCH model.  As expected, findings from Table 4.14 show 
that the effect of it−ξ on current volatility is much more mixed and significant than its 
counterpart 21−tξ in Table 4.13.  News about volatility from the previous month is 
significant for 19 markets at 10% significance level.  In seven markets, namely Treasury 
bonds, Canadian dollars, Japanese yen, wheat (Minnesota), corn, live cattle, and cotton, 
news about volatility from previous month has a significant negative effect on current 
volatility.  On the other hand, in silver, platinum, heating oil, S&P500, Eurodollars, 
British pounds, wheat (Kansas), soybean, soybean oil, pork bellies, coffee and lumber 
markets, news about volatility from previous month has a significant positive effect on 
current volatility.  Further, lagged volatility 1−tσ  is significant in 17 markets, where in 
heating oil, wheat (Chicago), soybean meal, live hogs and cocoa, lagged volatility has a 
significant negative impact on current volatility.  This compares with 24 markets which 
are significantly affected by 21−tσ from the GARCH model. 
 
 Speculators also bear the significant effect of it−ξ on current volatility in 15 
markets.  In 10 out of these 15 markets, news about volatility from the previous month 
tends to add to current volatility levels.  This result interestingly compares with 18 
markets which were significantly affected by 21−tξ from the GARCH model.  Further, 
lagged volatility of large speculators’ trading activity is significant and positive for 10 out 
of 14 markets.  Lagged volatility has a significant negative impact on current volatility 
only in wheat (Chicago).  Hedgers’ and speculators’ current volatility (under GARCH) 
have significantly increased (decreased) by last month volatility in 23 (1) and 19 (1) 
markets respectively.  More importantly, while speculators’ current volatility (under 
GARCH) has significantly increased (decreased) in 14 (5) markets after accounting for 
news about volatility (under GARCH) from previous month, hedgers’ current volatility 
(under PARCH) significantly increased (decreased) in 12 (7) markets after accounting for 
similar news about volatility from previous month.  In sum, as expected, while the 
 
 
157
PARCH model exhibits more significant negative variables, the GARCH model produces 
more significant positive variables.  Further, it can be observed that the significance of 
2
1−tσ over 1−tσ is much higher for both hedgers and speculators.  However, 
while 21−tξ is more significant than it−ξ for large speculators, that’s not the case for 
hedgers, where it−ξ  appears to have more impact than 21−tξ .  Although, 21−tξ is more 
significant than it−ξ for large speculators, it is important also to understand that the 
PARCH model has captured more significant negative impact of news about lagged 
volatility than in the GARCH model for speculators also.  In that line of thought, findings 
suggests that the PARCH model, by capturing more significant negative impact of 
variables, is a more informative model than its counterpart GARCH model for 
speculators.  Similarly, while the PARCH model for hedgers also captures more 
significant negative impact of variables like lagged volatility and news about volatility 
from previous month, the PARCH model also captures more significant positive impact 
of the news about volatility from previous month than its GARCH counterpart.  
However, to test whether the conditional standard deviation or variance model is a better 
model in reflecting actual volatility, in-sample model performance evaluations is 
suggested.  This is carried out in section 4.4.5. 
 
4.4.3.3 Return and Risk Relationship 
  
 Backed by authors such as De Long et al. (1990b), Lakonishok et al. (1994), and 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), who all studied trading behaviour, returns 
and volatility103—and due to the changing investors’ attitude to risk and return as shown 
in graph 1.1—a simple risk and return equation is regressed to seek the relationship 
between futures return, expected volatility and unexpected volatility.  Full output can be 
found in Table 4.15 and results are reported at 10% significance level.  The risk/return 
equation is as follows: 
                                                          
 
103 Refer to Chapter 2 with particular reference to hedging and speculation theory, positive feedback, 
contrarian strategies, and volatility for more information. 
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+= 0ϕtR 1ϕ  Exp  2tσ + exp2Unϕ  2tσ  + tε             (4.15) 
 
Hedgers’ expected volatility (or risk) is theoretically expected to be low or 
insignificant due to the purpose of hedging in minimizing risk  (Hoffman, 1932).  Results 
from Table 4.15 shows that expected volatility of hedgers is significant in nine markets, 
where only crude oil, heating oil and wheat (Chicago) returns are significantly increased 
by expected volatility.  These findings support earlier results in the study that there is a 
need to re-check CFTC regulation in regards to position limits of hedgers in crude oil and 
heating oil markets.  Further, an increase in expected volatility tends to reduce futures 
returns in silver, Eurodollars, Japanese yen, wheat (Kansas, Minnesota) and pork bellies.  
On the other hand, unexpected volatility in hedgers’ trading is significant for seven 
markets, where S&P500 and soybean oil futures’ returns are reduced by an increase in 
unexpected volatility.  Due to the informed characteristic of hedgers, unexpected 
volatility is also theoretically expected to be low and insignificant, in that hedgers will 
hardly readjust their risk levels throughout the month but rather set a tolerated risk level 
at the start of the month for a given return.   
 
 On the opposite side of the coin, speculators’ expected volatility is theoretically 
expected to be high or significant, compensated by the higher returns.  While expected 
volatility significantly adds to speculators’ futures returns in crude oil, heating oil, and 
wheat (Kansas, Chicago), it significantly reduces returns in Eurodollars, Canadian dollars 
and pork bellies.  Unexpected volatility also is theoretically assumed to be higher or more 
significant for speculators due to over-reaction towards noise information, and also due to 
the fact that speculators will usually readjust their risk levels during the month to affect 
their returns.  While findings support that speculators’ returns are significantly increased 
by unexpected volatility in gold, silver, Swiss francs and cotton, returns are significantly 
decreased by unexpected volatility in Japanese yen, pork bellies and wheat (Chicago).  
This supports theories propounded by Keynes (1930), Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939) 
that any loss made by the hedger in terms of risk avoidance and insurance represents an 
insurance premium paid to the risk-assuming speculators.   
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Risk/Return Equation
   Hedgers Speculators
Intercept Expected Unexpected Intercept Expected Unexpected
Minerals
GC -0.078 -0.010 0.013 -0.100 -0.007 0.013
3.587 3.685
SI 17.331 -1.080 0.033 -31.344 1.935 0.038
2.005 -1.991 1.724 2.053
HG -0.722 0.025 0.012 -0.998 0.035 -0.001
PL 1.202 -0.109 -0.007 1.762 -0.164 -0.006
CL -11.389 0.193 0.000 -12.307 0.215 0.000
-6.097 8.453 -6.962 9.908
HO -1.254 0.036 -0.004 -3.244 0.069 0.002
-1.717 4.197 -2.555 2.824
/pto
2
tσ 2tσ 2tσ 2tσ
This table shows the relationship between futures return at time t and risk (which is proxied as volatility)
for hedgers and speculators. Volatility is measured as the squared residuals obtained from the mean
equations, as shown in below. The idiosyncratic volatility is decomposed into expected volatility and 
unexpected volatility using ARMA specifications and tested for serial correlation using Ljung- Box 
Qstatistics and Breusch Godfrey LM test. The numbers in italics are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis
that the relevant parameter is zero at 10% significance level. Estimated risk and return equation is  
+= 0ϕtR 1ϕ  Exp  2tσ + exp2Unϕ  2tσ  + tε  
, where the volatility measure 2tσ is derived from the following mean equation: 
tR = μ t + tξ ,   tξ  = tt zσ ,  tz ~ N(0,1) 
, where the conditional mean μ t  = E[ ]1| −ΩttR  
, 1−Ωt is the information set available at time t-1, 
, tξ  is the innovation term, 
, tσ is its conditional variance, 
    
2
tξ = E [ ]12 | −Ωttξ   =  2tσ .E [ ]12 | −Ωttz    =  2tσ    
 
 
Table 4.15 
Risk and return relationship for hedgers and speculators. 
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Financials
SP 2.158 -0.117 -0.036 0.734 0.046 -0.013
3.227 -1.741
ED 0.218 -3.552 0.109 0.217 -3.566 0.117
2.055 -1.835 1.990 -1.775
US -0.697 0.127 -0.007 -0.921 0.163 -0.007
Currencies
BP 0.133 -0.032 0.011 -0.305 0.050 0.011
SF 3.318 -0.428 0.039 1.143 -0.139 0.032
2.881 2.538
CD 0.872 -0.976 -0.061 1.454 -1.464 -0.072
1.657 -1.855
JY 1.529 -0.189 -0.003 0.949 -0.097 -0.039
2.822 -2.974 -2.010
Agriculturals
W -4.133 0.135 -0.002 -3.240 0.085 -0.008
-1.913 1.873 -1.883 1.869 -1.692
KW 18.539 -0.569 -0.001 -33.885 0.917 -0.004
2.007 -1.999 -1.718 1.722
MW 3.108 -0.104 0.000 2.059 -0.060 0.002
1.908 -1.737
C -0.573 0.032 -0.006 -14.533 0.755 -0.005
S -2.950 0.198 0.014 1.059 -0.050 0.007
BO -0.975 0.090 -0.058 2.330 -0.200 -0.032
-1.988
SM 0.847 -0.037 -0.007 0.357 -0.006 -0.011
PB 19.004 -0.117 -0.003 11.971 -0.072 -0.005
4.936 -4.868 3.641 -3.772 -1.776
LH -129.067 1.905 -0.010 39.525 -0.542 -0.010
LC -0.580 0.053 0.005 -1.120 0.101 0.004
FC -2.521 0.384 -0.013 0.032 0.010 -0.013
SB -1.767 0.030 -0.007 -3.221 0.053 -0.013
CC 5.371 -0.136 -0.012 12.394 -0.282 -0.013
KC -1.187 0.016 0.007 -1.459 0.020 0.007
1.727
CT -4.355 0.182 0.018 12.217 -0.371 0.013
3.676 2.850
LB -1.251 0.036 0.010 -0.763 0.028 -0.013
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4.4.4 Error Distribution 
 
 In line with McNew and Fackler (1994) who underlined the importance of 
probability distributions, and backed by Bera et al. (1997) and Manfredo et al. (1999) 
who showed the relevance t distribution has over normal distribution104, the GARCH and 
PARCH models used in this study are tested for normality in their probability 
distributions.   Skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera statistics for both GARCH and 
PARCH models (under normal and t distribution) are provided in Table 4.17105.   
 
 Findings from Table 4.17 show that the skewness for hedgers’ returns (under the 
GARCH model), under normal distribution, is positive for 20 markets and negative for 
Eurodollars, Treasury bonds, British pounds, corn, feeder cattle, sugar, cotton, live cattle 
and silver.  The fact that 20 markets have a probability distribution with long tail to the 
right is reflected also in the upward trend in the S&P500 returns in the 1990s, where 
many hedgers have had positive returns in their respective markets.  The skewness values 
under t distribution are positive and negative as under the normal distribution.  However, 
under t distribution, the probability distributions are as skewed or more skewed to the 
right if the skewness is positive and as skewed as or more skewed to the left if the 
skewness if negative.  That’s the case except for Canadian dollars where the positive 
skewness value is larger than under t distribution.  The skewness for hedgers under 
(PARCH, normal) is negative for 12, where the nine markets under (GARCH, normal) 
are also reflected here in addition to gold, copper and Japanese yen.  The skewness under 
(PARCH, normal) is less in value than under (GARCH, t) for 26 markets except for 
Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, and soybean where skewness under (PARCH, normal) 
was higher in value.  The skewness under (PARCH, t) for hedgers’ probability 
distribution returns is negative for 11 markets, which is the same as for (GARCH, 
normal) except for Japanese yen and soybean oil.  
 
                                                          
 
104 See Chapter 2, section ‘Error distribution’ for more information. 
105 See Appendix 6.5.11 and 6.5.16 for specification on the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera test. 
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 The skewness for speculators’ probability distributions returns under (GARCH, 
normal) is negative in 11 markets, which is the same as under (GARCH, normal) for 
hedgers in addition to soybean and copper.  The negative skewness for Eurodollars and 
Treasury bonds for both hedgers and speculators can be attributed to introduction of the 
Euro currency that affected Eurodollars Treasury bonds (BIS, 1999).  The skewness 
under (GARCH, t) is the same as under (GARCH, normal).  However, under t 
distribution, the probability function is more skewed to the right if the skewness is 
positive and more skewed to the left if the skewness is negative.  This similarity holds for 
25 markets except for copper, wheat (Minnesota), corn and soybean oil.  Under (PARCH, 
normal), the skewness for speculators’ probability returns is negative for 13 markets.  In 
fact, under (PARCH, normal), the skewness is less in value than the skewness under 
(GARCH, t) except for soybean oil, corn, wheat (Minnesota), Canadian dollars, crude oil 
and copper.  In contrast, under (PARCH, t), the skewness is negative in 11 markets, 
which is the same as under (GARCH, normal) except for copper and soybean oil.   
  
Having assumed symmetry in the GARCH and PARCH models, it is interesting 
to know which model (GARCH, PARCH) and under what error distribution (normal or t) 
do hedgers’ and speculators’ distribution returns appear to exhibit a greater tendency 
towards symmetry.  Table 4.17 shows that the PARCH model, under normal distribution, 
ranks first in converging hedgers’ returns towards symmetry106.  This contrasts with 
speculators, where the GARCH model, under t distribution, ranks first in converging 
speculators’ returns towards a skewness of zero107.     
  
 In regards to kurtosis, a value less than three suggests that the probability function 
is flat (platykurtic) and a value greater than three suggests the probability function is 
peaked (leptokurtic).  Hedgers’ probability functions theoretically have a lower (flatter) 
kurtosis in more futures markets than speculators, due to hedgers entering the market to 
reduce risk and speculators entering the market to bear that risk.  Table 4.17 shows that 
this is the case under (GARCH, normal), (GARCH, t), (PARCH, normal), but not under 
                                                          
 
106 The (GARCH, normal) model ranks 2nd, followed by (PARCH, t) and lastly, (GARCH, t). 
107 The (PARCH, t) model ranks 2nd, followed by (PARCH, normal), and lastly, (GARCH, normal). 
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(PARCH, t)108.  As such, the first three models help to support the fact that hedgers enter 
the market to reduce risk and has managed to do so in copper, crude oil, heating oil, 
soybean oil, sugar and Canadian dollars, relative to speculators.  Speculators, however, 
also have a kurtosis lower than three in silver, copper, crude oil, Canadian dollars, sugar 
and soybean.  Further, the kurtosis of hedgers is much smaller than speculators in copper, 
crude oil and sugar, but bigger than speculators in Canadian dollars.   
 
 The probability of the Jarque-Bera statistic is also reported under each model in 
Table 4.17.  It appears that in four markets, hedgers’ probability distribution returns 
converge to normality due to their high probability in the Jarque-Bera test.  In fact, 
copper and soybean oil have the highest probability under (GARCH, normal), Canadian 
dollars under (PARCH, t), and sugar under (PARCH, t).  Speculators’ probability 
distribution returns also converge to normality in copper, soybean, soybean oil and 
soybean meal.  Soybean and soybean meal have the highest probability under (PARCH, 
normal), copper under (GARCH, t), and soybean oil under (GARCH, normal).  The high 
probability of the Jarque-Bera test is supported by low skewness and kurtosis not far from 
three.  Overall, Table 4.17 supports the non-normal distribution in 25 markets for both 
hedgers’ and speculators’ probability distribution returns.  This is consistent with Hilliard 
and Reis (1999) and Taylor (1986) who concluded non-normality in most futures 
markets.  This is also supportive of studies by Mann and Heifner (1976), Blattberg and 
Gonedes (1984) and Houthakker (1961) where the distribution of large hedgers’ and 
speculators’ returns appear to be not normal, but rather leptokurtic. 
 
  
                                                          
 
108 In fact, hedgers (speculators) have a kurtosis in 3 (2) markets under (GARCH, normal), in 6 (3) markets 
under (GARCH, t), in 3 (2) markets under (PARCH, normal), and a kurtosis in 2 (3) in (PARCH, t). 
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GARCH PARCH
Normal dist.  t dist.    Normal dist. t dist.
S K Prob. S K Prob. S K Prob. S K Prob.
(J-Bera) (J-Bera) (J-Bera) (J-Bera)
Panel A: Hedger
Minerals
GC 4.076 36.339 0.000 5.551 52.863 0.000 -0.254 3.094 0.463 3.312 30.844 0.000
SI -0.225 3.171 0.515 -0.225 3.203 0.496 -0.460 3.491 0.044 -0.460 3.491 0.044
HG 0.010 3.138 0.946 1.003 0.013 0.938 -0.009 3.152 0.935 0.106 3.187 0.795
PL 1.027 6.081 0.000 2.232 14.846 0.000 1.166 6.985 0.000 2.090 14.127 0.000
CL 0.831 5.495 0.000 1.083 2.238 0.000 0.829 5.528 0.000 1.344 8.405 0.000
HO 0.792 5.575 0.000 1.018 1.390 0.000 0.954 5.577 0.000 1.285 10.661 0.000
Financials
SP 0.749 4.782 0.000 0.950 5.496 0.000 0.706 4.628 0.000 0.864 5.452 0.000
ED -0.563 3.872 0.003 -0.630 4.515 0.000 -0.560 3.939 0.002 -0.656 4.589 0.000
US -0.390 3.353 0.122 -0.870 5.509 0.000 -0.742 5.611 0.000 -1.149 7.608 0.000
Currencies
BP -0.095 3.987 0.055 -1.151 10.942 0.000 -0.341 4.700 0.000 -0.676 5.929 0.000
SF 0.165 3.960 0.052 0.298 4.438 0.001 0.310 3.712 0.077 0.273 4.510 0.001
CD 0.021 2.633 0.675 0.020 2.614 0.649 0.029 2.642 0.685 0.025 2.648 0.695
JY 0.381 5.516 0.000 0.544 6.526 0.000 -0.184 4.214 0.010 -5.422 51.136 0.000
/pto
This table shows the values for skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics for the GARCH and PARCH
volatility models.  Panel A reports the results of hedgers under normal and t distribution, while Panel B
reports the results for speculators.  If the skewness value is positive (negative) that would indicate that error
distribution is skewed to the right (left).  A kurtosis value less than 3 indicates the distribution is flat
(platykurtic) and peaked (leptokurtic) relative to the normal if it’s greater than 3.  The probability of the
Jarque-Bera test is the probability that a Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds (in absolute value) the observed
values under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution.  A small probability rejects the null hypothesis. S
denotes Skewness and K denotes Kurtosis.
 
Table 4.17  
Normality test of error distribution under GARCH and 
PARCH volatility models for hedgers and speculators. 
 
 
165
Agriculturals
W 0.493 4.517 0.000 0.571 4.794 0.000 0.268 4.184 0.008 0.259 4.399 0.002
KW 0.732 5.259 0.000 0.873 6.911 0.000 0.593 4.532 0.000 0.143 5.351 0.000
MW 0.888 6.557 0.000 0.888 6.557 0.000 0.498 6.040 0.000 0.638 7.016 0.000
C -0.640 5.997 0.000 -0.662 5.890 0.000 -0.451 4.977 0.000 -0.593 5.838 0.000
S 0.218 3.772 0.105 0.216 4.114 0.016 0.268 3.586 0.164 0.253 3.941 0.038
BO 0.125 2.813 0.756 0.136 2.825 0.742 0.028 2.856 0.934 -0.116 3.136 0.812
SM 0.300 3.582 0.134 0.466 5.062 0.000 0.200 3.241 0.534 0.380 4.457 0.000
PB 0.860 4.164 0.000 1.062 5.436 0.000 0.816 4.311 0.000 0.748 3.921 0.000
LH 1.080 5.217 0.000 1.263 7.005 0.000 1.251 6.623 0.000 0.477 5.084 0.000
LC -0.736 4.105 0.000 -0.743 4.153 0.000 -0.568 3.373 0.016 -0.821 4.449 0.000
FC -0.394 4.256 0.002 -0.475 5.073 0.000 -0.304 3.451 0.193 -0.109 4.288 0.007
SB -0.269 2.784 0.380 -0.269 2.785 0.380 -0.058 2.698 0.740 -0.023 2.805 0.891
CC 0.448 4.980 0.000 0.589 6.509 0.000 0.517 4.801 0.000 0.830 5.317 0.000
KC 0.304 3.666 0.096 0.469 4.113 0.002 0.414 3.700 0.034 0.585 4.990 0.000
CT -0.658 6.658 0.000 -1.439 11.948 0.000 -0.720 7.323 0.000 -1.069 10.198 0.000
LB 0.463 4.893 0.000 0.549 5.349 0.000 0.360 4.264 0.002 0.327 3.791 0.048
Normal dist. t dist. Normal dist. t dist.
S K Prob. S K Prob. S K Prob. S K Prob.
(J-Bera) (J-Bera) (J-Bera) (J-Bera)
Panel B: Speculator
Minerals
GC 1.543 11.677 0.000 3.893 33.207 0.000 1.123 12.157 0.000 2.849 25.705 0.000
SI -0.375 3.211 0.175 -0.378 3.275 0.156 -0.320 2.957 0.306 -0.225 3.353 0.390
HG -0.096 3.161 0.835 -0.091 3.171 0.836 -0.109 3.144 0.821 0.175 2.760 0.594
PL 0.739 4.755 0.000 1.698 11.363 0.000 1.281 8.296 0.000 1.683 10.864 0.000
CL 0.743 5.442 0.000 1.154 2.543 0.000 1.390 8.236 0.000 1.957 14.205 0.000
HO 0.770 5.546 0.000 1.057 7.227 0.000 0.728 5.298 0.000 0.803 8.902 0.000
/pto  
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Financials
SP 0.477 4.242 0.000 0.638 4.680 0.000 0.510 4.196 0.001 1.040 5.392 0.000
ED -0.644 4.009 0.000 -0.701 4.555 0.000 -0.660 4.282 0.000 -0.726 4.718 0.000
US -0.594 3.845 0.000 -0.995 6.222 0.000 -0.632 4.963 0.000 -1.242 8.123 0.000
Currencies
BP -0.292 4.061 0.015 -0.941 8.451 0.000 -0.339 4.475 0.001 -0.837 6.154 0.000
SF 0.238 4.019 0.026 0.398 4.390 0.001 0.359 3.500 0.111 0.338 4.467 0.001
CD 0.044 2.509 0.488 0.046 2.511 0.490 0.054 2.567 0.564 0.071 2.581 0.569
JY 0.375 4.648 0.000 1.088 7.386 0.000 0.352 4.613 0.000 0.614 4.999 0.000
Agriculturals
W 0.255 3.335 0.342 0.689 5.010 0.000 0.600 4.708 0.000 0.196 3.710 0.151
KW 0.743 5.098 0.000 0.877 6.232 0.000 -0.056 4.502 0.001 0.476 5.842 0.000
MW 0.635 4.569 0.000 0.373 6.566 0.000 0.558 4.519 0.000 0.343 5.803 0.000
C -0.651 5.736 0.000 -0.639 5.886 0.000 -0.664 5.694 0.000 -0.507 5.168 0.000
S -0.136 2.984 0.807 -0.137 2.984 0.806 -0.123 3.077 0.825 -0.165 3.533 0.323
BO 0.085 3.107 0.891 0.036 3.295 0.767 0.117 3.016 0.854 -0.224 3.244 0.474
SM 0.191 3.225 0.569 0.197 3.400 0.404 -0.010 3.188 0.903 0.041 3.530 0.437
PB 0.787 4.265 0.000 1.049 5.431 0.000 0.911 4.424 0.000 0.690 3.679 0.001
LH 1.050 4.946 0.000 1.294 7.504 0.000 0.942 5.175 0.000 0.518 5.353 0.000
LC -0.722 4.006 0.000 -0.735 4.073 0.000 -0.551 3.850 0.004 -0.791 4.316 0.000
FC -0.598 4.719 0.000 -0.618 5.777 0.000 -0.384 4.479 0.000 -0.336 4.628 0.000
SB -0.417 3.462 0.073 -0.506 3.850 0.007 -0.399 3.378 0.107 -0.038 2.552 0.553
CC 0.363 3.551 0.092 0.433 3.930 0.010 0.389 3.475 0.091 0.700 4.252 0.000
KC 0.335 4.292 0.002 0.672 5.474 0.000 0.379 3.555 0.079 0.810 5.050 0.000
CT -0.568 5.933 0.000 -1.385 11.935 0.000 -1.337 11.221 0.000 -1.337 11.306 0.000
LB 0.520 5.019 0.000 0.594 5.322 0.000 0.328 3.889 0.030 0.332 3.775 0.050
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4.4.5 Performance Evaluation of Models  
 
 Backed by Poon and Granger (2003) who reviewed 39 studies109 on the out-of-
sample forecasting abilities of models such as GARCH (1, 1), this study validates the 
performance of the GARCH, PARCH and idiosyncratic models.  To check in-sample and 
out-sample forecasting abilities, the 139 data sample is divided into two parts, where the 
first 126 data are used to test for actual model specification, and the remaining 13 data 
are used for out-of-sample forecasting110.  Results for the actual model performance111 
are displayed in Table 4.18, with the root mean squared error (RMSE), and forecasting 
evaluation tools (bias proportions, variance proportions, covariance proportions, and 
Theil inequality test)112. 
                                                          
 
109 See Chapter 2, section 2.16.3 for a review of studies on forecasting. 
110 The 126 data sample ends on December 1999, right before the burst occurred in early 2000.  This helps 
to see whether models such as GARCH (1, 1) and PARCH forecast well the year 2000 burst. 
111 Actual model specification uses the data sample 1 126.  Out-of-sample forecasting uses the data sample 
127 139. 
112 Specifications of the RMSE, bias proportions, variance proportions, covariance proportions and Theil 
inequality can be found in Appendix 6.5.14 and 6.5.15. 
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Panel A          Hedgers
     normal distribution
  GARCH PARCH
Theil  Bias Variance Covariance Theil  Bias Variance Covariance
Ineq. prop. prop. prop. Ineq. prop. prop. prop.
Minerals
GC 45.51% 0.05% 21.65% 78.31% 42.52% 0.01% 2.36% 97.63%
SI 44.31% 0.09% 23.84% 76.06% 43.62% 0.13% 20.86% 79.01%
HG 79.68% 0.00% 63.20% 36.80% 79.71% 0.00% 63.26% 36.74%
PL 41.46% 0.22% 18.80% 80.99% 41.95% 0.04% 20.85% 79.10%
CL 64.51% 0.90% 26.17% 72.93% 64.09% 1.02% 24.64% 74.34%
HO 49.87% 0.20% 23.35% 76.46% 52.53% 1.30% 33.27% 65.42%
Financials
SP 47.15% 0.03% 29.51% 70.46% 47.66% 0.00% 30.34% 69.66%
ED 63.51% 0.13% 42.71% 57.16% 63.30% 0.13% 41.68% 58.18%
US 71.43% 0.04% 46.42% 53.54% 78.47% 1.11% 60.77% 38.13%
Currencies
BP 73.21% 0.05% 62.12% 37.83% 71.89% 0.00% 59.61% 40.39%
SF 71.71% 0.02% 51.40% 48.58% 69.38% 0.01% 43.71% 56.28%
CD 74.00% 0.00% 59.06% 40.94% 73.72% 0.02% 56.62% 43.35%
JY 40.11% 0.11% 19.92% 79.97% 40.39% 0.27% 19.73% 80.01%
Agriculturals
W 40.01% 0.19% 14.74% 85.07% 39.97% 0.02% 14.48% 85.50%
KW 42.90% 0.79% 15.76% 83.46% 42.86% 1.65% 13.96% 84.39%
This table shows the GARCH and PARCH model performance evaluation for the period 1990-2000, for
hedgers and speculators, under normal and t distribution.  The mean (bias) proportions, variance
proportions, covariance proportions, and Theil inequality test results are displayed in Panel A-D, and the
root mean squared error (rmse) is shown in Panel E.   If the model is well specified, the mean and variance
proportions should be small, and the covariance proportions should be near 1.  A lower rmse also suggests
a better specified model. 
 
 
Table 4.18 
Performance evaluation for GARCH and PARCH models 
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MW 44.66% 0.66% 18.64% 80.70% 46.36% 0.18% 24.65% 75.17%
C 39.24% 0.02% 15.31% 84.68% 38.88% 0.70% 12.33% 86.97%
S 36.67% 0.05% 18.81% 81.14% 36.54% 0.04% 17.85% 82.11%
BO 36.70% 0.16% 14.44% 85.40% 37.34% 0.18% 17.79% 82.03%
SM 36.78% 0.24% 13.65% 86.11% 37.22% 0.58% 11.05% 88.37%
PB 69.04% 0.45% 46.15% 53.40% 66.63% 0.09% 40.46% 59.45%
LH 58.72% 0.54% 38.44% 61.02% 58.40% 1.26% 34.73% 64.02%
LC 56.46% 0.00% 31.50% 68.50% 57.03% 0.26% 33.48% 66.27%
FC 44.35% 0.09% 22.01% 77.90% 44.85% 0.36% 24.60% 75.04%
SB 44.46% 0.80% 31.46% 67.74% 40.42% 0.01% 16.86% 83.13%
CC 41.29% 0.00% 22.95% 77.05% 39.82% 0.00% 16.43% 83.56%
KC 44.72% 0.69% 37.01% 62.30% 43.81% 0.61% 34.02% 65.38%
CT 42.06% 0.55% 19.86% 79.59% 40.31% 0.44% 12.18% 87.37%
LB 51.72% 0.31% 30.30% 69.39% 51.12% 0.55% 29.36% 70.09%
Panel B          Hedgers
      t distribution
  GARCH PARCH
Theil  Bias Variance Covariance Theil  Bias Variance Covariance
Ineq. prop. prop. prop. Ineq. prop. prop. prop.
Minerals
GC 50.36% 0.05% 39.52% 60.44% 46.01% 1.46% 24.05% 74.50%
SI 44.47% 0.14% 24.56% 75.30% 43.35% 0.35% 20.61% 79.04%
HG 79.61% 0.00% 63.02% 36.97% 68.98% 46.43% 18.56% 35.01%
PL 42.40% 0.75% 20.51% 78.74% 42.04% 0.63% 21.66% 77.71%
CL 66.72% 0.43% 46.99% 52.57% 74.05% 4.93% 21.57% 73.51%
HO 51.57% 0.39% 31.73% 67.88% 63.82% 49.07% 22.42% 28.50%
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Financials
SP 48.62% 0.41% 31.77% 67.82% 45.95% 0.05% 22.16% 77.79%
ED 67.29% 0.02% 54.00% 45.98% 66.63% 0.02% 52.61% 47.36%
US 72.86% 0.86% 52.22% 46.92% 71.91% 1.46% 52.68% 45.86%
Currencies
BP 72.84% 0.03% 59.58% 40.39% 62.61% 0.14% 39.10% 60.76%
SF 72.49% 0.04% 53.06% 46.90% 72.20% 0.18% 49.74% 50.08%
CD 73.47% 0.00% 57.70% 42.30% 73.75% 0.03% 56.46% 43.51%
JY 43.20% 0.16% 29.51% 70.34% 41.46% 0.23% 13.50% 86.26%
Agriculturals
W 40.50% 0.00% 17.37% 82.63% 41.02% 17.84% 5.14% 77.02%
KW 44.54% 0.03% 23.40% 76.56% 43.79% 4.70% 14.62% 80.67%
MW 46.93% 0.22% 27.84% 71.93% 51.20% 32.13% 17.35% 50.52%
C 39.37% 0.10% 16.00% 83.91% 38.87% 3.18% 9.97% 86.85%
S 36.46% 0.02% 17.62% 82.36% 35.13% 1.22% 10.07% 88.71%
BO 36.78% 0.17% 14.72% 85.12% 35.77% 0.36% 9.46% 90.18%
SM 38.54% 0.05% 21.75% 78.19% 37.84% 0.09% 18.82% 81.09%
PB 72.70% 2.23% 54.66% 43.12% 79.22% 77.22% 3.21% 19.57%
LH 56.72% 0.00% 32.29% 67.71% 74.16% 77.42% 8.20% 14.39%
LC 56.58% 0.03% 31.91% 68.07% 57.47% 2.38% 31.15% 66.47%
FC 45.91% 0.00% 28.66% 71.33% 44.57% 0.02% 23.19% 76.79%
SB 44.46% 0.80% 31.47% 67.74% 41.77% 4.71% 16.45% 78.84%
CC 42.73% 0.13% 28.63% 71.23% 49.63% 2.45% 42.17% 55.37%
KC 44.07% 0.56% 34.90% 64.54% 55.22% 18.23% 50.39% 31.38%
CT 43.41% 0.14% 27.33% 72.54% 50.83% 32.84% 18.11% 49.05%
LB 50.95% 0.02% 30.54% 69.44% 67.15% 60.33% 25.23% 14.44%
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Panel C          Speculators
     normal distribution
  GARCH PARCH
Theil  Bias Variance Covariance Theil  Bias Variance Covariance
Ineq. prop. prop. prop. Ineq. prop. prop. prop.
Minerals
GC 50.25% 0.02% 19.94% 80.04% 48.00% 0.02% 20.93% 79.05%
SI 41.45% 0.02% 11.67% 88.31% 40.71% 0.00% 7.76% 92.24%
HG 78.22% 0.00% 61.10% 38.90% 78.32% 0.00% 61.31% 38.69%
PL 42.10% 0.28% 17.26% 82.45% 42.06% 0.01% 18.75% 81.24%
CL 65.48% 0.90% 26.88% 72.21% 66.10% 0.00% 44.89% 55.10%
HO 54.92% 0.10% 28.39% 71.52% 54.80% 0.10% 26.49% 73.41%
Financials
SP 50.32% 0.11% 32.04% 67.84% 51.74% 0.50% 36.75% 62.75%
ED 61.66% 0.15% 40.70% 59.15% 62.01% 0.08% 41.98% 57.94%
US 71.16% 1.55% 49.62% 48.83% 81.19% 1.39% 58.27% 40.34%
Currencies
BP 79.05% 0.09% 70.68% 29.23% 80.10% 0.04% 75.20% 24.76%
SF 74.44% 0.02% 57.20% 42.77% 69.73% 0.01% 42.22% 57.77%
CD 76.38% 0.00% 63.18% 36.82% 75.65% 0.03% 58.54% 41.43%
JY 49.53% 0.01% 29.13% 70.86% 52.36% 0.03% 38.62% 61.34%
Agriculturals
W 43.65% 0.31% 19.23% 80.46% 43.20% 0.03% 18.48% 81.49%
KW 44.22% 0.78% 17.16% 82.07% 46.98% 0.68% 23.86% 75.45%
MW 46.73% 1.20% 17.47% 81.33% 47.10% 1.29% 18.86% 79.85%
C 43.27% 0.02% 19.07% 80.91% 43.15% 0.00% 18.57% 81.42%
S 44.70% 0.01% 21.38% 78.62% 45.14% 0.02% 23.07% 76.91%  
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BO 35.87% 0.40% 17.76% 81.84% 36.36% 0.64% 19.63% 79.73%
SM 43.34% 0.17% 21.74% 78.09% 42.46% 0.05% 17.82% 82.13%
PB 67.08% 0.00% 41.24% 58.76% 67.70% 0.28% 41.51% 58.21%
LH 56.96% 0.69% 35.55% 63.76% 58.10% 0.02% 38.21% 61.77%
LC 56.56% 0.01% 31.34% 68.65% 56.42% 0.30% 29.29% 70.41%
FC 49.06% 0.30% 26.90% 72.80% 47.34% 0.00% 21.22% 78.78%
SB 44.95% 0.01% 28.14% 71.84% 44.93% 0.00% 27.67% 72.32%
CC 43.58% 0.02% 21.36% 78.62% 42.91% 0.03% 18.67% 81.29%
KC 47.94% 0.43% 36.36% 63.21% 45.17% 0.08% 29.79% 70.13%
CT 44.90% 0.84% 20.83% 78.33% 44.23% 0.00% 19.57% 80.43%
LB 50.12% 0.05% 26.96% 72.99% 52.07% 1.43% 32.26% 66.31%
Panel D          Speculators
     t distribution
  GARCH PARCH
Theil  Bias Variance Covariance Theil  Bias Variance Covariance
Ineq. prop. prop. prop. Ineq. prop. prop. prop.
Minerals
GC 52.07% 0.23% 36.78% 62.99% 49.33% 2.21% 27.00% 70.79%
SI 41.55% 0.06% 12.20% 87.74% 42.72% 2.07% 15.52% 82.42%
HG 78.16% 0.00% 60.92% 39.08% 68.54% 33.28% 6.54% 60.18%
PL 42.97% 0.49% 21.07% 78.44% 42.66% 0.62% 19.88% 79.50%
CL 67.29% 0.65% 46.98% 52.37% 71.27% 38.59% 20.62% 40.79%
HO 55.93% 0.27% 34.23% 65.50% 50.68% 9.80% 12.79% 77.41%
Financials
SP 51.66% 0.84% 34.17% 64.98% 47.05% 1.72% 24.08% 74.19%
ED 64.39% 0.01% 49.95% 50.04% 64.18% 0.01% 49.44% 50.55%
US 72.94% 0.77% 53.41% 45.82% 73.70% 0.20% 53.61% 46.19%  
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Currencies
BP 80.91% 0.10% 72.64% 27.26% 67.06% 0.46% 45.31% 54.23%
SF 72.98% 0.05% 53.50% 46.45% 73.02% 0.01% 51.35% 48.64%
CD 76.41% 0.00% 63.21% 36.79% 75.80% 0.03% 58.78% 41.19%
JY 52.45% 0.54% 37.29% 62.17% 48.87% 0.69% 25.78% 73.54%
Agriculturals
W 43.96% 0.01% 21.78% 78.21% 48.98% 18.82% 1.20% 79.98%
KW 45.94% 0.01% 25.32% 74.67% 44.33% 0.14% 13.19% 86.67%
MW 50.51% 0.28% 32.51% 67.20% 54.57% 32.00% 19.29% 48.71%
C 43.49% 0.22% 19.75% 80.03% 47.33% 12.79% 19.05% 68.17%
S 44.71% 0.01% 21.38% 78.61% 44.30% 0.19% 19.44% 80.37%
BO 35.90% 0.43% 17.87% 81.70% 34.69% 0.31% 12.07% 87.61%
SM 44.16% 0.10% 25.23% 74.67% 42.42% 0.16% 16.76% 83.08%
PB 72.85% 2.18% 54.25% 43.57% 80.22% 78.85% 2.06% 19.09%
LH 58.60% 0.32% 39.43% 60.25% t w 74.71% 80.79% 7.02% 12.19%
LC 56.87% 0.01% 32.39% 67.60% 57.61% 0.65% 33.08% 66.27%
FC 49.78% 0.19% 30.54% 69.28% 47.73% 0.04% 22.72% 77.24%
SB 45.21% 0.27% 28.72% 71.01% 55.25% 62.64% 2.29% 35.07%
CC 44.44% 0.18% 25.37% 74.45% 46.77% 26.95% 9.45% 63.60%
KC 45.27% 0.17% 25.64% 74.18% 61.29% 52.67% 20.63% 26.70%
CT 46.92% 0.02% 30.20% 69.78% 46.79% 1.32% 26.17% 72.51%
LB 50.81% 0.04% 30.26% 69.70% 67.20% 60.77% 24.43% 14.80%
/pto  
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Panel E        Hedgers         Speculators
         Normal dist.               t dist.   Normal dist.         t dist.
GARCH PARCH GARCH PARCH GARCH PARCH GARCH PARCH
Minerals
GC 2.535 2.694 2.587 2.553 2.771 2.660 2.680 2.681
SI 4.056 4.050 4.059 4.036 4.041 4.069 4.039 4.091
HG 5.849 5.850 5.849 8.373 5.821 5.822 5.821 8.308
PL 3.283 3.285 3.313 3.290 3.348 3.319 3.342 3.354
CL 8.659 8.681 8.178 10.420 8.727 8.216 8.222 11.626
HO 7.407 7.420 7.363 10.911 7.837 7.884 7.766 8.282
Financials
SP 3.117 3.125 3.131 2.321 3.230 3.234 3.245 3.241
ED 0.275 0.275 0.277 0.277 0.271 0.271 0.272 0.272
US 2.705 2.740 2.720 2.709 2.717 2.827 2.709 2.706
Currencies
BP 2.646 2.632 2.654 2.561 2.711 2.696 2.726 2.642
SF 3.385 3.398 3.392 3.426 3.405 3.427 3.403 3.423
CD 1.209 1.210 1.208 1.210 1.222 1.223 1.222 1.223
JY 2.355 2.362 2.414 2.492 2.704 2.737 2.738 2.698
Agriculturals
W 4.587 4.586 4.581 5.123 4.846 4.816 4.821 6.424
KW 4.759 4.806 4.746 4.890 4.853 4.951 4.833 4.948
MW 4.500 4.520 4.512 5.518 4.706 4.708 4.704 5.835
C 4.150 4.179 4.151 4.242 4.440 4.439 4.448 4.939
S 3.282 3.284 3.281 3.283 3.843 3.849 3.843 3.846
BO 3.218 3.218 3.220 3.214 3.108 3.123 3.109 3.088
/pto  
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SM 3.791 3.873 3.822 3.800 4.221 4.210 4.230 4.226
PB 12.761 12.769 12.909 35.497 12.760 12.801 12.942 38.301
LH 8.184 8.234 8.118 20.279 8.088 8.087 8.344 21.578
LC 3.279 3.286 3.280 3.346 3.285 3.312 3.286 3.311
FC 2.405 2.409 2.415 2.405 2.561 2.546 2.562 2.549
SB 6.067 5.902 6.067 6.138 6.181 6.188 6.202 10.790
CC 5.002 4.975 5.050 5.494 5.264 5.254 5.274 6.284
KC 8.537 8.472 8.489 10.150 9.030 8.799 8.942 14.442
CT 4.616 4.611 4.614 6.029 4.859 4.821 4.862 4.928
LB 7.282 7.241 7.196 12.586 7.208 7.275 7.187 12.671
 
 
Table 4.18 (Panel A-D) shows the performance evaluation for hedgers and speculators 
under (GARCH, normal), (GARCH, t), (PARCH, normal) and (PARCH, t) volatility 
models.  It can be observed that under normal distribution models, the Theil inequality 
coefficient is very low for most markets, except for copper, crude oil, Eurodollars, 
Treasury bonds, British pounds, Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, and pork bellies.  Similar 
markets are found to exhibit high Theil inequality under t distribution, in addition to live 
hogs.  These relatively high inequality values suggest that the four models used above 
perform poorly in these eight and nine markets.  This is reflected in the relatively low 
covariance proportion that measures the remaining unsystematic forecasting errors 
between actual and forecasted returns.  In the remaining 22 or 21 markets, the four 
models reflect higher covariance proportion figures, suggesting the models fit the actual 
returns better.  It appears that the (PARCH, t) model tends to produce smaller covariance 
proportions, suggesting less unsystematic risk than the three other models113.  If any of 
the models is correctly specified, the covariance proportions should be high, and 
                                                          
 
113 In fact, the (PARCH, t) model had 12 markets with low covariance proportions compared to (PARCH, 
normal), (GARCH, normal) and (GARCH, t) which all had seven markets with low covariance proportions. 
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relatively higher than the bias and variance proportions.  The PARCH model, under t 
distribution, ranks last in that perspective. 
  
 The bias proportions for hedgers and speculators, under all models, appear to be 
very low except under (PARCH, t), where agricultural futures in particular tend to exhibit 
bigger differences between the forecast returns and the actual returns.  For hedgers, such 
markets are copper, heating oil, Eurodollars, Treasury bonds, British pounds, Swiss 
francs, Canadian dollars, wheat (Minnesota), pork bellies, live hogs, cotton and lumber.  
For speculators, markets with high bias proportions are copper, crude oil, British pounds, 
Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, wheat (Minnesota), pork bellies, live hogs, sugar, coffee, 
and lumber114. 
 
 Further, under normal distribution, the variance proportions of currencies (except 
Japanese yen), Eurodollars, Treasury bonds, and copper are relatively high, suggesting 
that much of the high Theil inequality can be explained due to the high variability 
between the forecast and actual returns, and not due to differences between actual and 
forecasted returns.  For hedgers, under normal distribution, variance proportions tend to 
be lower for PARCH models except in nine markets.  Also, under t distribution, variance 
proportions tend to be lower for PARCH models except in four markets.  However, for 
speculators, under normal distribution, variance proportions is lower for PARCH only in 
13 markets.  This compares with 26 markets, where variance proportions are lower for 
speculators, under t distribution. 
 
 From Panel E, which reports the root mean squared error (RMSE), it can be seen 
that under normal distribution, the GARCH (1, 1) model gives the lowest RMSE for 
hedgers’ returns in 13 markets.  This is similar to Bracker and Smith (1999) who found 
that the symmetric GARCH model ranks first with the lowest RMSE compared to other 
models.  This is followed by the GARCH (1, 1) model under t distribution with nine 
markets having the lowest RMSE for hedgers’ returns.  PARCH models rank 3rd and 4th 
                                                          
 
114 This is also reflected in the relatively higher RMSE in these markets in Panel E. 
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with only five and four markets having the lowest RMSE.  On the other hand, it is the 
PARCH model, under normal distribution, that ranks 1st, with 11 markets having the 
lowest RMSE in speculators’ returns.  This is closely followed by the (GARCH, normal) 
model with 10 markets having the lowest RMSE, and (GARCH, t) ranking 3rd with nine 
markets.  Similar with hedgers, the (PARCH, t) ranks last with three markets having the 
lowest RMSE.  In comparing which model has the lowest RMSE between hedgers and 
speculators, it appears that the (GARCH, normal) model ranks first with 10 markets 
having the lowest RMSE in explaining hedgers’ returns.  This is followed by the 
(GARCH, t), where six markets have the lowest RMSE in explaining hedgers’ returns. 
The lowest RMSE results in Panel E are supported by the lowest Theil inequality in 10 
markets for hedgers’ returns and two markets for speculators’ returns.  Overall, this 
suggests that the GARCH model fits the actual returns of hedgers better than that of 
speculators.  The PARCH model fits the actual returns of speculators better under normal 
distribution.  The PARCH model, under t distribution, fits the actual returns for both 
players in the least accurate way among the four models.  
 
 
4.5 Forecasting Return and Volatility 
 
 Backed by Tomek and Peterson (2001) who argued that forecasting models have 
statistical but not economic significance, a graphical representation is used for forecasting 
purposes.  The sample for forecasting is set from January 2000 to Dec 2000 and a static 
forecasting technique is used115.  Supported by Jackson, Maude and Perraudin (1997) 
who argued that the forecastability of volatilities and the sensitivity of the forecasts to 
different techniques depend very much on the return series in question, graphs 4.8–4.11 
in Appendix 6.14 show the forecasted returns of hedgers and speculators under both 
GARCH and PARCH models, and under both normal and t probability distributions.  
Actual futures returns complement each graph to compare actual with forecasted returns.  
 
                                                          
 
115 See Appendix 6.5.13 for more on static forecasting. 
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 Findings in graphs 4.8–4.11 show that both returns for hedgers and speculators, 
under GARCH and PARCH models, follow nearly the same close trend in all 29 markets.  
This is further supported by the fact that 95% confidence intervals of the forecasted 
returns under GARCH and PARCH models are calculated for all 29 markets, and all of 
them are wide enough to include the actual returns within the intervals range116.  
Moreover, for hedgers’ forecasted returns,  the (GARCH, normal) underestimates 
(overestimates) in 13(8) markets, while under (PARCH, normal), hedgers’ forecast 
returns are underestimated (overestimated) in 11(8) markets.  For speculators’ returns, the 
(GARCH, normal) model underestimates (overestimates) the forecast in 14(9) markets 
while under PARCH model in 13(9).  Under (GARCH, t), hedgers’ forecast returns are 
underestimated (overestimated) in 12(9) markets, and under (PARCH, t) in 15(8).  For 
speculators, the (GARCH, t) underestimates (overestimates) the forecast returns in 17(8) 
markets.  While the highest number of underestimated forecasts is 17 under (PARCH, t) 
for speculators’ forecast returns, the number of overestimated forecasts are generally the 
same across all four models.  This suggests that the GARCH and PARCH models are 
generally more affected by increasing actual returns compared to decreasing actual 
returns.  This is analogous to the decreasing trend in net positions observed in December 
1999 just before the forecast of January 2000.  In line with Ding and Granger (1996), the 
GARCH model under normal distribution puts too much weight on recent observations 
relative to those in the past.  Further, under t distribution, the PARCH model with its high 
number of underestimated returns forecasts can be attributed to high sensitivity of 
standard deviation over returns.  This is in line with Poon and Granger (2003) who found 
that standard deviation is more proportional to derivatives prices than variance models. 
 
 In deciding which of the four models of graphs 4.8–4.11 better predict the actual 
returns, the first month forecast returns is compared with the actual futures returns, and 
only those markets’ returns which have been correctly forecasted are reported.  For 
hedgers, the (PARCH, normal) model ranks first with ten good forecasts of one-month 
                                                          
 
116 Available on request of author. 
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return117.  The (GARCH, normal) and (GARCH, t) rank equally 2nd with eight good 
forecasts118.  (PARCH, t) ranks last in predicting the one-month actual returns.  As for 
speculators, the best models are (PARCH, normal) and (GARCH, t) which rank equally 
1st with seven good forecasts119.  (GARCH, normal) ranks 3rd with six good forecasts120, 
while (PARCH, t) ranks again last with only four good forecasts.  The reason for 
(PARCH, t) ranking last is due to the high number of underestimated forecast returns.  
The (PARCH, normal) ranks first by producing also the least number of underestimated 
forecast returns.  In comparing the number of good forecasts achieved under hedgers’ and 
speculators’ returns, it can be observed that hedgers’ returns are better forecasted than 
speculators’ returns.  Further, the (PARCH, normal) model appears to work better in 
forecasting hedgers’ one-month return than speculators’ one-month return121.   
 
 Having looked at the forecasted returns under GARCH and PARCH models, it is 
also worthwhile to consider the conditional standard deviation under PARCH model and 
the conditional variance under the GARCH model.  Due to the volatile characteristics of 
standard deviation and variance, it is better to have an outlook of the whole sample data 
rather than just for the forecast sample.  The idiosyncratic volatility used before in this 
study is also included as a proxy of actual volatility, for comparison with the conditional 
variance and conditional standard deviation.  Based upon the good one-month forecast 
returns obtained above, it is interesting to know whether the idiosyncratic volatility 
                                                          
 
117 These markets were live hogs, lumber, coffee, cotton, corn, soybean oil, soybean meal, S&P500, sugar 
and soybean.   
118 Under (GARCH, normal), these markets were lumber, coffee, corn, soybean oil, soybean meal, S&P500, 
sugar and soybean.  Under (GARCH, t), in addition to live hogs, the markets were same as (GARCH, 
normal) except for coffee. 
119 Under (PARCH, normal), these markets were wheat (Minnesota), lumber, copper, crude oil, soybean oil, 
S&P500, and sugar.  Under (GARCH, t), in addition to Eurodollars, these markets were the same as under 
(PARCH, normal) except for wheat (Minnesota).  
120 These markets are the same as under (PARCH, normal) except for S&P500. 
121 It is important to know that only one-month forecast return (January 2000) has been analysed here.  
Tables 4.3-4.6 show the forecasted returns under December 2000.  To check the robustness of that one-
month forecast, the same exercise as above can be undertaken over more months.  A comparison of actual 
RMSE with forecast RMSE can be valuable in comparing the models further.  Only one-month forecast is 
studied to analyse the effect of the January 2000 bust where net positions dropped significantly. 
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measures the corresponding volatility quite accurately or not.  Full sample results are 
reported in the Appendix 6.15.1 and 6.15.2122. 
 
 Graphs 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 in Appendices 6.15.1 and 6.15.2 support that idiosyncratic 
volatility tends to be more volatile among the three volatility measures.  Also as 
expected, variance ( 2tσ ) is larger than standard deviation ( tσ ) since theoretically 
2
tσ >0.  Under t distribution, the PARCH model, as seen before, is much more sensitive 
than the GARCH model. Markets where variance ( 2tσ ) or standard deviation ( tσ ) of 
hedgers are smaller than those of speculators support Smith’s (1922) price insurance 
theory where hedging enables hedgers to insure against the risk of price fluctuations and 
also Hoffman’s (1932) view that hedging is shifting risk.  On the other hand, markets 
where variance ( 2tσ ) or standard deviation ( tσ ) of hedgers are bigger than those of 
speculators support Telser (1981) that the motivation to use futures contracts is not 
primarily driven by the firm’s desire to reduce risk, but by the institutional characteristics 
of the futures exchange itself like regulation ensuring liquidity.  Hedgers who wish to 
avoid price risks of holding inventories can do so without an organized futures market, 
namely by entering into forward transactions in the cash market.  Panel A in both 
appendices also support that the variance tends to be much more volatile in currency and 
financial markets.  This is analogous to currency and financial markets known to be the 
most volatile markets in the US.  
 
  In comparing the idiosyncratic volatility with the standard deviation and variance 
in one-month forecast, only in S&P500 futures market does idiosyncratic volatility 
provide a good measure of volatility for the one-month forecast returns123.  Panel B, 
which magnifies the results of Panel A, shows that idiosyncratic volatility is a good 
measure of volatility to forecast one-month futures return in S&P500, under either 
                                                          
 
122 Only markets in footnotes 116-119 are included to compare idiosyncratic volatility with GARCH and 
PARCH volatility. 
123 This is obviously based on the assumption that the GARCH and PARCH models have provided a good 
forecast return.  Only then can the idiosyncratic volatility be compared with that specific standard deviation 
and variance. 
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normal and t distribution.  For the remaining 28 markets, idiosyncratic volatility fails to 
provide a good measure of volatility for one-month forecast returns, where volatility is 
measured as standard deviation and variance, which provides good one-month forecast 
returns. Consistent with the existing volatility forecasting literature and specifically 
Manfredo et al. (1999), the poor measure of idiosyncratic volatility confirms the 
difficulty in finding a “best” volatility forecasting method across alternative data sets and 
horizons. Importantly too, graphs from Appendices 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 show that the 
hypothesis that the variance rate on the market remains constant over any appreciable 
period of time can be rejected.  This is consistent with Merton (1980) and Rosenberg 
(1972).   
 
4.6 Stability and Events Analysis  
 
 Although US exchange markets had witnessed huge success in the 1990s due to 
factors like good macroeconomic policy, luck, and stability in oil shocks124, Graph 2.1 
showed that many events did occur during that decade.  As proposed by Frommel and 
Menkhoff (2003), structural breaks in futures markets may indicate that in addition to 
permanent micro structural impacts, macro economically-caused shifts are possibly also 
important for any volatility increase.  While it is hard to examine all events of the 1990s 
in the US, an attempt is made to consider the effect of these major macroeconomic events 
on the 29 futures markets125.  In line with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS 
1990–2001) reports, the following table depicts more specific details about the event 
analysis126. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
124 See Chapter 2, section 2.17 for more details on events analysis.  
125 More specific details about each event are provided in Appendix 6.9 
126 The ‘sample before event’ column provides the data sample up to including the nearest COT reporting 
date just before the event, and the ‘sample after event’ column provides the data sample up to including the 
nearest COT reporting date just after the event.   
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Source: BIS (1990-2001) quarterly and annual reports. 
 
  To know whether any of these eight events has affected the US futures markets, a 
stability test is performed upon the behaviour127 and performance models128 used before 
in this study. While the literature is backed by many tests like Perron’s (1997) structural 
break test and Ramsey’s (1969) stability test, recursive coefficient estimation is 
performed to test for the stability of specific coefficients in the models.  The recursive 
coefficient estimation enables us to trace the evolution of estimates for any coefficient as 
more and more of the sample data are used in the estimation.  If the coefficient displays 
significant variation as more data is added to the estimating equation, it significantly 
suggests instability.  Any dramatic break in coefficient plots suggests that the postulated 
equation tried to digest a structural break.  Any structural break is matched with any of 
the eight events above, and regressed accordingly using pre-event sample and post-event 
sample.  If there is no structural break for some commodity markets, this suggests that the 
above named events did not significantly affect the specific futures markets during the 
last decade, in relation to the models.   
 
4.6.1 Behaviour - Trading Determinant Model 
 
 Due to some events (like events one & two) having some small sample sizes, and 
in order to keep consistency in the models, only variables deemed important are regressed 
                                                          
 
127 See Equation 4.1 
128 See Equations 4.10.1, 4.13, 4.14.2 
Table 4.19 
Major macroeconomic events of the 1990s in the US 
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in the models.  This means the removal of some unimportant variables like the three 
information variables and sentiment data129.  The behaviour model of Equation 4.1 is thus 
changed to: 
 
Δ 1+tNP  =  0ϕ  + 1ϕ  tR + tξ         (4.20) 
 
Only significant recursive coefficients for the futures returns (with significant t ratios130 
after adjusting for structural breaks) in Equation 4.20 are graphically displayed in 
Appendix 6.16, together with two standard error bands around the estimated coefficients.  
The highest coefficient estimates of tR can be found in Canadian dollars, Eurodollars, 
British pounds, Treasury bonds, Japanese yen and gold131.  The occurrence of relatively 
higher coefficient estimates suggests that large players tend to rely more on actual returns 
tR  to change their net positions next month than large players in agricultural futures 
markets.  Moreover, the coefficient estimates of tR  between hedgers and speculators tend 
to bear a negative relationship132.  This is supportive that the futures market is a zero-sum 
game, and that for every long position there should a short position to net it off.  The 
S&P500 tR  coefficient for hedgers appears to be negative on average.  The fact that 
hedgers were net short during the 2000 burst compared to large speculators who were net 
long, suggests that following hedgers during that period would have led to less losses and 
possibly profits than trend-chasing with speculators.   
 
 In checking the stability of the behaviour model, most of the markets appear to be 
stable with rare occasions of structural breaks.  It is important to neglect the instability of 
the coefficient estimates in early stages of the graph, since Δ 1+tNP  would be highly 
                                                          
 
129 Information variables are removed due to their insignificance as shown in earlier parts of the study.  
Sentiment data is removed since they were exhibiting a bullish behaviour, which was quite predictable. 
130 Significant t ratios are those independent variables being siginificant at 10% significance level. 
131 Markets like British pounds, Canadian dollars, Eurodollars, Swiss francs, Treasury bonds, S&P500, 
copper, live cattle and live hogs all had negative coefficients for hedgers’ return coefficient estimates. 
132 Except for crude oil, Japanese yen and heating oil where both hedgers and speculators tend to add to 
their next month’s net position when actual returns are positive. 
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sensitive to tR
133.  Those markets with significant breaks in their returns coefficient 
estimates are crude oil, cotton, Eurodollars, soybean, wheat (Chicago) and cocoa (for 
speculators); and corn, Japanese yen, soybean and cocoa (for hedgers)134.  This is 
consistent with Cheung and Wong (2001) that macroeconomic announcements have a 
smaller impact on the gold market than on the Eurodollars and Japanese yen.  As further 
asserted by Fung and Patterson (2001), the Eurodollar, although influenced substantially 
by domestic US news, is an international asset that is traded globally and thus more 
readily reflects changes in risk premiums among different Eurocurrency rates in the 
international financial market.  Table 4.21 in Appendix 6.16 shows that while all breaks 
for hedgers’ returns coefficients estimates are trending upwards, speculators’ returns 
breaks are heading in both directions.  Results show that hedgers’ actual returns 
coefficient estimates go up for corn, Japanese yen, soybean and cocoa after the major 
economic event brought more stability to previous economic conditions.  For instance, 
soybeans and corn returns have more effect on net positions of hedgers after the end of 
the US long period of tightening interest rates.  The same analogy can be concluded with 
cocoa and Japanese yen returns bearing more effect on net positions of hedgers at the 
start of the temporary revival from Japanese recession.   
 
 On the other hand, the effect of speculators’ returns on next-month net positions, 
as expected, is backed by positive feedback behaviour, where speculators take more long 
positions when major economic events are an indication of easing economic conditions, 
and take more short positions where events tend to show tightening economic conditions.  
For instance, speculators took less long positions in Eurodollars after the LCTM near 
financial collapse, but then took more long positions after the buyouts occurred to save 
LTCM from affecting financial markets.  The same analogy can be applied to the 
upwards jumps in returns coefficients occurring due to more favourable economic 
conditions like the end of US tightening interest rates, introduction of the Euro currency, 
                                                          
 
133 To ensure consistency throughout this event analysis, any instability before sample 49 is rejected for 
analysis.  This allows us to analyse any structural break starting with US Fed tightening of interest rates, 
which occurred in sample 50.  
134 While there were more structural breaks in the 29 markets, only those structural breaks that match any 
of the eight events of Table 4.19 are analysed. 
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and downward breaks due to less favourable economic conditions like LTCM near 
collapse, Russian crisis, EM slump, US tightening interest rates, and Japanese recession.  
The only exceptions would be Eurodollars returns coefficient estimates which jumped at 
the start of US tightening of interest rates.  This can be explained by speculators going 
more net long in Eurodollars, as an alternative to less attractive US dollars.  More 
importantly, t statistics show that only soybeans, cotton, wheat (Chicago) and cocoa have 
significant return coefficient estimates (all from speculators).  This supports BIS (1995–
2001) reports on these major economic events that the eight named events do not affect 
significantly futures markets in the US, except in four markets above at a specific point in 
time.   
 
 
 
4.6.2 Mean Equation Model 
 
 Using the same understanding about small size sampling as above, the mean 
equation model of 4.10.1 is simplified to Equation 4.21 below, and regressed to obtain 
the estimated recursive coefficients of net positions135.   
 
tR  =  0ϕ  + 1ϕ tNP + tξ        (4.21) 
 
As can be seen in the graphs of Appendix 6.16 (Table 4.22), all the recursive coefficients 
of returns tend to be stable over the ten-year period.  The small amount of structural 
breaks in that mean equation model was expected due to the low coefficient estimates of 
net positions obtained in Table 4.10.1 and Table 4.10.2 earlier in the study.  This supports 
that positive feedback trading persists in the long run where the recursive coefficient 
estimates are greater than zero.  Only crude oil return estimate tended to rise in a more 
upward fashion than the rest, but nonetheless keeping its stability feature over the ten- 
year period.  Overall, this is in line with Frankel and Froot (1988) who found that market 
                                                          
 
135 Note that net positions are adjusted for stationarity before regressing Equation 4.21.  Results are 
reported at 10% significance level. 
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participants expect recent price changes (short run) to trigger others in the same direction, 
while also expecting prices to return to their fundamental values in the long run.  This is 
also consistent with De Bondt and Thaler (1987) who found that extreme movements in 
prices eventually revert, as long as part of these movements is accounted for by positive 
feedback trading.  Only corn, cocoa, cotton, coffee and lumber have had structural breaks 
in the net positions of speculators, and only coffee and live hogs have had structural 
breaks.  Further, results from Table 4.22 seem to indicate that only the temporary revival 
from Japanese recession event and US tightening of interest rates event have had some 
effect on these six markets.  More importantly, only coffee136 and live hogs have 
significant negative coefficient estimates when the effect of the event is taken into 
account.  The jump in the change of net positions coefficient estimates for coffee, due to 
the start of the temporary revival from Japanese recession, can be attributed to more 
confidence of hedgers about selling their futures contracts later at a better price.  The 
jump in live hogs net positions coefficient estimates, due to the start of US Fed tightening 
interest rates, can be attributed to hedgers shorting fewer contracts in the expectation of 
interest rates easing in the future.  Overall findings suggest that all the eight major events 
have had hardly any significant effect on futures markets, where the impact of monthly 
net positions on returns is assessed.   
 
4.6.3 Risk and Return Relationship 
 
 As observed in Graph 1.1 in Chapter 1, investors tend to change their attitude 
towards risk during specific events like LTCM near financial collapse and Asian crisis 
turmoil.  Using this same analogy that risk can be proxied as standard deviation and 
variance, the actual return tR  is regressed against standard deviation and then against 
variance as follows:   
 
+= 0ϕtR 1ϕ tσ + tε              (4.22) 
 
                                                          
 
136 The net positions of hedgers for coffee had to be differenced for stationarity.  Therefore, the estimated 
coefficient is that of a change in net positions of coffee. 
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+= 0ϕtR 1ϕ 2tσ + tε            (4.23) 
 
where tσ is the standard deviation from PARCH model (Equation 4.14.2) and 2tσ is 
the variance from GARCH model (Equation 4.13).  The pattern of the recursive 
coefficients ( tσ and 2tσ ) show whether there is any relationship between the measure 
of risk and return.  The recursive estimated coefficients of tσ and 2tσ also help in 
finding whether any significant break can be attributed due to the occurrence of a major 
macroeconomic event, which changes the attitude of large hedgers and large speculators 
towards risk.  Any structural break in the relationship between return and risk which is 
matched with any of the eight events is reported in Appendix 6.16 (Table 4.23). 
 
 Results from Panel A show a positive significant relationship between hedgers’ 
risk (standard deviation) and return for soybean oil, gold, coffee and soybean, and a 
significant negative relationship for live cattle; and a positive significant relationship 
between speculators’ risk (standard deviation) and return for gold, coffee, live hogs, 
sugar and S&P500, and a significant negative relationship for live cattle and silver at 
10% significance level.  From Panel B, there is a different mixture of findings again due 
to the different sensitivity of the proxy of risk over return.  Panel B shows a positive 
significant relationship between hedgers’ risk (variance) and return for soybean oil, 
coffee, wheat (Minnesota) and platinum; a negative significant relationship for gold and 
wheat (Chicago, Kansas); a significant positive relationship between speculators’ risk 
(variance) and return for feeder cattle, coffee, platinum and sugar; and a significant 
negative relationship for gold, copper and Treasury bonds.  While the findings of a 
positive relationship between risk and return supports portfolio theory that a higher risk is 
compensated with a higher return and vice versa, the findings of a significant relationship 
between risk and return can be explained by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) 
who discussed special circumstances that would make it possible to observe a negative 
correlation between current returns and current measures of risk. For instance, investors 
may not demand high risk premium if they are better able to bear risk at times of 
particular volatility.  Moreover, if the future seems risky, the investors may want to save 
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more in the present, thus lowering the need for larger premium. And, if transferring 
income to future is risky and the opportunity of investment in a risk-free asset is absent, 
then the price of a risky asset may increase considerably, hence reducing the risk 
premium.  In addition to Glosten et al. (1993) who argued that both positive and negative 
relationships between current returns and current variances (risk) are possible, the study 
adds contribution by also finding more negative relationships between current returns and 
current standard deviation (risk).  The higher number of negative significant relationships 
is due to derivatives prices being more proportional to standard deviation than variance, 
hence the higher sensitivity as supported by Poon and Granger (2003).   
 
 Panel A shows that speculators’ returns are affected with seven structural breaks 
in risk that occurred during the listed macroeconomic events  at  10% significance level.  
These structural breaks in the return and risk relationship of Equation 4.22 occur in 
cotton, feeder cattle, Japanese yen, coffee, live hogs, soybean and Treasury bonds for 
speculators; and soybean, crude oil, cotton and copper for hedgers’ attitude towards risk.    
Since speculators’ attitude towards risk are more affected than hedgers’, this suggests that 
speculators not only bear more risk than hedgers, but also that speculators’ returns are 
more affected during major macroeconomic events.  However, generalization about this 
suggestion is questionable since only soybean and Treasury bonds have significant risk 
coefficient estimates before and after the event.  This is consistent with Flood and Rose 
(1999) who demonstrated that exchange rate volatility cannot be linked to changes in 
underlying fundamentals.  The jump of the effect of hedgers’ risk on return for the 
soybean futures market has been occurring after the end of the long period of US 
tightening interest rates.  This can be explained by hedgers in the soybean futures market 
taking more risk towards obtaining their return, due to the instability of US interest rates 
that eased after a long period of tightening.  On the other hand, the fall of the effect of 
speculators’ risk on return for the Treasury bonds market has been occurring at the start 
of the temporary revival from the Japanese recession.  This can be explained by 
speculators using less risk to obtain a desired return, due to the stability regained in the 
global economy after the temporary recovery of the Japanese recession.  Overall, Panel A 
supports that the major global economic events named in Table 4.19 did not have much 
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effect on the risk and return relationship, except for soybean for hedgers’ return and 
Treasury bonds for speculators’ return.   
 
 In contrast to Panel A, Panel B shows that there is a smaller occurrence of 
structural breaks that occurred during the major economic events used in the study.  
Speculators’ attitude towards risk changed in copper, Japanese yen, wheat (Kansas, 
Chicago) and Treasury bonds, while hedgers’ attitude towards risk changed only in wheat 
(Kansas).  The lower number of breaks in Panel B can be explained since many of the 
recursive coefficient estimates of standard deviation from Panel A were larger in 
magnitude than their recursive coefficient estimates of variance.  This is supported by 
Poon and Granger (2003) who found that derivative prices are roughly proportional to 
standard deviation.  The only structural break, due to the same economic event, where 
risk is measured as variance and standard deviation, occurs in Japanese yen, where 
speculators’ return was more negatively affected by the end of the long period of US 
tightening interest rates in 1995.  However, more importantly, none of the structural 
breaks in Panel B significantly affected the risk and return relationship in the futures 
markets.  Either measurement of risk (standard deviation and variance) tends to return to 
their stable long-run estimate very shortly after the macroeconomic event has disturbed 
the risk/return relationship in all the 29 futures markets.  This is inconsistent with Christie 
and Chaudhry (1999) who showed that volatility persists following macroeconomic 
events, particularly for liquid financial markets.  The study adds contribution to BIS 
(1999) reports that events like the Russian crisis, LTCM near financial collapse, Asian 
crisis, and Mexico crisis did not have significant effect upon the attitude towards risk of 
large speculators and even lesser significance for large hedgers. 
 
 
4.6.4 Trading Activity and Volatility 
 
 In the same spirit as Roth et al. (2003), who found a positive relation between 
volatility and open interest for both hedgers and speculators, Equations 4.24 and 4.25 are 
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regressed to see whether there is such a relation between volatility and net positions137.  
Volatility is proxied as standard deviation in Equation 4.24, and variance in Equation 
4.25.  
 
tNP = 0ϕ + 1ϕ tσ + tε         (4.24) 
 
tNP = 0ϕ + 1ϕ 2tσ + tε         (4.25) 
 
 
Findings upon regressing Equation 4.24 show that volatility, when measured as standard 
deviation, has a mixed effect on the trading activity of hedgers and speculators, where 
trading activity is measured as current net positions.  Recursive estimates of volatility had 
a significant negative effect on net positions of hedgers for soybean oil, British pounds, 
copper, live hogs and Swiss francs; and only a significant positive effect for Japanese 
yen.   On the other hand, recursive estimates of volatility had a significant positive effect 
on net positions of speculators for copper, Japanese yen, wheat138 (Chicago); and a 
significant negative effect for corn, soybean, cocoa139, cotton, pork bellies, sugar, 
S&P500, and Treasury bonds.  The boundaries within which recursive estimates of 
volatility lie are much broader in currency markets like Japanese yen, British pounds and 
Swiss francs; and financial markets like S&P500.  This is consistent with Christie-David 
and Chaudhry (1999) who reported that more liquid financial instruments show longer 
volatility persistence following macroeconomic announcements.   
 
 Recursive estimates of variance from Equation 4.25 have a significant and 
negative effect on hedgers’ trading activity in soybean oil, cotton, wheat (Chicago, 
Minnesota), soybeans, silver and S&P500; and a significant positive effect in crude oil, 
heating oil, Swiss francs and platinum at 10% significance level.  Recursive estimates of 
volatility have a significant positive effect on net positions of speculators for Japanese 
                                                          
 
137 Due to the high correlation between net positions and volatility, there were too many breaks occurring 
within the model, making it impractical to test for any significant structural break. 
138 Stationary after first level differencing. 
139 Cocoa and soybeans are stationary at first level differencing. 
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yen140, coffee and cotton; and a significant negative effect in crude oil, wheat 
(Minnesota), pork bellies, and sugar.  The boundaries between which the coefficient 
estimates of variance lie are smaller than those of standard deviation.  This can be 
attributed to variance which is expected to be the squared of standard deviation.  The 
significant negative relationship observed  between standard deviation and net positions, 
and between variance and net positions, is consistent with Peck (1981), Bessembiner and 
Seguin (1992), but inconsistent with Roth et al. (2003) who found a positive relation 
between net position and open interest for both hedgers and speculators.  However, it is 
also important to note that Roth et al. (2003) pointed out that the positive significance of 
open interest and volatility is highly sensitive to the volatility measure used, particularly 
for hedgers’ trading activity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The trading determinant model suggests hedgers are positive feedback traders in 
most markets.  Speculators’ behaviour is inconclusive due to higher trading frequency 
level suspected.  Hedgers also have superior market timing abilities than speculators, on a 
monthly basis.  Hedging pressure effects are mostly insignificant, suggesting no transfer 
of risk from hedgers to speculators.  The negative market timing of hedgers in heating oil 
and Japanese yen, and positive feedback trading behaviour, suggest large hedgers 
destabilized futures prices in these markets, suggesting a need to look again at CFTC’s 
stringent position limits imposed on speculators.  Overall, information variables are 
insignificant in determining monthly trading decisions. 
 
 The decomposed mean equation in the performance section, with a higher number 
of expected net positions, suggests hedgers are more prone in setting an expected net 
positions at the start of the month in determining actual returns rather than readjusting 
their net positions althroughout the rest of the month.  The lower number of significant 
                                                          
 
140 Stationary after first level differencing. 
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expected net position variables in determining volatility further added support that 
hedgers are better informed, where their trading at the start of the month has less effect 
on the volatility than compared with speculators.  Higher expected volatility of hedgers in 
crude oil and heating oil added support to their destabilizing features.  The GARCH 
model suggested the importance of both lagged volatility and news of volatility from 
previous month in determining actual volatility.  Both players’ volatility had a tendency 
to decay over time in response to shocks, supporting the informative traits of these large 
players.  The PARCH model, by capturing more significant negative impact of variables, 
is a better model than the GARCH model for both hedgers and speculators.  Expected 
idiosyncratic volatility and unexpected volatility had a mixed effect on returns, 
supporting the poor measure of idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of risk.  Both 
variance- and standard deviation- based models, under normal and t distribution, reported 
the returns tend to be leptokurtic.  The (PARCH, t) model represented actual returns less 
accurately, while the (GARCH, normal) and (PARCH, normal) models ranked first in 
explaining hedgers’ and speculators’ actual returns.  The (PARCH, normal) model ranked 
first in forecasting one-month return.  Idiosyncratic volatility poorly forecasted volatility 
in forecasting one-month returns.   
 
 The trading determinant model, mean equation model, and risk/return relationship 
model were all stable over the 10 years.  Major economic events had little or no 
significant effect on hedgers’ and speculators’ trading decisions, and risk attitude.  Lastly, 
the trading activity and volatility relationship model showed stronger effect of volatility 
on speculators’ trading activity, particularly in financial and currency markets.  All 
models tend to capture more structural breaks, where risk was proxied as standard 
deviation, due to the higher sensitiveness of standard deviation to futures prices than 
variance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Two important issues in the international derivatives markets are studied, namely 
the behaviour and performance of large speculators and large hedgers in the US futures 
markets over the 1990s period. The academic contributions are first laid out. Then, the 
summary and findings are presented below, starting with the behaviour and performance 
section.  The behaviour section summarizes findings about the trading determinant, 
market timing abilities and hedging pressures models.  The performance section 
summarizes findings about the different return and volatility models used, followed by 
the forecasting abilities of one-month futures return.  Then, the events analysis section 
summarizes the results about stability in the behaviour and performance models and if 
they were affected by major economic events in the 1990s.  The remaining sections of 
this chapter lay out the main limitations, policy implications, practical significance of 
study, and a generalization of findings.  The chapter ends with some final concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
5.2 Academic Contributions 
 
  This is the first study to analyse the behaviour and performance of 29 US 
futures markets.  Regarding behaviour, areas like trading determinants of large hedgers 
and large speculators, market timing abilities, and hedging pressure effects, were 
analysed using variables like sentiment index, net positions, returns, and priced risk 
information variables.  The trading determinant model helped in understanding how large 
hedgers and large speculators change their net positions following the previous month’s 
return, and as such, whether they exhibited positive feedback trading or contrarian 
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trading.  An increase (decrease) in net positions in one-month’s time, due to an increase 
(decrease) in actual return, would suggest positive feedback trading (contrarian trading).  
The non-significance of information variables also helped in understanding that these 
large players did not consider that information like the three-month Treasury bill yield, 
S&P500 dividend yield and corporate spread played a very important role in their 
monthly trading decisions.  The market timing ability test also helped in understanding 
whether hedgers or speculators predicted the one-month futures return accurately, based 
on actual change in their net positions.  A significant positive value for the change in net 
positions would support that hedgers or speculators had good market timing abilities in 
judging the future prices and hence a higher return in one month.  More importantly, it 
helped in supporting Keynes (1930) theory of normal backwardation where it is assumed 
speculators would have no forecasting or market timing ability, to support the existence 
of risk premium.  The hedging pressure effect tests helped in ascertaining the existence of 
the transfer of risk from hedgers to speculators due to the existence of significant risk 
premium in futures markets.  The existence of significant positive feedback trading and 
significant negative market timing ability for hedgers in specific markets encouraged the 
need to reconsider regulation, in that these players would destabilize prices away from 
fundamentals.    
  
 In the performance section, this study is the first to decompose net positions, 
sentiment, and information variables against return and volatility.  The decomposition of 
these variables into expected and unexpected components helped in further understanding 
how significant expected and unexpected variables affected the actual returns and 
idiosyncratic volatility at the start or during the rest of the month.  The use of a lagged 
hedging pressure variable against actual return and volatility also is a first, and helped in 
determining how significant risk premium affects futures return and actual idiosyncratic 
volatility.  Further, the idiosyncratic volatility was also decomposed into expected and 
unexpected volatility.  This is also the first to be done and helps in finding markets where 
significant expected volatility is positive.  More importantly, the use of GARCH and 
PARCH volatility models, assuming symmetry, is the first to be done when it comes to 
using standard deviation and variance in explaining actual returns.  The performance 
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evaluation of GARCH and PARCH models set the pace in knowing whether standard 
deviation or variance accurately explained the futures returns in the 29 futures markets.  
In that same line of thought, the risk and return relationship model was used to help in 
understanding the attitude towards risk of speculators and hedgers over a specific period 
of time.  The use of GARCH and PARCH models was further extended by using both 
normal and t distributions.  This is the first study to show not only how these two models 
explained actual returns of both hedgers and speculators, but also how they differed under 
normal and t distribution.  The forecasting of one-month futures return using these four 
models, i.e. (GARCH, normal), (GARCH, t), (PARCH, normal) and (PARCH, t), helped 
to determine whether standard deviation- or variance-based models provide better 
forecasting for one-month futures return.  This study is the first one to compare 
idiosyncratic volatility against standard deviation and variance, and how accurately 
idiosyncratic volatility matched the volatility (standard deviation or variance) that 
accurately forecasted one-month futures return.   
 
 In the events analysis section, the study is the first one to analyse the effect of 
structural breaks over the trading determinant behaviour model, mean equation model, 
and risk and return model.  The use of coefficient estimates in the recursive stability test 
helped to match structural breaks with eight major economic events like the long period 
of tightening of US interest rates in early 1990s, the temporary revival from Japanese 
recession, the Russian crisis, the LTCM near financial collapse, and the introduction of 
the Euro currency in 1999.  The recursive coefficient estimates of returns in the trading 
determinant model showed if there were any significant jump in futures returns which 
affected net position of hedgers and speculators in a one-month period.  The recursive 
coefficient estimates of net positions (or change in net positions if not stationary at levels) 
showed if there was any break that would significantly affect the actual returns in the 
mean equation model.  More interestingly, the recursive coefficient estimate in the 
risk/return model showed whether speculators’ and hedgers’ attitude towards risk 
changed significantly during the eight major economic events, where risk was both 
proxied as variance and standard deviation.  Finally, but not least, the recursive 
coefficient estimate in the trading activity model showed how the relationship between 
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volatility and net positions of hedgers and speculators is affected during the major 
economic events. 
 
5.3 Summary of Findings 
5.3.1 Behaviour Section 
   
 The trading determinant model showed that large hedgers exhibited significant 
positive feedback trading behaviour in 15 markets, and significant contrarian behaviour 
in five markets.  This was consistent with Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) who found 
sophisticated investors pursued positive feedback strategies.  Speculators, on the other 
hand, exhibited significant positive feedback trading behaviour only in seven markets, 
and contrarian behaviour in Eurodollars only.  With 23 markets having speculators 
exhibiting positive feedback trading, and only significant in seven of them, the monthly 
data interval was found to be not synchronous enough to determine speculators’ trading 
decisions.  Hedgers (speculators) were also found to respond negatively (positively) to 
market sentiment after controlling for market risk, which was consistent with De Bondt 
(1993) and Wang (2003).  Information variables were insignificant in most markets, 
suggesting that the large players did not use these monthly yields significantly in their 
trading decisions.   
 
 Hedgers had significant market timing ability in getting a positive return in one-
month’s time for silver, corn, cocoa and coffee, while exhibiting similar poor abilities in 
Treasury bonds, Japanese yen, soybean oil, crude oil and heating oil.  This can be 
contrasted with speculators having significant market timing ability in wheat (Minnesota) 
and cocoa only.  This was consistent with Khoury and Perrakis (1998) that hedgers in 
silver, corn and coffee properly change their net positions to increase their futures return 
in one month’s time, and hence are better informed than speculators in these markets, but 
inconsistent with Chatrath et al. (1997) that speculators were the most profitable in the 
1990s.  The poor or negative market timing ability for hedgers was supported by 
Working (1953) that short hedgers tend to lose money to speculators on their hedge 
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transactions.  However, due to the poor market timing ability of speculators, a higher 
frequency data interval was recommended to fully test their market timing ability.  Using 
the monthly data, the poor market timing ability of speculators do support Keynes (1930) 
assumption that speculators do not have any forecasting ability, thereby, giving further 
support to the existence of risk premium.  To test the existence of risk premium, own- 
and cross-hedging pressure effect tests were used and revealed significant risk premium 
only in few markets, which was consistent with Besseminder (1993) that hedging 
pressures do not affect the futures returns.  Further, price pressure tests were performed to 
test the robustness of hedging pressure tests.  After controlling for price pressures, silver, 
crude oil and live cattle continued to exhibit significant risk premium, suggesting the 
transfer of risk from hedgers to speculators in those markets.  Significant positive 
feedback trading behaviour and negative market timing ability in Japanese yen, crude oil 
and heating oil, suggested hedgers tend to destabilise the futures markets by pushing 
away prices from their fundamental values.  In particular, hedgers in Japanese yen and 
heating oil suggested a tendency to be destabilisers, since there was no significant risk 
premium after controlling for price pressures.  A review of the regulation regarding 
stringent position limits imposed upon speculators in these markets was suggested.  This 
was further supported with the decline in speculation in these markets, and also where net 
positions of speculators were less than net positions of hedgers, both for the mean and 
standard deviation figures. 
 
    
5.3.2 Performance Section 
  
The mean equation showed that hedgers’ net positions were negatively related to 
returns in 18 markets, which was consistent with the negative correlation between the two 
variables.  Speculators’ returns were significantly related with their net positions only in 
four markets, which was consistent with the low correlation between the two variables.  
Sentiment index was highly associated with returns for both players, which can be 
explained by the bullish trend in the US.  The lagged hedging pressure variables were 
mostly significant for agricultural markets, which was consistent with Keynes (1930).  As 
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expected from earlier findings, information variables tend to be insignificant in 
determining returns.  An ARMA decomposition of net positions showed that expected net 
positions of hedgers are negatively related to returns in 17 markets, where 15 were from 
the agricultural group.  The fewer positive expected net positions of speculators and 
relatively more unexpected net positions of speculators suggested that these players were 
less informed than hedgers in setting their net positions at the start of the month, but 
rather speculators changed their net positions more often than hedgers during the rest of 
the month with the expectation of higher returns.  The expected net position coefficients 
for both hedgers and speculators in 15 and six markets were consistent with Canoles et al. 
(1998) that, in these markets, they were both financially sophisticated, well educated, and 
hedgers were better informed in setting a better expected net position at the start of the 
trading month to determine actual returns.  The low significance of expected net positions 
for speculators also suggested other non-return motivational factors like recreation, which 
were further supported by the poor correlation between returns and net positions.  
Decomposed sentiment variables and lagged hedging pressure variables were still 
significantly positive and negative as found in the non-decomposed mean equation.  As 
for decomposed information variables, unexpected T-bill yield appeared to be more 
negatively significant to return for speculators, and unexpected corporate spread and 
dividend yield to be more positively significant to returns of speculators, particularly for 
financials, minerals and currencies.   
 
 The decomposition of variables against idiosyncratic volatility helped in 
confirming that hedgers were better informed in setting a current net position level at the 
start of the month that would have a smaller impact of their risk levels and that 
speculators would rather set net positions that change more frequently to satisfy their risk 
appetites.  Net positions of hedgers (expected and unexpected) tend to have less effect on 
volatility compared to speculators’ net positions (expected and unexpected) that tended to 
add to volatility.  This was consistent with the Shalen (1993) and Chen et al. (1995) 
models, where speculators’ volatility was positively related with trading demand.  More 
significant expected and particularly unexpected variables affecting volatility were found 
within the currency group for both players, supported by the fact that the foreign 
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exchange markets were among the most actively traded contracts.   Information variables 
appear not to have significant effect upon volatility of large players.  A decomposition of 
idiosyncratic volatility showed that speculators had 22 markets with significant expected 
volatility, with 17 being positive. Expected volatility of hedgers was significant and 
positive in 14 markets, and negative in seven markets.  While both speculators and 
hedgers had significant positive expected volatility in heating oil and crude oil, the 
magnitude of the coefficients was larger for hedgers, suggesting more active trading in 
these markets by hedgers at the start of the month rather than for the rest of the month.   
 
 Using a GARCH (1, 1) model, news about volatility from the previous month was 
positive and significant in 10 (15) markets for hedgers (speculators), suggesting that the 
ARCH term was important in determining current volatility levels for hedgers 
(speculators), especially in agricultural futures markets.  The GARCH term (lagged 
volatility) was significant in 24 (19) markets, which was consistent with Yang and 
Brorsen (1993).  The greater significance of the news about volatility from the previous 
month for speculators suggested their greater reliance on noise trading and herding 
behaviour, where news from previous periods affected current volatility.  Further, 
hedgers’ volatility in Treasury bonds and coffee, and speculators’ volatility in gold and 
S&P500 futures, had experienced increasing volatility persistence to shocks over the 
1990s.  In all remaining markets, hedgers’ and speculators’ volatility had shown a 
tendency to decay over time in response to shocks, supporting that both players were 
informed and reacted well to news volatility.  The PARCH model, in contrast, exhibited 
more significant negative variables for both lagged volatility and news about volatility 
from previous month for speculators.  By capturing more significant negative impact of 
lagged volatility and news of volatility from previous month, the PARCH was suggested 
to be more informative than the GARCH model for speculators’ current volatility.  The 
PARCH model, by capturing both more negative and positive impacts of lagged volatility 
and news of volatility from previous month for hedgers’ current volatility, was also 
preferred over the GARCH model.  As a robust check, model performance evaluation 
was carried out and the GARCH model, under normal distribution, gave the lowest 
RMSE for hedgers’ returns in 13 markets, which was consistent with Bracker and Smith 
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(1999).  On the other hand, the PARCH model under normal distribution ranked first in 
explaining speculators’ actual returns, with 11 markets having the lowest RMSE.  The 
PARCH model, under t distribution, fitted the actual returns for both players in the least 
accurate way among all ARCH-based models. 
 
 An analysis of the return and risk relationship showed that expected volatility had 
a positive and significant effect on hedgers’ return only in crude oil, heating oil and 
wheat (Chicago), thereby further enhancing the need to re-check position limits of 
hedgers in those markets.  In markets like silver, Eurodollars, Japanese yen, wheat 
(Kansas, Minnesota) and pork bellies, expected volatility significantly decreased hedgers’ 
return which was consistent with portfolio theory that hedgers’ risk should be 
insignificant or low due to the purpose of minimizing risk as stated by Hoffman (1932).  
Due to the informed traits of hedgers, unexpected volatility was also theoretically 
expected to be low and insignificant, suggesting that their return are less affected by 
changing risk attitudes that occur during the month rather than at the start of the month.  
However, unexpected volatility in gold, silver, Swiss francs, coffee and cotton was 
positively related to returns, suggesting that in these markets changing risk level that 
occur during the rest of the month have a positive effect on returns.  On the other hand, 
speculators’ expected volatility, as theoretically expected, was positive and significant in 
crude oil, heating oil, and wheat (Kansas, Chicago), but negative in Eurodollars, 
Canadian dollars and pork bellies.  Unexpected volatility, theoretically expected to be 
higher or more significant for speculators due to overreaction towards noise information, 
was so in gold, silver, Swiss francs and cotton, but negative and significant in Japanese 
yen, pork bellies and wheat (Chicago).  Overall, in line with Marshall (1919), the hedger 
did not speculate but insured, thereby reinforcing the higher expected risk borne by 
speculators. 
 
 In testing the normality assumptions of the error distributions of the GARCH and 
PARCH volatility models, skewness values of hedgers’ and speculators’ returns under 
(PARCH, normal) and (PARCH, t) were more negative than under GARCH models due 
to the higher sensitivity of the PARCH model to negative returns.  Theoretically, 
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hedgers’ kurtosis should be smaller due to their risk-minimizing profiles.  The (GARCH, 
normal), (GARCH, t), (PARCH, normal) models supported that claim in copper, crude 
oil, heating oil, soybean oil, and sugar, where hedgers managed to have a lower risk 
relative to speculators.  Overall findings were supported by Mann and Heifner (1976), 
Blattberg and Gonedes (1984) and Houthakker (1961) that the distribution of large 
hedgers’ and speculators’ returns were leptokurtic.   
 
 Forecasting of one-month return showed that both returns for hedgers and 
speculators, under GARCH and PARCH models, followed nearly the same close trend in 
all 29 markets, with actual returns being within 95% confidence intervals bands of the 
forecasted returns.  While the highest number of underestimated forecast was 17 under 
(PARCH, t) for speculators’ forecast returns, the number of overestimated forecast were 
generally the same across all four models.  This suggested that the GARCH and PARCH 
models were generally more affected by increasing actual returns compared to decreasing 
actual returns.  This was analogous to the decreasing trend in net positions observed in 
December 1999 just before the forecast of January 2000.  Also, in line with Poon and 
Granger (2003) and Ding and Granger (1996), GARCH models under normal distribution 
put too much weight on recent observations relative to those in the past.  The (PARCH, t) 
model’s high number of underestimated returns forecasts could be attributed to high 
sensitivity of standard deviation over returns.  This was in line with Poon and Granger 
(2003) who found that standard deviation is more proportional to derivatives prices than 
variance models.  For hedgers, the (PARCH, normal) model ranked first with 10 good 
forecasts of one-month return.  As for speculators, the best models were (PARCH, 
normal) and (GARCH, t) who ranked equally first with seven good forecasts.  In 
comparing the number of good forecasts achieved under hedgers’ and speculators’ 
returns, it could be observed that models using hedgers’ net positions provided better 
forecasts than using speculators’ net positions-based models. 
 
 The standard deviation and variance for both players were mixed in magnitude.  
Markets whose variance or standard deviation of hedgers were smaller than those of 
speculators supported Smith’s (1922) price insurance theory where hedging enabled 
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hedgers to insure against the risk of price fluctuations and also Hoffman’s (1932) view 
that hedging was about shifting risk.  On the other hand, markets where variance or 
standard deviation of hedgers were bigger than those of speculators supported Telser 
(1981) that the motivation to use futures contracts was not primarily driven by the firm’s 
desire to reduce risk, but by the institutional characteristics of the futures exchange itself 
like regulation ensuring liquidity.  Variance appeared to be more volatile in currency and 
financial markets due to their highly traded activity.   In comparing the idiosyncratic 
volatility with the standard deviation and variance in one-month forecast, only in the 
S&P500 futures market did idiosyncratic volatility provide a good measure of volatility 
for the one-month forecast returns.  Consistent with the existing volatility forecasting 
literature and specifically Manfredo et al. (1999), the poor measure of idiosyncratic 
volatility confirmed the difficulty in finding a “best” volatility forecasting method across 
alternative data sets and horizons. 
 
5.3.3 Stability and Events Analysis Section 
 
 The trading determinant model showed that the highest return coefficient 
estimates could be found in Canadian dollars, Eurodollars, British pounds, Treasury 
bonds, Japanese yen and gold.  The occurrence of relatively higher coefficient estimates 
suggested that large players in currency and financial markets tended to rely more on 
actual returns to change their net positions the following month than large players in 
agricultural futures markets.  Moreover, the return coefficient estimates between hedgers 
and speculators had a tendency to bear a negative relationship.  This was supportive of 
the idea that the futures market is a zero-sum game, and that for every long position there 
should a short position to net it off.  With the exception of most markets being stable, 
only speculators in soybeans, cotton, wheat (Chicago) and cocoa had structural breaks 
with significant return coefficient estimates.  The effect of speculators’ returns on next 
month’s net positions, as expected, is backed by positive feedback behaviour, where 
speculators took more long positions (in soybean and cocoa) when major economic 
events was an indication of easing economic conditions, and took more short positions 
(wheat (Kansas) and cotton) under events upholding tight economic conditions.  This 
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supported BIS (1995–2001) that major economic events did not affect significantly 
futures markets in the US, except in the four markets mentoned above at a specific point 
in time. 
   
 Similarly, few structural breaks were found in the mean equation, supporting 
that positive feedback trading persisted in the long run where the recursive coefficient 
estimates were greater than zero.  This was consistent with De Bondt and Thaler (1987) 
and Frankel and Froot (1988), who found that extreme movements in prices eventually 
revert, as long as part of these movements was accounted for by positive feedback 
trading.  More importantly, only coffee and live hogs had structural breaks with 
significant negative coefficient estimates when the effect of the event was taken into 
account.  The jump in the change of net positions coefficient estimates for coffee, due to 
the start of the temporary revival from Japanese recession, could be attributed to more 
confidence of hedgers selling their futures contracts later at a better price.  The jump in 
live hogs net positions coefficient estimates, due to the start of the US Fed tightening 
interest rates, could be attributed to hedgers shorting fewer contracts in the expectation of 
interest rates easing in the future.   
 
 In the risk and return relationship model, recursive estimates of risk were 
mixed, where risk was both proxied as standard deviation and variance.  There were more 
significant recursive estimates where standard deviation was used as a measure of risk.  
This was due to standard deviation being more proportional to futures prices.  While the 
findings of a positive relationship between risk and return supported portfolio theory that 
a higher risk was compensated with a higher return and vice versa, the findings of a 
significant negative relationship between risk and return could be explained by Glosten, 
Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) where investors may not demand high risk premium if 
they were better able to bear risk at times of particular volatility.  Moreover, if the future 
seems risky, the investors may want to save more in the present, thus lowering the need 
for larger premiums.  When using standard deviation as a risk proxy, there were more 
structural breaks occurring for speculators, suggesting that speculators’ returns were 
more affected during major macroeconomic events.  However, the structural breaks were 
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significant only in soybean for hedgers and Treasury bonds for speculators.  No structural 
breaks were significant where variance was proxied as risk.   
 
 Finally, but not least, the relationship between trading activity and volatility was 
looked at.  Recursive estimates had more positive and negative effects on trading activity 
of speculators than hedgers, where standard deviation was used as a proxy of volatility.   
The boundaries within which recursive estimates of volatility lie were much broader in 
currency markets like Japanese yen, British pounds and Swiss francs; and financial 
markets like S&P500, which is consistent with Christie-David and Chaudhry (1999) that 
financial instruments showed longer volatility persistence.  The boundaries between 
which the coefficient estimates of variance lay were smaller than those of standard 
deviation.  The significant negative relationship observed between standard deviation and 
net positions, and between variance and net positions, was consistent with Peck (1981), 
Bessembiner and Seguin (1992), but inconsistent with Roth et al. (2003) who find a 
positive relation between net position and open interest for both hedgers and speculators.  
More importantly, volatility estimates (standard deviation) had a significant positive 
effect on net position of hedgers for Japanese yen. Similarly, volatility estimates 
(variance) had a significant positive effect on hedgers’ trading activity in crude oil, 
heating oil, Swiss francs and platinum.  The suggestion that volatility in hedgers’ returns 
tended to add to their net positions, added further support for the need to re-check the 
speculators’ stringent position limits status quo in Japanese yen, crude oil and heating oil.  
The case for crude oil was further enhanced by the significant negative effect of volatility 
(variance) on speculators’ net positions. 
 
5.4 Policy Implications and Practical Significance 
 
 In the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) and Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA) in the US, it is well observed that large speculators have imposed 
penalties like position limits in the futures markets.  This study encouraged such stringent 
regulation to be revaluated from CFTC policy makers.  Findings in the behaviour section 
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showed that hedgers exhibited both significant positive feedback trading and significant 
negative market timing in the crude oil, heating oil, and Japanese yen futures markets.  
This suggests that hedgers destabilise futures prices by pushing away the prices from 
their fundamental value, and thereby encourages the need to re-assess the relaxed 
regulation imposed on hedgers in these markets.  Particular emphasis is recommended for 
the heating oil and Japanese yen, since there was no significant risk premium that was 
borne by speculators, after controlling for price pressure effects.  Further support is 
brought from findings in the performance section, where volatility (standard deviation) 
had a significant positive effect on hedgers’ net positions in Japanese yen; volatility 
(variance) had a similar effect in crude oil and heating oil; and volatility (variance) had a 
significant negative effect on speculators’ net positions in crude oil. 
 
 A better understanding of whether risk is better proxied as standard deviation or 
variance in specific futures markets can be a very useful risk-management tool for 
investment companies and traders alike.  For instance, using a conditional standard 
deviation-based model and the return model (mean equation), under normal distribution, 
would have produced an accurate forecast of one-month return for live hogs, lumber, 
coffee, cotton, corn, soybean oil, soybean meal, sugar and soybean for both large hedgers 
and large speculators.  Similarly, the recursive coefficient estimates of risk (standard 
deviation and variance) against return have shown not only the actual attitude of hedgers 
and speculators towards risk, but also that these key market players’ returns are not 
significantly affected by jumps or breaks in the return/risk relationship during major 
global economic events.      
 
 The trading determinant behaviour model used can also help investors, 
quantitative analysts and such likes to understand that large hedgers exhibit significant 
positive feedback trading in 15 of the futures markets studied, and large speculators do 
not appear to follow a clear-cut positive feedback or contrarian behaviour strategy.  This 
suggests that hedgers do not significantly change their net positions in intervals less than 
one month, but also that a higher frequency data interval is required to test trading 
determinants of speculators.  The trading determinant model also shows that information 
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variables like S&P500 dividend yield, three-month Treasury bill and corporate yield 
spread do not significantly affect these market players’ trading decisions.  Further, the 
recursive coefficient estimates of return in the events analysis and stability model appear 
to be higher in financial and currency markets rather than agricultural markets.  This 
suggests that key market players tend to rely more on actual returns in determining next 
month’s change in net position in financial and currency markets than agricultural 
markets. 
 
 Moreover, the use of the market timing ability model gives information if large 
hedgers and large speculators can obtain positive returns in one month’s time, based on 
the actual change in net positions.  For instance, the change in actual net positions in 
silver, corn, cocoa and coffee increased one-month futures return for hedgers, but 
decreased one-month futures return in copper, heating oil, Japanese yen and crude oil.  
The market timing ability model fails to deliver significant results in explaining 
speculators’ returns due to the higher trading frequency they trade in.  This result not only 
helps in suggesting that hedgers are more informed by operating on a longer time 
interval, but also that speculators’ returns are due to market timing abilities on higher 
trading frequency intervals.  The result, using monthly data, also support the assumption 
from the theory of normal backwardation, that speculators do not have any forecasting 
ability.  Similarly, the hedging pressure effects models help to understand the existence 
of a transfer of risk through significant risk premium.  Results of significant negative 
hedging pressure variable coefficients not only support that hedgers are net short on 
average in most markets, but also that cross-hedging pressures exist in most markets, 
particularly agricultural markets.  This suggests that many markets make use of cross-
spreading futures in achieving a risk/return target and those investors seeking the out-
performance of large players in specific markets should consider cross-markets 
information rather than just the underlying market on which the futures contract is based 
on.   
 The decomposed mean equation shows how much expected and unexpected 
components of net positions, sentiment, and information variables affect the actual 
returns for hedgers and speculators.  For instance, hedgers’ actual returns are more 
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significantly negatively related to expected net positions than unexpected positions 
compared to speculators’ returns that are more significantly related to unexpected net 
positions.  This suggests that hedgers, on average, are more inclined than speculators in 
setting a better net position or change in net position at the start of the trading month in 
determining the futures returns.  The mean equation model adds further support to the 
non-significance of information variables in determining returns by large hedgers and 
speculators.  Finally, the recursive coefficient estimates in the mean equation suggest that 
major global economic events did not significantly affect net positions in determining 
actual returns. 
 
 
5.5 Areas for Future Research 
  
 This study has been conducted using monthly data, due to factors like good 
performance of market players on long-term investment horizons, consistency in models 
with release of monthly macroeconomic variables, and consistency of previous empirical 
results over different time horizons.  The data sample also is set from May 1990 to 
December 2000 to set the study in the context of a US decade that was very successful in 
all areas of macroeconomic policies, globalisation and financial deregulation.  The 
former assumption of monthly data can be relaxed for future research by using exclusive 
proprietary daily data like that employed in Haigh et al. (2005).  This would be 
particularly important for assessing the behaviour and performance of large speculators, 
which appeared to be more prone to structural breaks than large hedgers.  The latter 
assumption of using data up to December 2000 can also be extended to more up-to-date 
data to test for robustness in stability in the models and also to see the effect of important 
events like 9/11 and more volatile oil price shocks. 
 
 The GARCH and PARCH volatility analyses have been conducted, assuming 
symmetry in the models.  Due to high skewness values, and non-normality in most 
futures markets in explaining hedgers and particularly speculators’ returns, asymmetrical 
models such as Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) and Component GARCH (CGARCH) 
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can be implemented to ensure non negativity in the forecast of conditional variance to 
account for mean reversion and non-linearity in volatility.  The usage of asymmetrical 
models would also not only add value to the performance evaluation of the models in 
explaining returns, but also further ascertain whether standard deviation and/or variance 
can accurately forecast one-month futures return and whether idiosyncratic volatility can 
be a good measure of risk.  For instance, McKenzie et al. (2001) provides a nomenclature 
of nested ARCH model specifications where the estimation of the power term δ in the 
PARCH model is of critical importance.  In that same line of thought, forecasting can be 
tested for more than one-month (or weekly) return.  For example, the usage of daily data 
can help to reveal whether the GARCH/PARCH model can predict speculators’ returns in 
one day’s time. 
 
 A third and yet very important area to be considered for future research would 
be the relationship between speculators’ and hedgers’ returns and net positions.  While 
we have found significant negative correlation between net positions (or change in net 
positions) between hedgers and speculators, the same actual futures return for both large 
players was assumed.  This important assumption can be relaxed in the future, if 
proprietary data about speculators’ and hedgers’ returns can be provided.   Further, the 
effect of S&P500 futures or similar indices can be integrated into the models to estimate 
the effect of S&P500 returns or net positions in each futures market’s future net position 
or returns.  More interestingly, testing who leads, lags, or follows some non-random 
positioning in the futures markets can help to know where the futures markets might be 
heading in the future.  For instance, Caginalp and Laurent (1998) found traders are 
reacting to expectations involving strategies and resources of other participants.  In a 
similar fashion, uninformed traders overreact to another’s trades, thereby exaggerating 
price movements (Daigler and Wiley, 1999).  By integrating theories like herding, 
lead/lag relationships and causality; by using data about the concentration of positions 
held by the largest four and eight traders; and by also implementing small traders as 
defined by CFTC into the models, future research can further help in understanding the 
behaviour and performance of key market players in the US futures markets.   
  
 
 
209
 Finally, but not least, it would be interesting to consider the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) actions in response to the “Comprehensive Review of the 
Commitments of Traders Reporting Program” (June 21, 2006).  As from 5 January 2007, 
CFTC will publish an additional COT report called the “COT – Supplemental”.  The new 
report will show aggregate futures and option positions of Non-commercial, Commercial, 
and Index Traders in 12 selected agricultural commodities.  These so-called “Index 
Traders” will be drawn from both the current Non-commercial and the Commercial 
categories. Coming from the Non-commercial category will be managed funds, pension 
funds and other institutional investors that generally seek exposure to commodity prices 
as an asset class in an unleveraged and passively-managed manner using a standardized 
commodity index. Coming from the Commercial category will be entities whose 
positions predominantly reflect hedging of OTC transactions involving commodity 
indices—for example, swap dealers holding long futures positions to hedge short OTC 
commodity index exposure opposite institutional traders such as pension funds. These 
latter position holders are those traders called “non-traditional commercials.”  That would 
be an exciting path for future research to further differentiate hedgers and speculators into 
traditionals and non-traditionals, and use this finer distinction to look at the behaviour 
and performance of these key market players in the US Futures markets. 
 
 
5.6 Generalisation of Results 
 
 Besides the limitations of this study which can form prominent areas of future 
research, as laid out in section 5.5, it is important to be careful before generalising about 
the findings of this study.  First and foremost, while 29 markets have been studied within 
developed, highly liquid financial derivatives markets (US), the sample is one that can be 
at most generalized for the US futures markets only, and not extended to emerging ones.  
The uniqueness of the COT data is available only in the US futures exchanges, making 
the study comparable only to other studies using that same US data.   
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 This study being the first—particularly in analyzing 29 markets in the trading 
determinant model; market timing model; GARCH and PARCH volatility models under 
both normal and t distribution; risk/return relationship model; trading activity and 
volatility relationship model; and recursive estimates in events analysis—makes the 
results justifiable only for the last decade period, using monthly decision intervals by 
large hedgers and large speculators only.  The 21st century is a different episode with 
factors like more volatility in Fed rates, unstable price shocks, and September 11-like 
events.  Although the results can serve for guidance for small traders as to the behaviour 
and performance of key market players like large hedgers, the results in no sense 
represent small traders.  Further, although herding and mean reversion in the net positions 
of hedgers and speculators is expected, this study didn’t test for these explicitly.  
Moreover, it was assumed hedging pressure effects (cross hedging) flow only within a 
similar commodity group and not within groups.  Importantly too, we assumed large 
hedgers and large speculators behave separately and do not depend on either party before 
buying or selling futures contracts.     
  
 The results among the 29 futures markets are mixed due to different 
econometric models, methodologies, and underlying assumptions.  This study was geared 
towards getting a big picture of the behaviour and performance of large hedgers and large 
speculators in those markets only in the 1990s.  Similarities and non-similarities of 
significant results in the models and with other scholars’ results used have helped 
towards that end.  Superior market timing abilities were tested for robustness with 
hedging pressure effect tests, which were in turn tested for robustness with the price 
pressure test.  The destabilising feature of hedgers in crude oil, heating oil and Japanese 
yen markets is based on the assumption that hedgers traded on a monthly interval.  
However, results for speculators appear insignificant due to their higher trading 
frequency interval.  Other models such as trading determinant models, risk/return 
relationship model, trading activity and volatility relationship model, and mean equation 
model were also tested for robustness with the recursive stability test.  All these models 
were found stable with few or no significant structural breaks found that matched any of 
the eight macroeconomic events used in this study.  Other models such as decomposed 
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mean equation were also tested by diagnostic tests.  Overall, care should still be taken 
before generalizing the results of this study due to the uniqueness of the data, the 
timeframe chosen, events underlying the decade, and the sound economic system of the 
US in the 1990s. 
 
   
 
5.7 The Behaviour and Performance of Key Market Players in US Futures Markets: 
Final Concluding Remarks 
 
   The uniqueness of this study can be attributed not only to the COT unique data, 
but also to the disaggregation of the market into large hedgers and large speculators. 
Beaver (1972) argued, “…it is important to distinguish between securities markets and 
individual investors, because the role of information can vastly be different in each 
context.  To a certain extent, the distinction is artificial, in that aggregate actions of 
individuals determine market behaviour..”  However, more importantly, the process of 
aggregation is often deceptive, and if we fail to make the distinction, we may be subject 
to any one of a number of fallacies of composition (Winsen, 1976).  In that spirit, this 
study helps to shed further light on behaviour and performance of large hedgers and large 
speculators in 29 US futures markets.    
 
 The policy implications are critical in terms of position limits for specific players, 
as well as the practical significance which can help towards a better understanding of risk 
and return of the largest traders in the US futures markets.   This study is only a step 
forward in the wilderness of behavioural finance in helping to get a view of how hedgers 
and speculators change their monthly trading decisions; how they can do so and achieve 
positive return in one month’s time; why the transfer of risk from one party to another is 
an important concept in futures markets; that information variables are not significant 
variables in these large players’ decisions; how different error distributions can result in 
different model performance; how well standard deviation- or variance-based models 
help to predict one-month return better than idiosyncratic volatility; and how stable are 
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trading decisions and attitudes towards risk during major economic events.  Everything 
comes back to the two most important things:  the risk and return of hedgers and 
speculators, where the latter is conceptualized after accepting certain level of risk.  As 
Greenspan put it so well, “Management of risk is definitely a must to avoid contagion and 
near collapse like LCTM ... that’s why understanding the risk and return of key market 
players become ultimately the key issue for all entities dealing with derivatives like 
futures markets…”  I rest my case by quoting an interview with a pioneer of behavioural 
finance, Hersh Shefrin, who said: 
 “It is really behavioral finance that ultimately will tell you why a particular 
trading rule is likely to work, because technical trading does, for the most part, exploit 
market inefficiencies. Otherwise, you might as well just buy and hold, but if you are 
looking for abnormal returns, then you have to be using the right technical trading 
strategies..”141 
 
                                                          
 
141 Excerpted from an article originally published in the March 2000 issue of Technical Analysis of Stocks 
and Commodities magazine 
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REURODOLLAR P13EDHF P14EDHF P15EDHF P16EDHF EEDH BEDH GEDH OEDH EURODOLLARR
P13EDSF P14EDSF P15EDSF P16EDSF EEDS BEDS GEDS OEDS EURODOLLARRS
RFEEDER_CATTLE P13FCHF P14FCHF P15FCHF P16FCHF EFCH BFCH GFCH OFCH FEEDER_CATTLER
P13FCSF P14FCSF P15FCSF P16FCSF EFCS BFCS GFCS OFCS FEEDER_CATTLERS
RGOLD P13GCHF P14GCHF P15GCHF P16GCHF EGCH BGCH GGCH OGCH GOLDR
P13GCSF P14GCSF P15GCSF P16GCSF EGCS BGCS GGCS OGCS GOLDRS
RCOPPER P13HGHF P14HGHF P15HGHF P16HGHF EHGH BHGH GHGH OHGH COPPERR
P13HGSF P14HGSF P15HGSF P16HGSF EHGS BHGS GHGS OHGS COPPERRS
RHEATING_OIL P13HOHF P14HOHF P15HOHF P16HOHF EHOH BHOH GHOH OHOH HEATING_OILR
P13HOSF P14HOSF P15HOSF P16HOSF EHOS BHOS GHOS OHOS HEATING_OILRS
RJAPANESE_YEN P13JYHF P14JYHF P15JYHF P16JYHF EJYH BJYH GJYH OJYH JAPANESE_YENR
P13JYSF P14JYSF P15JYSF P16JYSF EJYS BJYS GJYS OJYS JAPANESE_YENRS
RCOFFEE P13KCHF P14KCHF P15KCHF P16KCHF EKCH BKCH GKCH OKCH COFFEER
P13KCSF P14KCSF P15KCSF P16KCSF EKCS BKCS GKCS OKCS COFFEERS
RWHEAT__KW_ P13KWHF P14KWHF P15KWHF P16KWHF EKWH BKWH GKWH OKWH WHEAT__KW_R
P13KWSF P14KWSF P15KWSF P16KWSF EKWS BKWS GKWS OKWS WHEAT__KW_RS
RLUMBER P13LBHF P14LBHF P15LBHF P16LBHF ELBH BLBH GLBH OLBH LUMBERR
P13LBSF P14LBSF P15LBSF P16LBSF ELBS BLBS GLBS OLBS LUMBERRS
RCATTLE_LIVE P13LCHF P14LCHF P15LCHF P16LCHF ELCH BLCH GLCH OLCH CATTLE_LIVER
P13LCSF P14LCSF P15LCSF P16LCSF ELCS BLCS GLCS OLCS CATTLE_LIVERS
RHOGS P13LHHF P14LHHF P15LHHF P16LHHF ELHH BLHH GLHH OLHH HOGSR
P13LHSF P14LHSF P15LHSF P16LHSF ELHS BLHS GLHS OLHS HOGSRS
RWHEAT__MW_ P13MWHFP14MWHFP15MWHFP16MWHF EMWH BMWH GMWH OMWH WHEAT__MW_R
P13MWSFP14MWSFP15MWSFP16MWSF EMWS BMWS GMWS OMWS WHEAT__MW_RS
RPORC_BELLIES P13PBHF P14PBHF P15PBHF P16PBHF EPBH BPBH GPBH OPBH PORCBELLIESR
P13PBSF P14PBSF P15PBSF P16PBSF EPBS BPBS GPBS OPBS PORCBELLIESRS
RPLATINUM P13PLHF P14PLHF P15PLHF P16PLHF EPLH BPLH GPLH OPLH PLATINUMR
P13PLSF P14PLSF P15PLSF P16PLSF EPLS BPLS GPLS OPLS PLATINUMRS
RSUGAR P13SBHF P14SBHF P15SBHF P16SBHF ESBH BSBH GSBH OSBH SUGARR
P13SBSF P14SBSF P15SBSF P16SBSF ESBS BSBS GSBS OSBS SUGARRS
RSWISS_FRANC P13SFHF P14SFHF P15SFHF P16SFHF ESFH BSFH GSFH OSFH SWISSFRANCR
P13SFSF P14SFSF P15SFSF P16SFSF ESFS BSFS GSFS OSFS SWISSFRANCRS
RSOYBEAN P13SHF P14SHF P15SHF P16SHF ESH BSH GSH OSH SOYBEANR
P13SSF P14SSF P15SSF P16SSF ESS BSS GSS OSS SOYBEANRS
RSILVER P13SIHF P14SIHF P15SIHF P16SIHF ESIH BSIH GSIH OSIH SILVERR
P13SISF P14SISF P15SISF P16SISF ESIS BSIS GSIS OSIS SILVERRS
RSOYBEAN_MEAL P13SMHF P14SMHF P15SMHF P16SMHF ESMH BSMH GSMH OSMH SOYBEAN_MEALR
P13SMSF P14SMSF P15SMSF P16SMSF ESMS BSMS GSMS OSMS SOYBEAN_MEALRS
RS_P500 P13SPHF P14SPHF P15SPHF P16SPHF ESPH BSPH GSPH OSPH S_P500R
P13SPSF P14SPSF P15SPSF P16SPSF ESPS BSPS GSPS OSPS S_P500RS
RTBONDS P13USHF P14USHF P15USHF P16USHF EUSS BUSH GUSH OUSH TBONDSR
P13USSF P14USSF P15USSF P16USSF EUSH BUSS GUSS OUSS TBONDSRS
RWHEAT__W_ P13WHF P14WHF P15WHF P16WHF EWS BWH GWH OWH WHEAT_W_R
P13WSF P14WSF P15WSF P16WSF EWH BWS GWS OWS WHEAT_W_RS
tR tR tR tR tσ tσ2tσ 2tσ
Table 4.0 
Terms used in Methodology and Analysis stages 
Appendix 6.1 
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Appendix 6.2: US futures markets growth in activity  
 
 
 
 
 
Contract Exchange Category 1993y
Bond CBT Interest Rate 102.9
Dollars CME Interest Rate 81.4y
Note (10Year) CBT Interest Rate 21.4
Sweet NYMEX Energy 32
S&P 500 Index CME Stock Index 16.1
Note (5Year) CBT Interest Rate 10.1
Corn CBT Domestic Agriculture 13.5
(Henry Hub) NYMEX Energy 5
Soybeans CBT Domestic Agriculture 14.6
Gold - COMEX NYMEX Metal 10.6g
N.Y. No. 2 NYMEX Energy 9.4
Japanese Yen CME Currency 8.3
Regular Gasoline NYMEX Energy 7.4
Deutschemark CME Currency 18.8
Sugar #11 CSCE Foreign Agriculture 5.2
Soybean Meal CBT Domestic Agriculture 5
Soybean Oil CBT Domestic Agriculture 4.8
Wheat CBT Domestic Agriculture 3.7
Silver - COMEX NYMEX Metal 6
Live Cattle CME Domestic Agriculture 3.8
S&P 500 E-mini CME Stock Index 
Cotton #2 NYCE Domestic Agriculture 2
Swiss Franc CME Currency 6.2
Industrial Index CBT Stock Index 
Foreign Agriculture 
390.8 592.4
421 631
93.0% 93.9%Sub-total / U.S. total 
Sub-total 
U.S. total 
25Coffee “C” CSCE 2.5 3.1
4.3 -32
3.8
4.5
4.3 119
4.9 -17
4.9 29
7.3 51
7 88
7.6 47
7.4 48
8.7 18
7.6 -60
19.1 281
16.3 12
21.2 110
20 49
38 18
36.4 126
142.6 75
41.8 95
1998 % Change
152.2 48%
Trading Volume of the 25 Largest U.S. Exchange-Traded Futures and Option Contracts in 
1998, with Comparisons to 1993 (in millions of contracts)
10.9 3
9.5 1
9 9
 
Source: BIS 
Table 1.4 
Trading Volume of the 25 Largest US Exchange-Traded Futures and 
Option Contracts in 1998 
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Appendix 6.3: Global exchange traded commodity volume and US futures markets 
market positions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: BIS 
Graph 1.2 
Global exchange traded commodity volume-total and top 4 
countries. (1994-1998) (millions of contracts) 
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Dec-90 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Apr-95 Jun-98 Dec-98 Jun-99 Dec-99 Jun-00
Derivatives market turnover[1]
Exchange traded derivatives[2] 1222 1373
OTC derivatives 880 1265
Derivatives market positions[3]
Exchange traded derivatives 2290 3519 4634 7771 8862 10310 14792 13932 14440 13522 13904
Interest rate futures 4960 5807 5876 5978 7580 8019 7913
Currency futures 34 40 34 37 42 32 37
Stock market index futures 110 127 172 195 211 290 334
[1] Daily average in billions of US dollars.
[2] Sourced from Futures Industry Associations, various futures and options exchanges
[3] Notional amounts outstanding in billions of US dollars
[4] US ranked second after UK as the second largest derivatives market activity location.
Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS) : Central Bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives market activity 95 & 98, BIS Quarterly Reviews 1990-2001
 
Table 1.5 
US futures markets market positions (1990-2000) 
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Appendix 6.5 Econometric Methodology 
 
6.5.1 Stationary of individual time series 
 
ADF test 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) ADF test assumes that the y series follows an AR 
(p) process and adds lagged difference terms of the dependent variable to the right hand 
side of the test regression as follows: 
   (1) 
 
This is then used to test (using conventional t ratios142) 
 
      (2) 
 
An important result obtained by the test is that the asymptotic distribution of the t-ratio 
for is independent of the number of lagged first differences included in the ADF 
regression.   
 
 
6.5.2 Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Panel unit root tests are similar, but not identical to unit root tests carried out on a single 
series.  Firstly, classification of unit root tests is done on the basis of whether there are 
restrictions on the autoregressive process across cross-sections or series. Consider a 
following AR (1) process for panel data: 
 
       (3) 
                                                          
 
142  
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, where i= 1,2,…N cross-section units or series, that are observed over periods t = 
1,2,…Ti.  represent the exogenous variables in the model, including any fixed effects 
or individual trends,  are the autoregressive coefficients, and the errors are assumed 
to be mutually independent idiosyncratic disturbance. If  , is said to be weakly 
trend-stationary. On the other hand, if , then,  contains a unit root.  For 
purposes of testing, there are two natural assumptions that is made about the  .  First, 
the persistence parameters are common across cross-sections so that for all . 
The Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC), Breitung, and Hadri tests all employ this assumption. 
Alternatively, one can allow  varying freely across cross-sections. The Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin (IPS), and Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests are of this form. 
 
• Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) began by specifying a separate ADF regression for each 
cross section: 
     (4) 
The null hypothesis may be written as, 
    (5) 
 
, while the alternative hypothesis is given by: 
    
     (6) 
(where the may be reordered as necessary) which may be interpreted as a non-zero 
fraction of the individual processes is stationary.  After estimating the separate ADF 
regressions, the average of the t-statistics for from the individual ADF regressions, 
: 
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        (7) 
is then adjusted to arrive at the desired test statistics.  In the case where the lag order is 
always zero , simulated critical values for are provided in the IPS 
paper for different numbers of cross sections , series lengths , and for test equations 
containing either intercepts, or intercepts and linear trends (IPS, 2003).  EViews uses 
these values, or linearly interpolated values, in evaluating the significance of the test 
statistics.  In the general case where the lag order in equation 5 may be non-zero for some 
cross-sections, IPS shows that a properly standardized has an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution: 
     (8) 
The expressions for the expected mean and variance of the ADF regression t-statistics, 
 and , are provided by IPS for various values of T and p and 
differing test equation assumptions, and are not provided here.   
 
• Fisher-ADF  
An alternative approach to panel unit root tests, proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999),  
uses Fisher’s (1932) results to derive tests that combine the p-values from individual unit 
root tests.  If is defined as the p-value from any individual unit root test for cross-
section i, then under the null of unit root for all N cross-sections, the asymptotic result is: 
        (9) 
 
In addition, Choi (2001) demonstrates that: 
 
       (10) 
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where  is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
EViews reports both the asymptotic and standard normal statistics using ADF 
individual unit root tests. The null and alternative hypotheses are the same as for the as 
IPS.  For the ADF Fisher test, the exogenous variables must be specified for the test 
equations.  
 
 
6.5.3 Lag optimization -Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 
The Akaike Information Criterion determines the model order p by minimizing an 
information theoretic function of p, AIC (p) and is defined as follows: 
         (11) 
where  is the log likelihood, . The AIC is often used 
in model selection for non-nested alternatives—smaller values of the AIC are preferred.  
Other information criteria such as BIC form a useful class of indexes, as they penalize for 
the number of parameters, and thus consider the thriftiness of models.  Although the 
information statistics have rather different origins, they all have a similar structure in that 
they involve the same information.  Lower information index values indicate better fit 
(Wicherts and Dolan, 2004). 
 
 
6.5.4 The GARCH (1,1) Model 
 
A simple GARCH (1, 1) specification is as follows:  
 
      (12) 
     (13) 
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where: the mean equation given in Equation (12) is written as a function of exogenous 
variables with an error term.  Since  is the one- period ahead forecast variance based 
on past information, it is called the conditional variance.  The conditional variance 
equation specified in (13) is a function of three terms:  
• A constant term: ω  
• News about volatility form the previous period measured as the lag of the squared 
residual from the mean equation: 2 1−tε (the ARCH term) 
• Last period forecast variance: 21−tσ  (the GARCH term) 
The (1, 1) in GARCH (1, 1) refers to the presence of a first order auto regressive GARCH 
term (the first term in parentheses) and a first- order moving average ARCH term ( the 
second term in parentheses).  An ordinary ARCH model is a special case of a GARCH 
specification in which there are no lagged forecast variances in the conditional variance 
equation – i.e., a GARCH (0, 1).  This is often interpreted in a financial context where an 
agent or trader   predicts this period’s variance by forming a weighted average of a long 
term average (the constant), the forecasted variance from the last period (the GARCH 
term) and information about volatility observed in the previous period (the ARCH term).  
If the asset return is unexpectedly larger, then the trader will increase the approximate 
value of the variance for the next period.  This model is also consistent with the volatility 
clustering often seen in financial returns data, where large changes in returns are likely to 
be followed by further large changes.   
 
There are two equivalent representations of the variance equation that may aid in 
interpreting the model: 
 
•  If  the lagged variance on the right hand side of Equation (13) is recursively 
substituted, the conditional variance can be expressed as a weighted average of all  
the lagged squared residuals: 
                                   (14) 
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It can be observed that the GARCH (1, 1) variance specification is analogous to the 
sample variance but that it down weights more distant lagged squared errors. 
• The error in the squared returns is given by tυ = −−2 1tε  2tσ .  Substituting for 
the variances in the equation the model can be written in terms of the error term as 
follows: 
        (15) 
 
Thus, the squared errors follow a heteroskedastic ARMA (1, 1) process.  The 
autoregressive root which administers the persistence of volatility shocks is the sum of α  
andβ .  In many applied settings, this root is very close to unity so that shocks die out 
rather slowly.  If no ARCH effects exist, then, no GARCH effects can exist  (Hamilton, 
1989).  
 
Moreover, higher order GARCH models, denoted GARCH (q, p), can be estimated by 
choosing either q or p greater than 1 where q is the order of the autoregressive GARCH 
terms and p is the order of the moving average ARCH terms, as follows: 
  
      (16) 
 
 
6.5.5 The Power ARCH (PARCH) Model  
 
 Taylor (1986) and Schwert (1989) introduced the standard deviation GARCH 
model, where the standard deviation is modelled rather than the variance.  This model, 
along with several other models, is generalized in Ding et al. (1993) with the Power 
ARCH specification.  In the Power ARCH model, the power parameter δ  of the standard 
deviation can be estimated rather than imposed, and the optional γ parameters are 
added to capture asymmetry of up to order r as follows: 
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 (17) 
The symmetric model sets iγ =0 for all i.  Note that if 2=δ  and iγ =0 fo all i, the 
PARCH model is simply a standard GARCH specification.  As in the previous models, 
the asymmetric effects are present if ≠γ 0.  To estimate the Taylor-Schwert’s model, for 
example, the order of the asymmetric terms is set to zero and δ  to 1. 
 
 
6.5.6 ARIMA theory 
 
 ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) models are generalizations of 
the simple AR model that use three tools for modeling the serial correlation in the 
disturbance: 
 
• The first tool is the autoregressive, or AR, term. The AR (1) model uses only the 
first-order term, but in general, higher-order AR terms can be used. Each AR term 
corresponds to the use of a lagged value of the residual in the forecasting equation for 
the unconditional residual.  An autoregressive model of order p, AR (p) has the form: 
 
      (18) 
   
 
• The second tool is the integration order term.  Each integration order corresponds 
to differencing the series being forecast.  For instance, a first-order integrated 
component means that the forecasting model is designed for the first difference of 
the original series.   
 
• The third tool is the MA, or moving average term.  A moving average forecasting 
model uses lagged values of the forecast error to improve the current forecast.  
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For instance, a first-order moving average term uses the most recent forecast 
error.  An MA (q) has the form: 
 
     (19) 
The autoregressive and moving average specifications can be combined to form an 
ARMA (p, q) specification: 
 
     (20) 
 
Although econometricians typically use ARIMA models applied to the residuals from a 
regression model, the specification can also be applied directly to a series.  This latter 
approach provides a univariate model, specifying the conditional mean of the series as a 
constant, and measuring the residuals as differences of the series from its mean.  
 
 
6.5.7 Principles of ARIMA Modeling (Box-Jenkins 1976) 
 
In ARIMA forecasting, a complete forecasting model is set up by using 
combinations of the three building blocks described above.  The first step in forming an 
ARIMA model for a series of residuals is to look at its autocorrelation properties.  The 
next step is to decide what kind of ARIMA model to use.  If the autocorrelation function 
dies off smoothly at a geometric rate, and the partial autocorrelations were zero after one 
lag, then a first-order autoregressive model is suitable.  Otherwise, if the autocorrelations 
were zero after one lag and the partial autocorrelations fell geometrically, a first-order 
moving average process would seem appropriate.  If the autocorrelations appear to have a 
seasonal pattern, this would suggest the presence of a seasonal ARMA structure. 
 
The goal of ARIMA analysis is a simple representation of the process governing the 
residual.  Only enough AR and MA terms should be used to fit the properties of the 
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residuals.  The Akaike information criterion and Schwarz criterion provided with each set 
of estimates may also be used as a guide for the appropriate lag order selection.  After 
fitting a candidate ARIMA specification, verification is done to ensure that there are no 
remaining autocorrelations that the model has not accounted for.  This is done by 
examining the autocorrelations and the partial autocorrelations of the innovations (the 
residuals from the ARIMA model) to see if any important forecasting power has been 
overlooked.  EViews provides views for diagnostic checks after estimation. 
 
 
6.5.8 Estimating ARIMA Models 
 
EViews estimates general ARIMA specifications that allow for right-hand side 
explanatory variables.  To specify ARIMA model: 
• Dependent variable is differenced, if necessary, to account for the order of integration. 
• Structural regression model is defined (dependent variables and regressors) and any AR 
or MA terms added. 
 
Seasonal ARMA Terms 
Box and Jenkins (1976) recommend the use of seasonal autoregressive (SAR) and 
seasonal moving average (SMA) terms for monthly or quarterly data with systematic 
seasonal movements.  The lag polynomial used in estimation is the product of the one 
specified by the AR terms and the one specified by the SAR terms.  The purpose of the 
SAR is to allow the formation of product of lag polynomials.  Similarly, SMA (q) can be 
included in your specification to specify a seasonal moving average term with lag.  The 
lag polynomial used in estimation is the product of the one defined by the MA terms and 
the one specified by the SMA terms.  As with the SAR, the SMA term allows the 
building of  up a polynomial that is the product of underlying lag polynomials. 
 
For example, a second-order AR process without seasonality is given by, 
 
       (21) 
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which can be represented using the lag operator  as: 
 
        (22) 
 
A second-order MA process without seasonality may be written,   
 
                  (23) 
 
or using lag operators:        (24) 
Adding a seasonal AR part, say, SAR (4) to equation (25) gives: 
 
       (25) 
 
which is equivalent to : 
    (26) 
The parameter  is associated with the seasonal part of the process. Note that this is an 
AR (6) process with nonlinear restrictions on the coefficients.  Adding a seasonal MA 
part, say, SMA (4) to equation (25) gives: 
 
       (27) 
, which is equivalent to: 
  
     (28) 
 
 
 ARMA Equation Diagnostics 
-ARMA Structure 
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 This set of views provides several diagnostic tests to assess the structure of the 
ARMA portion of the estimated equation. The view is currently available only for models 
specified by list that includes at least one AR or MA term and estimated by least squares. 
Only specifications for correlograms are displayed below. 
 
1. Correlograms 
 
The correlogram view compares the autocorrelation pattern of the structural residuals and 
that of the estimated model for a specified number of periods (recall that the structural 
residuals are the residuals after removing the effect of the fitted exogenous regressors but 
not the ARMA terms).  For a properly specified model, the residual and theoretical 
(estimated) autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations should be “close”. 
 
Autocorrelations (AC) 
 
 The autocorrelation of a series Y at lag k is estimated by: 
      (29) 
, where  is the sample mean of  .  This is the correlation coefficient for values of the 
series  periods apart.  If  is nonzero, the series is first order serially correlated.  If it 
declines more or less geometrically with increasing lag , it is a sign that the series 
follows a low-order autoregressive (AR) process.  If it drops to zero after a small number 
of lags, it is a sign that the series follows a low-order moving-average (MA) process.   
 
Partial Autocorrelations (PAC) 
 
The partial autocorrelation at lag  is the regression coefficient on  when 
 is regressed on a constant, .  This is a partial correlation since it 
measures the correlation of  values that are periods apart after removing the correlation 
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from the intervening lags.  If the pattern of autocorrelation is one that can be captured by 
an autoregression of order less than , then the partial autocorrelation at lag  will be 
close to zero.  The PAC of a pure autoregressive process of order, AR (p) cuts off at lag 
p, while the PAC of a pure moving average (MA) process gradually asymptotes to zero. 
EViews estimates the partial autocorrelation at lag  recursively by: 
     (30) 
where  is the estimated autocorrelation at lag and where, 
                     (31) 
 
This is a consistent approximation of the partial autocorrelation. The algorithm is 
described in Box and Jenkins (1976).  To obtain a more precise estimate of , simply run 
the regression: 
    (32) 
, where  is a residual.  The dotted lines in the plots of the partial autocorrelations are the 
approximate two standard error bounds computed as .  If the partial 
autocorrelation is within these bounds, it is not significantly different from zero at 
(approximately) the 5% significance level. 
 
 
6.5.9 Q-Statistics 
  
The Ljung-Box Q test is based on the autocorrelation plot.  However, instead of 
testing randomness at each distinct lag, it tests the "overall" randomness based on a 
number of lags.  That is why, it is often referred to as a "portmanteau" test (Giot, 2003).  
In fact, the Q-statistic at lag  is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no 
autocorrelation up to order  and is computed as: 
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       (33) 
, where  is the j-th autocorrelation and is the number of observations.  If the series is 
not based upon the results of ARIMA estimation, then under the null hypothesis, Q is 
asymptotically distributed as a  with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
autocorrelations.  If the series represents the residuals from ARIMA estimation, the 
appropriate degrees of freedom should be adjusted to represent the number of 
autocorrelations less the number of AR and MA terms previously estimated.  
 
 The Q-statistic is often used as a test of whether the series is white noise.  There 
remains the practical problem of choosing the order of lag to use for the test.  If a too 
small lag is chosen, the test may not detect serial correlation at high-order lags.  
However, if a too large lag is chosen, the test may have low power since the significant 
correlation at one lag may be diluted by insignificant correlations at other lags.  For 
further discussion, see Ljung and Box (1979). 
 
6.5.10 Serial Correlation LM Test 
  
 As an alternative to the Q-statistics for testing serial correlation, the LM can be 
used.  Unlike the Durbin-Watson statistic for AR (1) errors, the LM test may be used to 
test for higher order ARMA errors and is applicable whether or not there are lagged 
dependent variables.  It is recommended over the Durbin Watson test statistic whenever 
there is the possibility that the errors exhibit autocorrelation.  Besides, Bera and Jarque 
(1987) suggest two aspects of the LM test as being useful. First, this test has asymptotic 
power characteristics (asymptotically efficient) including maximum local asymptotic 
power on the basis of small sample properties. Second, computation of this test is easy: to 
calculate the LM statistic, only estimation under the null hypothesis is required. 
 
The null hypothesis of the LM test is that there is no serial correlation up to lag order p, 
where is a p pre-specified integer.  The alternative is ARMA(r, q) errors, where the 
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number of lag terms p=max(r,q ).  Note that this alternative includes both AR (p) and 
MA (p) error processes, so that the test may have power against a variety of alternative 
autocorrelation structures (Godfrey, 1988).  If the LM test is greater than the critical test 
value, the null hypothesis is rejected (Sadorsky, 2003).    
 
The test statistic is calculated as follows. First, suppose the following regression is 
carried out: 
         (34) 
 
, where b are the estimated coefficients and are the errors. The test statistic for lag order 
p is based on the auxiliary regression for the residuals  
 
       (35) 
  
Following the suggestion by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), EViews sets any 
presample values of the residuals to 0. This approach does not affect the asymptotic 
distribution of the statistic, and Davidson and MacKinnon argue that doing so provides a 
test statistic that has better finite sample properties than an approach that drops the initial 
observations.  This is a regression of the residuals on the original regressors and lagged 
residuals up to order p.  EViews reports the Obs*R-squared statistic which is the 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic. This LM statistic is computed as the number of 
observations, times the (uncentered) from the test regression. Under quite general 
conditions, the LM test statistic is asymptotically distributed as .  Finally, the 
original regression may include AR and MA terms, in which case the test regression will 
be modified to take account of the ARMA terms. 
 
 
6.5.11 Jacques Bera normality test statistic  
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 Jarque-Bera is a test statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed.  
The test statistic measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series with 
those from the normal distribution  is computed as: 
 
    (36) 
 
, where S is the skewness, K is the kurtosis and k represents the number of estimated 
coefficients used to create the series. 
 
Under the null hypohesis of a normal distribution, the Jarque – Bera statistic is distributed 
as 2X  with two degrees of freedom.  The reported probability is the probability that a 
Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds (in absolute value) the observed under the null hypothesis- a 
small probability value leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution at the 5% level but not at the 1% significance level. 
 
 
6.5.12 ARCH LM Test 
 
  This is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals (Engle 1982).  This particular specification of 
heteroskedasticity was motivated by the observation that in many financial time series, 
the magnitude of residuals appeared to be related to the magnitude of recent residuals.  
ARCH itself does not invalidate standard LS inference.  However ignoring ARCH effects 
may result in loss of efficiency.  The ARCH LM test statistic is computed from an 
auxiliary test regression.  To test the null hypothesis that there is no ARCH up to order q 
in the residuals, the following regression is run: 
      (37) 
, where ε  is the residual.  This is a regression of the squared residuals on a constant and 
lagged squared residuals up to order q. Eviews reports two test statistics from this test 
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regression.  The F-statistic is an omitted variable test for the joint significance of all 
lagged squared residuals.  The Obs*R-squared statistic is Engle’s LM test statistic, 
computed as the number of observations times the 2R  from the test regression.  2R  is the 
proportion of variability in the specific data series that is accounted for by the ARMA 
model.  The exact finite sample distribution of the F-statistic unde 0H  is not known but 
the LM test statistic is asymptotically distributed )(2 qX under quite general conditions.  
The ARCH LM test is available for equations estimated by least squared, two-stage 
squares and non-linear least squares. 
 
 
6.5.13 Static forecasting 
 
• Static Forecasting 
Static forecasting performs a series of one-step ahead forecasts of the dependent variable 
and is computed always using the actual value of the lagged endogenous variable as 
follows: 
    (38) 
 
Static forecasting requires that data for both the exogenous and any lagged endogenous 
variables be observed for every observation in the forecast sample.  As above, EViews 
will, if necessary, adjust the forecast sample to account for pre-sample lagged variables. 
If the data are not available for any period, the forecasted value for that observation will 
be an NA. The presence of a forecasted value of NA does not have any impact on 
forecasts for subsequent observations. 
 
 
6.5.14 Bias, variance, and covariance proportions of the forecast errors for the 
discrete-time models are discussed.16 
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        (39) 
 
     (40) 
 
       (41) 
   
 
where and   are the means and standard deviations of and , respectively, and  is 
the correlation coefficient and  between and   .  The bias proportion tells us how 
far the mean of the forecast is from the mean of the actual series.  The variance 
proportion tells us how far the variation of the forecast is from the variation of the actual 
series.  The covariance proportion measures the remaining unsystematic forecasting 
errors.  The bias, variance, and covariance proportions must add up to one. If the forecast 
is good, the bias and variance proportions should be small so that most of the bias should 
be concentrated on the covariance proportion.  One primary measure of forecasting 
ability is the root-mean-squared-forecast-error (RMSFE) measured in terms of the 
difference between actual and forecast annualized standard deviation of returns using 
GARCH/PARCH (Bracker and Smith, 1999).  The root mean squared forecast error is 
then measured as:  
 
        (42) 
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, where FSTD(s)m is the forecast standard deviation (also annualized) for an s day 
horizon beginning on day m using one of the four forecasting procedures outlined in the 
last section.  M represents the number of forecast periods. 
 
 
6.5.15 Theil inequality (model performance) 
 
 As an alternative to R² measures, the Theil inequality coefficient (TIC) is 
computed for the conditional variance of the different futures. The Theil inequality 
coefficient always lies between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a perfect fit: 
 
    (43) 
, where and   are the actual and forecasted values of squared return deviation. The 
TIC values describe the fit of the discrete-time models for the actual variance of the 
return change. 
 
  
6.5.16 Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
• Skewness is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of the series around its mean.  
Skewness is computed as: 
 
       (44) 
 
, where  is an estimator for the standard deviation that is based on the biased estimator 
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for the variance .  The skewness of a symmetric distribution, such as 
the normal distribution, is zero.  Positive skewness means that the distribution has a long 
right tail and negative skewness implies that the distribution has a long left tail. 
 
 
• Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of the distribution of the series. Kurtosis 
is computed as: 
       (45) 
 
, where  is again based on the biased estimator for the variance. The kurtosis of the 
normal distribution is 3. If the kurtosis exceeds 3, the distribution is peaked (leptokurtic) 
relative to the normal; if the kurtosis is less than 3, the distribution is flat (platykurtic) 
relative to the normal. 
 
 
Appendix 6.6: Other factors behind success of 1990s 
 
 1. Food and Energy Price Shocks 
 
One of the most important supply shocks in recent US history was the food and 
energy shocks of the 1970s which led to a rise in global inflation.  In contrast, the low 
standard deviation of inflation in Mankiw (2001) supports that large supply shocks were 
uncommon in the 1990s.  Moreover, the negative value for the average shock indicates 
that good shocks were more common than bad shocks.  By contrast, the worst shock of 
the 1990s was less than one-fourth as large as those in the 1970’s.  This shock occurred in 
1990 as a result of the Gulf War.  For the rest of the decade, there was no adverse food 
and energy shock as large as a full percentage point.  Given these information, it is hard 
not to conclude that the macroeconomic success of the 1990s was in part due to luck. 
Food and energy prices behaved well, and the economy benefited from this stability. 
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 2. The stock market 
 
Mankiw (2001) showed the performance of US financial markets were outstanding 
with low volatility and high returns.  While low volatility in the stock market reflects low 
volatility in the overall economy, the high return reflects the surprising speeding up in 
productivity growth, which helped increase growth in company profits.  See Mankiw 
(2001) for a detailed review of how stock markets also had a role to play in monetary 
policy in the 1990’s. 
 
 
 3. Good medium term macroeconomic policy 
 
Good fiscal and monetary policies contributed significantly to the strong economic 
performance of the 1990s.  Three key fiscal policy turning points included the 1990 
budget agreement, the 1993 budget agreement, and the 1998-2000 preservation of the 
emerging unified budget surpluses for debt reduction.  See Mankiw (2001) for more 
details on these three major fiscal policy implementations.  For instance, the Federal 
state’s  movement from deficit to surplus resulted in a progress in net national saving 
between 1993 and 2000.  This additional saving reduced long-term interest rates, thereby 
boosting private-sector domestic investment.  In the same line of thought, the public had 
learned from the experience of the 1980s to be aware  of politicians selling snake-oil tax 
cuts (Frankel and Orszag, 2002). 
 
Monetary policy- The Clinton Administration made two contributions to 
monetary policy.  Firstly, the elimination of the budget deficit allowed the Fed to lower 
interest rates.  Secondly, the Clinton Administration’s monetary policy was wholly led by 
the Fed.  Complying to this policy is more complicated than it sounds.  The political 
appeal is always strong to push the central bank toward an easier monetary policy.  
However, with amazingly few exceptions, the Administration held on to its self-imposed 
rule of silence143.  With a skilful Fed, the lack of Administration interference worked.  
                                                          
 
143 In particular, long before he was US Secretary Treasury, Lawrence Summers (1991) wrote, "the optimal 
inflation rate is surely positive, perhaps as high or 2 or 3 percent."  Although Summers has never had direct 
control over monetary policy, Fed policymakers were well aware of the views of prominent Treasury 
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The truly noteworthy aspect of the 1990s was not just its low inflation, but, its low and 
steady inflation144.  Like Paul Volcker before him, Greenspan followed a tight monetary 
yet moderated policy.  His patience during 1995-1998, even as growth and employment 
exceeded levels previously considered inflationary, was a gamble; but it turned out to be 
a wise gamble and an important component of the expansion’s durability (Frankel and 
Orszag, 2002).   
 
4. Long-term factors  
Many of the most fundamental factors in explaining US economic performance during 
the 1990s stretch back over at least two decades as follows:  
 
• Deregulation. This started under Carter’s Administration, with the deregulation in 
trucking, airline, natural gas and banking, followed by telecommunication under 
Reagan’s term.  More recently, further deregulation took place in the electricity 
market, and market-friendly environmental regulation, such as in the sulfur 
dioxide permit program (Frankel and Orszag, 2002).  The overall effect of 
deregulation made the US economy more efficient in the long run.  This was all 
possible with different Administration carrying on the work previous management 
has properly started. 
 
• Globalization. With a policy of free trade since World War II, the ratio of trade to 
GDP has more than tripled since the middle of the twentieth century.  Economic 
theory tells us that trade improves economic performance.  This holds for both old 
trade theory (classical “comparative advantage”) and of new trade theory (which 
allows for changing technology, increasing returns to scale, and imperfect 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
officials.  Moreover, nations that have adopted a policy of inflation targeting (which were common during 
the 1990s) have typically chosen a positive number, rather than zero, for their target. 
144 The 1990s look more exceptional once the standard deviation of inflation is looked at.  Inflation was far 
more stable during the 1990s than during any other recent decade (Mankiw, 2001).  The differences are 
substantial in magnitude.  Inflation was only one-third as volatile during the 1990s as it was during the 
1980s.  It was 24 percent less volatile during the 1990s than it was during the 1960s, the second-best 
decade as ranked by inflation volatility.  There is no doubt that by historical standards the 1990s were a 
decade of remarkably stable inflation.  After January 1992, inflation remained in a remarkably narrow 
range from 1.34 percent to 3.32 percent (Mankiw, 2001). 
 
 
264
competition).  The empirical evidence showed that openness contributed to 
growth.  Exports grew rapidly, a major selling point for international free trade 
policy (Frankel and Orszag, 2002).  Moreover, increases in imports and in the 
trade deficit during the 1990s were a useful safety net during the strongest phase 
of the US expansion.  They freed pressure from rapidly growing domestic 
demand, pressure that would otherwise have shown up as higher inflation and 
interest rates.  
 
 The Role of Luck- Standard economic analysis divide shocks into two types. 
While demand shocks are those that alter the overall demand for goods and 
services, supply shocks are those that change the prices at which firms are willing 
and able to supply goods and services.  Demand shocks were the easier type for 
the Fed to handle because they pushed output, employment, and inflation in the 
same direction.  For instance, a stock market crash reduces aggregate demand, 
putting downward pressure on output, employment, and inflation (Frankel and 
Orszag, 2002).  The standard reaction was for the Fed to lower interest rates by 
increasing the money supply.  Supply shocks pose a more difficult problem.  An 
increase in the world price of oil, for instance, raises firms' costs and the prices 
they charge, which tends to raise inflation and push the economy toward 
recession.  The Fed then had to choose between contracting policy to fight 
inflation and expanding policy to battle recession.  In the face of supply shocks, 
the Fed can not stabilize inflation and the real economy at the same time, forcing 
a tradeoff between inflation stability and employment stability (Frankel and 
Orszag, 2002).  Yet during the 1990s the US economy enjoyed stability of both 
kinds.  One possible reason is dumb luck. Perhaps the economy just did not 
experience the supply shocks that caused so much turmoil in earlier decades.  
 
 
Appendix 6.8.1: Reportable positions 
Reportable Positions - Futures commission merchants, clearing members and foreign 
brokers (collectively called "reporting firms") file daily reports with the Commission, 
showing futures and option positions of traders that hold positions above specific 
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reporting levels set by CFTC regulations.  (Current Commission reporting levels can also 
be found at the Commission’s website http://www.cftc.gov/cftc/cftclawreg.htm).  In any 
market, the total of all traders’ positions reported to the Commission usually represents 
70 to 90 percent of the total open interest.  Regularly, the Commission will change the 
reporting levels in specific markets to hit a balance between collecting sufficient 
information to oversee the markets and minimizing the reporting burden on the futures 
industry.  
Appendix 6.8.2: Classification among entities 
 
A trader can be classified as a commercial in some commodities and as a non-
commercial in other commodities.  A single trading body can not be classified as both a 
commercial and non-commercial in the same commodity.  Nevertheless, a multi-
functional organization that has more than one trading body may have each trading entity 
classified separately in a commodity.   
Appendix 6.9 
Event 1 (US Tightening of Interest rates) 
 MONETARY POLICY AND INTEREST RATES IN THE SHORT RUN 
 
Fed Reserve Policy Changes in 1990s (after first tightening in 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Board of the governors of the Federal Reseve System and Commodity Research Bureau 
Table 5.1 
Fed reserve policy changes in the 1990s 
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 Monetary policy 
 
The importance of the Federal Funds rate145 is indicated by the fact that since 1983 
the Federal Reserve has targeted the Federal Funds rate (Patelis, 1997).  Events related to 
monetary policy changes were the most significant economic factor leading to changes in 
exchange rates in the 1990s (Lobo, 2002).  Lagged values of the Federal Funds rate 
volatility are important determinants of stock return volatility where stock return 
volatility is calculated from monthly stock return data.  Some of these results can be 
attributed to the fact that conditional stock market volatility estimated from monthly data 
(rather than daily data) tends to be more highly correlated with the conditional volatilities 
of the macroeconomic factors (Sadorsky, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
145 See graph 5.2 and 5.3. 
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• Fed funds rate and Commodity prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5.2 
Fed funds rate and commodity prices 
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 Fed funds rate and financial crisis 
 
 
 
Event 2: Mexico Crisis 
 In the early 1990s, the Mexican economy appeared vigorous. It was growing 
again after the “lost decade” of the 1980s, when the 1982 debt crisis and the 1986 
collapse of oil prices sent the economy booming (Whitt, 1996).  Inflation fell 
Graph 5.3 
Federal Funds rate and Financial Crisis 
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considerably, foreign investors were putting money into the country, and the central bank 
had accumulated billions of dollars in reserves (Whitt, 1996).  Moreover, North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) reduced trade barriers between US and 
Mexico’s.  Less than twelve months after NAFTA took effect in 1994, Mexico faced 
economic disaster where the Mexican government devalued the local currency.  This sent 
inflation soaring and set off a severe recession in Mexico.  The main factor was Mexico’s 
current account deficit, which jumped from $6 billion in 1989 to $15 billion in 1991 and 
to more than $20 billion in 1992 and 1993 (Whitt, 1996).  To some extent, the current 
account deficit was a favourable development, reflecting the capital inflow stimulated by 
Mexican policy reforms.  However, the large size of the deficit led some observers to 
worry that the peso was becoming overvalued, a circumstance that could discourage 
exports, stimulate imports, and lead eventually to a crisis.  Backed by a crawling peg 
system, the state intervention kept the exchange rate against the dollar within a narrow 
target band, but the upper limit (see Graph 5.4) of the band was raised slightly every day 
by a pre-announced amount, allowing for a gradual nominal depreciation (a “crawling 
peg”) of the peso (Whitt, 1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5.4 
Mexican exchange rate and target band prior to devaluation (Jan 93-Dec 94) 
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 However, in real (price-adjusted) terms, the peso was gaining value, contributing 
to the increasing current account deficit as seen in Graph 5.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico Political instability and foreign reserves 
 
In early January 1994, Mexico experienced major political instability (See Graph 
5.6 for a chronology of political events and monetary policy actions during 1994).  This 
set off a minor financial crisis that preceded the major crisis by roughly nine months.  
With disturbed confidence among investors, this created immediate difficulties for 
Mexican banks and put downward pressure on the dollar price of the peso.  The 
government reacted by selling huge quantities of foreign exchange reserves and allowing 
domestic interest rates to increase sharply (Whitt, 1996).  These moves seemed to be 
successful, in the sense that the government was able to defend its peso peg without 
draining its foreign exchange reserves (which were, however, greatly reduced; see Graph 
5.6 below). 
 
Panic and Crisis 
 
Graph 5.5 
Mexico current and capital account (Quarterly data) 
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 Starting to lose confidence in the economy, investors reacted by committing less 
or no funds to Mexico.  The supply of foreign funds started to shift back in November, 
and the government was again forced to sell large amounts of reserves.  By December 20 
the reserves were nearly exhausted, and the government responded by devaluing the peso 
by 15 percent (Whitt, 1996).   Paradoxically, in the weeks and months following the crisis 
it became clear that the various threats to Mexican political stability were considerably 
less serious than they had appeared in November and December of 1994.  The basic 
cause of the crisis was the political turmoil146 in Mexico that led foreign lenders to 
become concerned about the fate of their investments.  It is the nature of political crisis 
however that often seemed far more serious at the time they break out than they do a few 
weeks or months later (Mathur et al., 2002). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
146 Furthermore, investors considered the replacement of a significant amount of short-term debt with 
“tesebonos”- securities convertible to US dollars at maturity- as a troubling sign regarding confidence in 
the Peso (Mathur et al., 2002). 
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Event 3: Asian Crisis 
 
Growth began to slow in a number of Asian economies in the 1990s—a reaction 
to shocks such as the devaluation of the Chinese currency in 1994, the depreciation of the 
Japanese yen against the dollar in 1995, and falling semiconductor prices.  However, the 
belief was that East Asia was basically healthy, and that a “soft landing” could be 
fruitfully implemented (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).  The collapse of the Thai baht in July 
1997 brusquely interrupted this picture, starting a wave of depreciation and stock market 
declines.  During the second part of 1997, the value of the most affected East Asian 
currencies had fallen 33%-75% against the US dollar.  Stock indices also declined 
sharply after June 1997, falling 36 percent in Indonesia, 43 percent in Korea and 22 
percent in Thailand through April 1998.  Measured from their peaks earlier in the 1990s, 
the stock price declines have been far sharper in Korea and Thailand.  Disturbance in 
bank balance sheets resulted in the closure of financial institutions and the bankruptcies 
of numerous firms, as well as a break in credit flows in most affected economies (Radelet 
and Sachs, 1998).  Thus, while collapsing pegs are expected to improve output in the 
Graph 5.6 
Mexican foreign reserves (Jan 1994-1995) 
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medium term, short-term economic activity has slowed radically in the most affected 
economies, and interest rates have risen due to uncertainty of investors.  All these 
resulted in a revised reduced forecast of East Asian growth in 1998, compared to the 
forecasts made when the crisis began in July 1997.  For instance, the mean forecast of 
Indonesian 1998 GDP fell from growth of 7.6 percent for the forecasts made in July 
1997, to a contraction of 7.8 percent for the forecasts made in May 1998147 (Moreno et 
al., 1998). 
 
 
Event 4: Emerging Markets Recovery 
 
Perhaps the best way to look at EM recovery is to picture the rising trend in 
capital flows for emerging economies (Kaminsky et al., 2001), as shown in Graph 5.7: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
147 Cheng, Fung, and Chan (2000) argue the crisis took place from January 1996 to June 1997. 
 
Graph 5.7 
Total net private capital flows to developing countries 
(Billions of US dollars) 
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  Source: World Bank 
 
Graphs 5.7 shows net capital flows towards developing countries, including bank 
and trade-related lending, bond and portfolio equity flows, and foreign direct investment.  
Through its Emerging Markets Database, IFC monitors the performance of more than 
1,600 stocks in 27 developing countries.  Using a random number of stocks in each 
market, IFC calculates daily, weekly, and monthly indexes of stock market performance 
that are consistent across national boundaries (Littler and Maalouf, 1996).  This is shown 
in Graph 5.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
275
 
Source: World Bank 
As shown in the graph above, emerging markets recovered after declines in 1995.  
The most outstanding feature of emerging market performance in 1995 was the fall of 
Latin America's stock markets.  Generally, the IFCI Latin America Index lost 19 percent 
in 1995, despite a rebound in December (Littler and Maalouf, 1996).  As the year started, 
share prices in Latin America fell; the IFCI Mexico Index lost 32 percent in January and 
another 18 percent in February, among concerns about the stability of Mexico's banking 
system, an uncertain outlook for the peso, the impact of interest rate increases on 
economic growth and company solvency, and a nervous political situation.  Latin 
America’s market recovered shortly in April, caused in part by views that Mexico's 
economic situation was stabilizing and by the Chilean government's easing of limits on 
equity investments by pension funds.  By August, however, share prices started to fall 
again, the result of fresh concern about Mexico, talk about higher taxes in Brazil, and a 
political crisis in Colombia. The IFCI Latin America Index stayed down in the dumps 
until December, when it gained 1.8 percent, attributed largely due to increases in the IFCI 
Indexes for Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela (Littler and Maalouf, 1996).  
 The IFCI Asia Index was heading downhill with only 7 percent for the year, as a 
gain of 4.4 percent in December compensated losses in some markets during the earlier 
part of the year.  A number of markets had recorded gains in the spring--elections in the 
Philippines boosted the IFCI Index for that country, and China's stock market surged in 
response to a government ban on trading in bond futures--but prices began to drop again 
Graph 5.8 
Emerging stock market rebounding after decline in 1995 
Changes in IFC Index (Jan 94-96, US dollars) 
(Jan 14, 1994 =100) 
 
 
276
in August (Littler and Maalouf, 1996).  The IFCI Indexes for the Philippines and China 
were down 12.9 percent and 22.7 percent, respectively, at the end of the year.  Although 
the IFCI Index for the Republic of Korea resisted the downward trend in the fall—
personal income and company tax cuts and rising foreign investor interest led to a 9 
percent gain in September--it still fell 7.9 percent for the year.  Despite a gain of 8.2 
percent in the last month of the year, the IFCI Index for Taiwan Province of China was 
down 31.5 percent as the year closed (Littler and Maalouf, 1996).  Pakistan, where share 
prices climbed 11.2 percent in December, could not avoid losses due to political 
confusion earlier in the year; its market registered a net loss of 33.7 percent.  
Nevertheless, the year ended on a positive note.  Losses in many markets were reduced 
by the rebound in December, which was fueled by attractive stock valuations, improved 
political and economic conditions in many countries, and optimistic equity markets and 
declining bond yields in industrial countries (Littler and Malouf, 1996).   
 
Event 5: Japanese Recession 
 
 
 Subsequent to the asset bubble burst in early 1990, Japanese growth gradually 
deteriorated through the first half of the 1990s, rebounded briefly at mid-decade, but has 
been generally weak since then.  The economy led CPI downward, falling below zero in 
1995.  As such, Japanese short-term interest rates were lowered nearly to zero by late 
1995 and have stayed close to zero ever since.  However, with prices declining, real 
interest rates remained positive, thereby restraining growth.  The balance-sheet problems 
of corporate borrowers led to a weakening in loan performance and in the financial 
strength of the banking system.148  Owing both to weaknesses in the Japanese supervisory 
system and to embed practices among Japanese bankers, Japanese banks failed to resolve 
their non-performing loans problems and sufficiently recapitalize themselves.  The 
sustained fragility of the banking system, then, has limited its capacity to extend new 
                                                          
 
148 See, inter alia, Hoshi and Kashyap (2000), Friedman (2000). 
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loans and sustain economic recovery.149   All of these factors weighed heavily on growth, 
which declined from nearly 5 percent in 1990 to nearly zero in both 1992 and 1993.  In 
addition, the yen reinforced considerably starting in early 1990, contributing to the falloff 
in economic activity and posing further downward pressure on prices.  Twelve-month 
CPI inflation fell to almost 1 percent by the close of 1993, while the growth of the GDP 
deflator fell off even more rapidly.  Few observers expected the slowdown to be as deep 
and protracted as it turned out to be.  With a temporary revival of growth, starting in mid-
1994 and extending through 1996, that undercut the need for further stimulus in the eyes 
of many policymakers (Ahearne et al., 2002). 
 
 With the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, the economy once more fell into a 
protracted slump150, interrupted only briefly by the high-tech boom in 2000.  Moreover, 
inflation after briefly becoming negative in 1995 (partly due to a sharp temporary surge 
in the yen) and then moving up slightly in 1996 and 1997, has been consistently negative 
since September 1999 (Ahearne et al., 2002).  In fact, hampered with a huge volume of 
bad debt aggravated by still-falling land prices, financial organizations squeezed their 
lending policies, thereby forcing companies to reduce plant and equipment investments. 
This, together with falling exports caused by the Asian economic crisis, resulted in lower 
profits in almost all industries.  Finally, but not least, studies using average growth rate or 
deviation from trend output showed that, though the initial decline in Japan was much 
milder than US Great Depression, slow down in output growth has persisted longer 
(Iwaisako,2000).  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
149 Bayoumi (2000) presents evidence that real economic activity in Japan was affected, via bank lending, 
by movements in assets prices.   
 
150 In fact, under the supposition that by the year 1996 the Japanese economy had already got over the 
recession caused by the bubble burst in the asset markets, the Japanese government changed from an 
expansionary to a contractionary policy, so that the cumulative debts of the government might be reduced. 
However, the introduction of the policy such as increasing the consumption tax rate from 3 % to 5 %, 
abolition of temporary income tax cuts, and increase in the medical insurance burden, caused the GDP 
growth back to zero or negative in 1997 and 1998 (Shinjo, 2002). 
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Event 6: Russian crisis  
 
The ratio of local debt servicing costs to federal budget revenues exceeded 100% 
in the third quarter of 1996, in 1997 (excluding the fourth quarter) and in the first half of 
1998 (Stroutchenevski, 1999).  Therefore, due to short-maturity of domestic debt, 
Russian government found itself in a very uncomfortable position already in the end of 
1996 as shown below.  The Russian government was in a debt trap and could not cover 
the debt itself (Stroutchenevski, 1999).  Moreover, high interest rates made the Russian 
bond market attractive to foreign investors and financial liberalization made the bond 
market accessible.  Non-residents were allowed to invest in government treasuries 
(GKOs) at the end 1996.  Despite of the huge capital inflows; the price for this was the 
dependence of the local market upon the mood swings of foreign investors as shown in 
Graph 5.9.  When the investors were skeptic about the government to repay its debts, 
capital inflows ended and the financial system collapsed eventually (Stroutchenevsk, 
1999). 
 
 
 
Graph 5.9 
Growth of GKO Debt, current account surplus and capital flight 
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Event 7: LTCM  
 
What sunk Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) is that it has expected 
worst-case situations where it would lose $2 billion out of its $5 billion in capital .151  In 
fact, LTCM’s problem was that, once it lost this money, it could not settle other positions 
due to their enormous size (LTCM had more than $1250 billion in derivatives notional, 
or 2.5% of the global swap market and 6% of the global futures market).  Furthermore, 
once it had announced its loss, it was unable to raise more capital.  This can be equally 
attributed to LTCM’s lack of transparency.  Investors may well be keen to trust blindly a 
winning strategy, but certainly not a losing strategy (Jorion, 2000).   
 
 
Event 8: The introduction of the Euro Currency 
1. Financial markets 
 
 The introduction of the euro as the only currency of twelve member countries has 
eliminated exchange risk for cross-border investments throughout most of the Union.  It 
also has the effect of creating large, deep and liquid euro-denominated financial markets, 
which should help to deliver higher rates of sustainable output growth and employment 
creation in the EMU economy (BIS, 1999).  Upon deciding to carry out euro-area 
monetary policy in euro, ECB brought about instant amalgamation of the unsecured 
segments of the market, mainly the inter-bank market and the short-term derivatives 
market.  The perseverance of different issuing instruments and techniques among the 12 
independent government debt issuers remains a source of fragmentation. Nevertheless, 
the market is share more similar features than before 1999 (BIS, 1999).  The non-
government segments of the euro-area bond market have also prospered in EMU. 
Probably a major development has been the rapid growth in the euro-denominated 
corporate bond market, which has increased several-fold in size and is now characterised 
by issues of above EUR 1 billion.  EMU has also encouraged integration in EU equity 
markets, where structural developments have been dominated by a series of high-profile 
                                                          
 
151 See Jorion (2000) for risk management lessons from the LTCM disaster. 
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mergers and attempted mergers.  Finally, but not least, in the derivatives industry, the 
launch of the euro had somewhat distinct implications for organised exchanges and over-
the-counter (OTC) markets in the first quarter of 1999.  Anticipation of the single 
currency had given rise in 1998 to a contest of new contracts among exchanges.  The 
Euribor contract and the bund contract at Eurex at LIFFE were the clear winners, as 
liquidity played in their favour (BIS, 1999). 
 
2. The euro exchange rate and external aspects of EMU 
 
 Developments in the exchange rate of the euro, particularly against the US dollar, 
have attracted massive public opinion, policy makers and the media.  The first two years 
of the existence of the euro, as seen in Graph 5.10, have been characterised by a strong 
depreciation against all major world currencies.  The depreciation continued until autumn 
2000, when, following several rounds of official intervention and changes in the 
international economic outlook, the euro started a recovery (BIS, 1999).  By the end of 
2000, the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro was 13% lower than at launch152.  
The real depreciation was larger (17%), as a result of lower cost inflation in the euro area 
than (on average) in its trading partners.  Most of the fall in the euro's exchange rate in 
1999 can be explained by its relatively high initial value, subsequent the appreciation of 
the participant currencies in the second half of 1998, and by the surprising buoyancy of 
the US economy which contrasted with uncertain prospects for the euro-area economy. 
At that time, the current and anticipated growth differential warranted a depreciation in 
the euro against the dollar both via its impact on market expectations for interest rates in 
the US and in the euro area, and via the accessibility of better investment opportunities in 
the US than in the euro area (BIS, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
152 The nominal and real effective exchange rates of the euro are measured against the currencies of 13 
industrialised countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Turkey, UK and US). The real effective exchange rate is based on unit labour costs in 
the whole economy. 
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Source: BIS (1999) 
 
By the second half of 2000 a consensus had emerged in international institutions, 
central banks and in most of the private sector that the depreciation in the euro 
represented a clear case of undervaluation compared to its medium term equilibrium 
level.  Most model estimates suggest that the real exchange rate of the euro was 20% or 
more below its medium-term equilibrium level (BIS, 1999).  Although exchange rates are 
not expected to be always at their equilibrium level, such a large undervaluation was hard 
to rationalise on the basis of economic progress.  Troubled by the repercussion of 
developments in the euro exchange rate, on 22 September 2000, the ECB jointly with the 
US Federal Reserve and the central banks of the UK, Japan and Canada interceded in 
foreign exchange markets in support of the euro (BIS, 1999). 
 
 From a domestic EU perspective, by getting rid of the risk of intra-euro-area 
exchange-rate variations the euro has created an area of stability in which the full benefits 
of the single market can be reaped. This is in addition to the positive impact which the 
introduction of the euro is expected to have on the single market through increased price 
transparency and product market competition (European Commission, 2001).  During the 
1980s and 1990s, occasional high volatility and episodes of misalignment between EU 
currencies sometimes threatened the sound functioning of the single market. The euro, 
however, has removed the risk of a sub-optimal resource allocation due to economically-
unjustified and protracted movements in nominal exchange rates (European Commission, 
2001). 
Graph 5.10 
USD/EUR, JPY/EUR, GBP/EUR, CHF/EUR after the 
introduction of the Euro currency 
 
 
282
 
 
 
The following graphs show the stationarity of net position of large hedgers, after differencing the level
series.  Differenced series are cocoa (ccdif), Eurodollars (eddif), feeder cattle (fcdif), wheat from Kansas
(kwdif), and coffee (kcdif). 
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Stationarity of Net Positions of Hedgers (differenced)     
Graph 4.1  
Stationarity of net positions of hedgers (after differencing) 
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The following graphs show the stationarity of net position of large speculators, after differencing the level
series.  Differenced series are soybean oil (bosdif), cocoa (ccdif), Eurodollars (eddif), feeder cattle (fcdif)
Japanese yen (jysdif), wheat from Kansas (kwdif), lumber (lbsdif), soybean (ssdif) and s&p500 (spsdif). 
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Stationarity of Net Positions of Speculators (differenced)            /pto  
  
Graph 4.2  
Stationarity of Net Positions of Speculators (after differencing) 
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Table 4.4 
Unit Root test for differenced series of net positions of 
hedgers and speculators 
Stationary of time series (net positions)- differenced 
Hedgers NP Speculators NP
Information criteria Information criteria
Akaike Schwarz Akaike Schwarz
ED -11.749 -11.749
US -10.074
SF -6.868
JY -8.232
S -7.869 -10.608 -8.061 -11.158
BO -7.542
SP -13.793 -13.793
FC -7.835 -11.372
W -6.751
KW -6.419 -11.452 -7.895
CC -6.799 -15.830 -7.542
KC -8.631
LB -10.199
This table shows the test for unit root for the differenced series of net positions for large hedgers and large 
speculators, using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  Net positions (NP) are defined as the long 
positions less the short positions of a trader type on the basis of the CFTC's COT reports, in units of 1,000 
contracts.  *(**) (***) denotes significance of ADF test at 1%(5%)(10%)  level.  Both Akaike and Schwarz
information selection criteria are used. Only results of series which were non stationary at levels are 
reported here.  Specification of ADF test, Akaike and Schwarz information criteria can be found in 
appendices. 
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Table 4.5.1.1  
Panel unit root test using ADF Fisher test 
(Akaike information criteria) 
Date: 10/16/06   Time: 15:51
Sample: 1 139
Series : All 29
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on AIC: 0 to 12
Total number of observations: 4071
Cross-sections included: 30
Method Statistic Prob.**
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 1638.81 0
ADF - Choi Z-stat -36.4339 0
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
        normality.
Intermediate ADF test results RETURNS
Series Prob. Lag  Max Lag Obs
CD 0 0 13 138
CL 0 9 13 129
CC 0 4 13 134
KC 0 4 13 134
HG 0 0 13 138
C 0 0 13 138
CT 0 0 13 138
CL 0 2 13 136
ED 0.0001 2 13 136
FC 0 3 13 135
GC 0 0 13 138
HO 0 1 13 137
LH 0.1632 12 13 126
JY 0.0122 8 13 130
LB 0 4 13 134
PL 0 1 13 137
PB 0 0 13 138
BP 0.0001 9 13 129
SP 0 1 13 137
SI 0 0 13 138
S 0 1 13 137
SM 0 1 13 137
BO 0 0 13 138
SB 0 4 13 134
SF 0 0 13 138
US 0 2 13 136
KW 0 0 13 138
MW 0 0 13 138
W 0 0 13 138
This table shows the test for panel unit root for futures returns, using the ADF Fisher test.  Akaike (AIC)
information selection criteria is used. Specification of test ADF Fisher test, Akaike information criteria can
be found in appendices. 
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Date: 10/16/06   Time: 15:53
Sample: 1 139
Series: All 29
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2
Total number of observations: 4136
Cross-sections included: 30
Method Statistic Prob.**
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 2327.05 0
ADF - Choi Z-stat -46.2045 0
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
        normality.
Intermediate ADF test results RETURNS
Series Prob. Lag  Max Lag Obs
CD 0 0 13 138
CL 0 2 13 136
CC 0 0 13 138
KC 0 0 13 138
HG 0 0 13 138
C 0 0 13 138
CT 0 0 13 138
CL 0 0 13 138
ED 0 0 13 138
FC 0 0 13 138
GC 0 0 13 138
HO 0 1 13 137
LH 0 0 13 138
JY 0 0 13 138
LB 0 0 13 138
PL 0 0 13 138
PB 0 0 13 138
BP 0 0 13 138
SP 0 0 13 138
SI 0 0 13 138
S 0 0 13 138
SM 0 0 13 138
BO 0 0 13 138
SB 0 0 13 138
SF 0 0 13 138
US 0 0 13 138
KW 0 0 13 138
MW 0 0 13 138
W 0 0 13 138
This table shows the test for panel unit root for futures returns, using the ADF Fisher test.  Schwarz (SIC) 
information selection criteria is used. Specification of test ADF Fisher test, Schwarz information criteria 
can be found in appendices 
Table 4.5.1.2  
Panel unit root test using ADF Fisher test (Schwarz 
information criteria) 
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Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process) 
Date: 10/16/06   Time: 15:45
Sample: 1 139
Series: All 29
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on AIC: 0 to 12
Total number of observations: 4071
Cross-sections included: 30
Method Statistic Prob.**
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -46.934 0
** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality
Intermediate ADF test results
Max
Series t-Stat Prob. E(t) E(Var) Lag Lag Obs
CD -12.556 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
CL -6.1694 0 -1.456 0.818 9 13 129
CC -6.3363 0 -1.495 0.771 4 13 134
KC -5.982 0 -1.495 0.771 4 13 134
HG -12.428 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
C -10.834 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
CT -13.117 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
CL -6.1712 0 -1.514 0.754 2 13 136
ED -4.9479 0.0001 -1.514 0.754 2 13 136
FC -5.0304 0 -1.512 0.761 3 13 135
GC -13.826 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
HO -9.2039 0 -1.53 0.745 1 13 137
LH -2.3335 0.1632 -1.456 0.818 12 13 126
JY -3.4145 0.0122 -1.456 0.818 8 13 130
LB -6.5503 0 -1.495 0.771 4 13 134
PL -9.4176 0 -1.53 0.745 1 13 137
PB -13.85 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
BP -4.8018 0.0001 -1.456 0.818 9 13 129
SP -9.7276 0 -1.53 0.745 1 13 137
SI -12.655 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
S -8.7867 0 -1.53 0.745 1 13 137
SM -8.5939 0 -1.53 0.745 1 13 137
BO -12.098 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
SB -6.4044 0 -1.495 0.771 4 13 134
SF -11.346 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
US -7.3948 0 -1.514 0.754 2 13 136
KW -11.224 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
MW -10.755 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
W -11.589 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
Average -8.9612 -1.514 0.755
This table shows the test for panel unit root for futures returns, using the Im, Pesaran and Shin test.
Akaike (AIC) information selection criteria is used. Specification of Im, Pesaran and Shin test, Akaike
information criteria can be found in appendices.
 
Table 4.5.2.1  
Panel unit root test using Im, Perasan & Chin test (Akaike 
information criteria) 
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Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process) 
Date: 10/16/06   Time: 15:27
Sample: 1 139
Series: All 29
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2
Total number of observations: 4136
Cross-sections included: 30
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -64.771 0
** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality
Intermediate ADF test results
Max
Series t-Stat Prob. E(t) E(Var) Lag Lag Obs
CD -12.556 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
CL -9.053 0 -1.514 0.754 2 13 136
CC -14.324 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
KC -12.65 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
HG -12.428 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
C -10.834 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
CT -13.117 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
CL -9.9564 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
ED -10.162 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
FC -12.253 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
GC -13.826 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
HO -9.2039 0 -1.53 0.745 1 13 137
LH -10.639 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
JY -10.161 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
LB -12.112 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
PL -12.412 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
PB -13.85 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
BP -11.084 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
SP -13.327 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
SI -12.655 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
S -11.892 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
SM -12.068 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
BO -12.098 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
SB -10.709 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
SF -11.346 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
US -10.712 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
KW -11.224 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
MW -10.755 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
W -11.589 0 -1.532 0.735 0 13 138
Average -11.676 -1.531 0.736
This table shows the test for panel unit root for futures returns, using the Im, Pesaran and Shin test.  
Schwarz (SIC) information selection criteria is used. Specification of Im, Pesaran and Shin test, 
Schwarz information criteria can be found in appendices
 
Table 4.5.2.2  
Panel unit root Test using Im, Perasan & Chin test (Schwarz 
information criteria) 
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Cross Hedging Pressure Effects (2)Minerals
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6
(1) Financials R t+1: gc
θ1 θ2 θ3 gc si hg pl cl ho
R t+1: sp -1.699 0.974 -1.921 1.800 3.687 0.183
sp ed us  t (δ2) -0.881 0.366 -1.366 1.045 0.636 0.045
-6.252 7.037 -6.443 R t+1: si
 t (δ2) -0.989 0.886 -0.913 si gc hg pl cl ho
-7.672 -2.220 -6.850 1.608 14.240 -9.514
 t (δ2) -2.339 -0.883 -2.642 0.640 1.094 -1.249
R t+1: ed
ed sp us R t+1: hg
0.959 -0.253 0.768 hg si gc pl cl ho
 t (δ2) 1.829 -0.557 1.282 1.993 5.995 -0.107 0.982 7.224 -2.045
 t (δ2) 0.676 1.518 -0.040 0.401 0.651 -0.285
R t+1: us R t+1: pl
us sp ed pl hg si gc cl ho
1.434 -1.525 -0.235 1.498 -0.365 -0.691 -4.682 11.753 -7.143
 t (δ2) 0.241 -0.441 -0.049  t (δ2) 0.671 -0.183 -0.248 -2.290 1.493 -1.254
R t+1: cl
cl pl hg si gc ho
20.089 2.742 2.743 8.074 -5.846 22.708
 t (δ2) 1.113 0.788 0.838 1.733 -1.665 1.664
R t+1: ho
ho cl pl hg si gc
13.074 -7.282 4.886 -0.254 5.050 -6.581
 t (δ2) 0.987 -0.402 1.147 -0.055 0.839 -1.517
(3) Currencies
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4
R t+1: bp
bp sf cd jy
0.199 -0.539 0.845 0.393
 t (δ2) 0.286 -0.830 1.127 0.510
R t+1: sf
sf bp cd jy
-0.498 0.197 -0.272 0.178
 t (δ2) -0.799 0.272 -0.226 0.170
R t+1: cd
cd sf bp jy
0.350 -0.080 0.092 0.180
 t (δ2) 1.125 -0.300 0.366 0.535
R t+1: jy
jy cd sf bp
0.809 -0.119 1.285 -1.104
 t (δ2) 1.023 -0.151 1.715 -1.343 /pto
This table shows the results for the cross-hedging pressure effects of the 29 Futures markets.  θ1 is the own 
hedging pressure variable.  θ2, θ3, …θ16 are the cross hedging pressure variables and t(δ2) are the t ratios of 
own and cross hedging pressure variables.  Rt+1   is the futures return in one month time, in percent.  Values 
of t ratios are shown in bold at 10% significance level.  Estimated equation used is  
 
)(
1,
j
tiR +  =  
)(
0
jϕ  +     ∑
=
N
n 1
ϕ i, n (j) λ n, t (j)      +   )( 1jt +ξ   
 where i (i = 1, 2, 3K , n) refers to the futures market and j (j=1,..,4) refers to the specific group the futures
market belong to.  ∑
=
N
n 1
ϕ  represent the coefficients of own- and cross-hedging pressure variables for each 
futures market within each of the four groups. 
 
Table 4.9.2 
Cross hedging pressure effects 
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 Cross-hedging pressure effects (continued)
(4) Agriculturals
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10 θ11 θ12 θ13 θ14 θ15 θ16
R t+1: w
w kw mw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb
-0.254 8.578 -0.574 0.116 0.238 -0.623 -2.703 -0.704 -2.613 2.339 -5.055 -0.972 7.695 -11.328 -6.062 1.130
 t (δ2) -0.062 1.074 -0.084 0.026 0.058 -0.216 -0.641 -0.418 -1.038 0.575 -2.402 -0.385 1.157 -2.386 -1.845 0.644
R t+1: kw
kw mw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
7.410 1.300 0.339 1.235 -1.363 -2.742 -0.778 -3.541 -0.788 -5.267 -1.734 7.548 -9.100 -4.144 0.663 1.404
 t (δ2) 1.014 0.201 0.073 0.308 -0.486 -0.677 -0.501 -1.411 -0.204 -2.492 -0.723 1.240 -2.093 -1.279 0.417 0.324
R t+1: mw
mw kw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
1.050 7.495 2.773 0.430 -1.628 -2.224 -0.240 -4.766 -1.317 -3.745 -3.009 4.903 -4.413 -3.484 0.628 -1.367
 t (δ2) 0.164 1.135 0.604 0.115 -0.650 -0.590 -0.163 -1.978 -0.361 -1.767 -1.270 0.832 -1.231 -1.186 0.430 -0.286
R t+1: c
c mw kw s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
4.203 11.039 1.392 -2.515 -2.973 -4.614 -0.232 -2.260 9.680 -2.087 -2.579 3.684 -2.605 0.184 2.988 -5.688
 t (δ2) 1.022 1.409 0.218 -0.665 -1.013 -1.039 -0.148 -0.838 1.809 -1.034 -0.982 0.655 -0.653 0.061 2.068 -1.269
R t+1: s
s mw c kw bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
1.083 0.580 2.338 5.195 1.385 -6.110 -0.611 -0.549 9.287 -1.568 -3.338 0.632 -2.961 -2.752 2.250 -6.842
 t (δ2) 0.291 0.102 0.593 0.904 0.553 -1.445 -0.391 -0.291 2.041 -0.872 -1.376 0.115 -0.923 -1.011 1.996 -1.576
R t+1: bo
bo mw c s kw sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
0.783 0.309 5.347 -1.831 6.254 -7.256 -2.027 -0.669 3.978 -2.830 -1.424 4.238 -0.212 -1.333 1.578 -6.768
 t (δ2) 0.300 0.057 1.467 -0.575 1.149 -1.825 -1.597 -0.364 0.941 -1.759 -0.615 0.908 -0.066 -0.494 1.490 -1.189
R t+1: sm
sm mw c s bo kw pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
-4.378 -2.169 -2.928 3.340 -0.431 3.129 -0.550 -0.103 9.836 -0.870 -3.581 3.912 -7.402 -1.192 2.272 -6.431
 t (δ2) -1.016 -0.345 -0.665 0.943 -0.140 0.518 -0.352 -0.041 2.009 -0.425 -1.215 0.587 -1.839 -0.389 1.697 -1.436
R t+1: pb
pb mw c s bo sm kw lh lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
3.691 -5.813 -11.261 8.557 4.187 5.442 6.448 -5.656 -4.580 2.561 -4.455 -16.083 4.397 -3.446 3.634 -1.422
 t (δ2) 1.236 -0.417 -1.115 0.929 0.574 0.500 0.456 -1.110 -0.384 0.480 -0.644 -1.216 0.392 -0.531 1.065 -0.119
R t+1: lh
lh mw c s bo sm pb kw lc fc sb cc kc ct lb w
0.190 7.156 2.746 7.823 -1.169 -8.307 0.414 2.822 2.024 4.382 -4.714 -12.006 6.915 -1.696 1.340 -10.606
 t (δ2) 0.051 0.812 0.434 1.247 -0.221 -1.239 0.204 0.280 0.240 1.207 -0.922 -1.019 0.921 -0.360 0.577 -1.705
R t+1: lc
lc mw c s bo sm pb lh kw fc sb cc kc ct lb w
-4.684 -2.175 -4.454 0.004 -0.330 2.561 -0.035 -1.841 2.253 -0.255 0.284 2.094 -4.069 0.635 0.372 3.409
 t (δ2) -1.708 -0.589 -1.526 0.002 -0.191 1.025 -0.038 -1.098 0.747 -0.194 0.159 0.524 -1.389 0.364 0.434 0.875
R t+1: fc
fc mw c s bo sm pb lh lc kw sb cc kc ct lb w
-2.460 -3.508 -5.845 1.172 1.864 3.544 0.241 0.353 -2.701 1.292 1.731 -6.229 -0.237 0.759 -0.305 -2.019
 t (δ2) -2.032 -1.065 -2.549 0.641 1.303 1.753 0.313 0.312 -1.053 0.372 1.225 -1.767 -0.087 0.416 -0.485 -0.744
R t+1: sb
sb mw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc kw cc kc ct lb w
-0.238 -6.267 -0.221 6.448 2.946 -1.029 -2.716 3.914 -9.261 1.291 7.075 5.355 -10.318 -0.836 -2.227 3.102
 t (δ2) -0.060 -0.821 -0.035 0.941 0.609 -0.147 -1.312 1.294 -1.282 0.396 0.797 0.521 -1.404 -0.201 -0.959 0.467
R t+1: cc
cc mw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb kw kc ct lb w
-10.687 -18.288 2.789 -1.747 2.701 5.712 0.675 -1.637 -4.256 -1.421 4.760 4.420 9.529 0.054 0.789 0.574
 t (δ2) -1.140 -2.553 0.496 -0.299 0.731 0.993 0.355 -0.597 -0.717 -0.597 1.290 0.602 1.575 0.014 0.403 0.119
R t+1: kc
kc mw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kw ct lb w
-21.177 3.705 -17.141 18.781 8.147 -10.522 -1.335 -0.981 11.984 -6.682 2.693 8.731 2.281 -5.663 3.580 -4.481
 t (δ2) -2.810 0.256 -2.013 3.032 1.669 -1.312 -0.400 -0.220 1.135 -1.552 0.482 0.654 0.171 -1.031 1.373 -0.562
R t+1: ct
ct mw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc kw lb w
-2.046 -3.329 2.946 -1.611 3.207 -3.374 -0.857 1.025 3.262 1.315 -3.176 7.682 -2.825 4.297 -0.208 -6.571
 t (δ2) -0.668 -0.486 0.705 -0.382 0.826 -0.814 -0.606 0.363 0.671 0.520 -0.983 0.997 -0.556 0.722 -0.129 -1.242
R t+1: lb
lb mw c s bo sm pb lh lc fc sb cc kc ct kw w
3.699 -3.724 -0.186 0.819 4.761 -4.725 -1.296 -1.260 5.409 -3.490 -7.664 -6.036 5.260 -3.576 11.828 9.530
 t (δ2) 1.641 -0.438 -0.029 0.144 1.087 -0.679 -0.500 -0.334 0.796 -1.013 -1.748 -0.642 0.846 -0.799 1.186 1.616
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Panel A  Hedger Speculator
Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob.
AC PAC Q (Q (Q statistics AC PAC Q (Q (Q statistics
statistics statistics) of squared statistics statistics) of squared 
residuals) residuals)
Minerals
GC -0.002 -0.002 13.628 0.995 0.999 -0.008 -0.008 14.716 0.991 0.999
SI 0.044 0.034 27.751 0.584 0.862 0.057 0.016 22.327 0.842 0.987
HG 0.019 -0.003 47.107 0.024 0.981 0.021 0.004 46.608 0.027 0.939
PL 0.006 -0.033 14.064 0.994 0.999 0.002 -0.025 12.364 0.998 0.999
CL -0.037 -0.036 8.841 0.999 0.999 -0.011 -0.001 5.867 0.999 0.999
HO -0.038 -0.047 18.359 0.952 0.419 -0.020 -0.010 16.322 0.980 0.715
Financials
SP 0.071 0.041 25.097 0.720 0.999 0.042 0.024 23.266 0.804 0.999
ED 0.010 -0.010 42.960 0.059 0.697 0.007 -0.011 42.796 0.061 0.693
US 0.047 0.056 21.764 0.862 0.999 0.033 0.027 21.536 0.870 0.999
Currencies
BP 0.049 0.076 27.528 0.533 0.270 0.031 0.072 27.357 0.572 0.475
SF 0.040 0.046 17.744 0.692 0.944 0.016 0.026 15.897 0.833 0.943
CD 0.108 0.071 36.022 0.204 0.992 0.085 0.050 35.499 0.214 0.989
JY 0.022 -0.029 22.947 0.817 0.945 0.045 -0.057 33.673 0.294 0.908
/pto
This table shows the residual test for the mean equations 4.10.3 and 4.10.4.  Panel A shows the
autocorrelation (AC), partial autocorrelation (PAC), Ljung-Box Q statistics and its probability, and the
probability of Q statistics of squared residuals are displayed. If the mean equations have been properly
specified, the AC and PAC should be close and near zero.  The probabilities for Q statistics of residuals and
squared residuals test that the residuals are not correlated up to a specified number of lags.  A high
probability value suggests less occurrence of autocorrelation.  Panel B reports the Breusch Godfrey serial
correlation LM test and its probability; and the probability of the ARCH observed r-squared test.  Both tests
in panel B add support towards efficiency of the mean models. 
Table 4.10.6 
Residual diagnostic tests for mean equation 4.10.3 and 4.10.4.
Appendix 6.11 
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Agriculturals
W 0.040 0.036 12.268 0.998 0.873 0.017 0.018 13.874 0.995 0.979
KW -0.035 -0.055 17.758 0.962 0.296 -0.024 -0.037 18.348 0.953 0.287
MW 0.010 -0.010 27.173 0.614 0.283 0.011 -0.016 23.169 0.808 0.094
C -0.001 0.003 26.729 0.637 0.830 -0.027 -0.034 25.514 0.700 0.924
S 0.062 0.055 25.757 0.636 0.998 0.029 0.022 14.004 0.994 0.677
BO 0.032 0.000 24.037 0.770 0.946 0.005 -0.019 17.975 0.959 0.968
SM 0.022 0.040 17.826 0.955 0.626 -0.041 -0.014 25.357 0.707 0.307
PB 0.030 0.071 29.195 0.471 0.593 0.026 0.062 31.332 0.378 0.782
LH 0.006 -0.424 53.931 0.005 0.470 -0.004 -0.465 51.976 0.008 0.380
LC 0.087 0.115 51.660 0.008 0.421 0.101 0.127 48.263 0.019 0.563
FC 0.049 0.045 33.011 0.322 0.018 0.031 0.022 35.045 0.241 0.030
SB 0.042 0.046 16.276 0.980 0.981 0.001 0.012 16.039 0.982 0.558
CC 0.006 -0.018 34.110 0.276 0.999 -0.014 -0.063 43.747 0.050 0.999
KC -0.023 -0.067 18.085 0.957 0.024 -0.055 -0.042 27.387 0.603 0.112
CT -0.057 -0.079 27.880 0.577 0.995 -0.057 -0.045 28.445 0.547 0.996
LB -0.089 -0.026 60.412 0.001 0.000 -0.089 -0.030 59.960 0.001 0.000
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Panel B  Hedger Speculator
Breusch- Prob. Prob. Breusch- Prob. Prob.
Godfrey (Breusch- (ARCH observed Godfrey (Breusch- (ARCH observed
serial correlation Godfrey r-squared test) serial correlation Godfrey  r-squared test)
LM test serial LM test) LM test serial LM test)
Minerals
GC 28.609 0.538 0.156 29.892 0.471 0.482
SI 28.622 0.538 0.871 23.870 0.778 0.991
HG 50.635 0.011 0.778 51.826 0.008 0.813
PL 29.737 0.479 0.333 27.697 0.586 0.265
CL 16.624 0.977 0.890 12.367 0.998 0.681
HO 17.689 0.963 1.000 17.749 0.962 0.998
Financials
SP 40.062 0.104 0.031 40.741 0.091 0.029
ED 44.768 0.041 0.839 47.011 0.025 0.786
US 30.186 0.456 0.998 33.841 0.287 0.999
Currencies
BP 38.780 0.131 0.168 41.814 0.074 0.320
SF 32.016 0.367 0.984 27.620 0.591 0.980
CD 49.283 0.015 0.985 50.168 0.012 0.994
JY 34.875 0.247 0.944 41.895 0.073 0.760
/pto
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Agriculturals
W 16.841 0.974 0.836 17.789 0.962 0.955
KW 17.562 0.965 0.485 18.948 0.941 0.575
MW 20.615 0.900 0.415 22.132 0.849 0.097
C 31.351 0.398 0.980 33.374 0.307 0.920
S 40.427 0.097 0.063 20.859 0.892 0.049
BO 19.718 0.924 0.947 19.741 0.923 0.933
SM 20.984 0.888 0.591 22.590 0.832 0.546
PB 48.910 0.016 0.473 47.267 0.023 0.594
LH 67.873 0.000 0.019 66.739 0.000 0.034
LC 40.794 0.090 0.717 39.602 0.113 0.761
FC 27.368 0.604 0.194 29.857 0.473 0.371
SB 36.997 0.177 0.737 32.380 0.350 0.766
CC 39.707 0.111 0.797 48.406 0.018 0.632
KC 23.394 0.799 0.205 30.734 0.429 0.200
CT 33.947 0.283 1.000 30.940 0.418 1.000
LB 46.593 0.027 0.283 46.601 0.027 0.227
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Hedger Speculator
Breusch- ARMA Breusch- ARMA 
Q Godfrey model Q Godfrey model 
statistic LM test specification statistic LM test specification
Minerals
GC 0.000 0.873 arma(1) 0.000 0.855 arma(1)
SI 0.003 0.740 arma(1) 0.002 0.783 arma(1)
HG 0.000 0.770 ma(2) ar(1) 0.013 0.809 arma(1) sma(1)
PL 0.000 0.960 ar(1) sar(1) 0.000 0.745 ar(1) sar(1)
CL 0.000 0.824 ar(1) 0.000 0.847 ar(1)
HO 0.043 0.730 ar(1) ma(2) sma(1) 0.000 0.879 ar(1) ma(2) 
Financials
SP 0.007 0.737 ar(1) sar(1) 0.002 0.630 arma(1) sar(1)
ED 0.000 0.629 ar(2) sar(1) 0.000 0.628 ar(2) sar(1)
US 0.001 0.963 ar(1) ma(1) 0.011 0.869 ar(1) ma(1)
Currencies
BP 0.000 0.957 ar(1) ma(1) 0.001 0.820 ar(1)
SF 0.000 0.983 ar(1) 0.001 0.771 ar(1)
CD 0.000 0.882 ar(1) ma(1) 0.000 0.954 ar(1)
JY 0.000 0.659 ar(1) sar(1) 0.002 0.807 ar(1)
/pto
This table shows the results for ARMA model specification (seasonality adjusted) for decomposed 
idiosyncratic volatility equation 4.12.1.  The Ljung-Box Q statistics and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test are 
carried out to check for autocorrelation in the residuals.  Autoregressive processes (AR) and Moving 
Average processes (MA) are applied in ARMA model specification up to including 10 lags and Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) is used to determine optimum number of lags.  The uncorrelated ARMA model 
specification is displayed on the right hand sheet of each sheet.
 
Table 4.12.2 
ARMA model specification for decomposed idiosyncratic 
volatility for hedgers and speculators 
Appendix 6.12 
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Agriculturals
W 0.001 0.871 ar(1) 0.007 0.746 ar(1)
KW 0.000 0.987 ar(1) 0.000 0.813 ar(1)
MW 0.000 0.910 ar(1) 0.000 0.973 ar(1)
C 0.001 0.677 ar(1) 0.000 0.968 ar(1)
S 0.630 0.630 ar(2) sar(1) 0.001 0.924 ) ma(2) sar(1) sma(1)
BO 0.000 0.870 ar(2) sar(1) 0.006 0.876 arma(1)
SM 0.001 0.828 ar(1) sar(1) 0.003 0.795 ar(1) sar(1)
PB 0.009 0.659 ar(1) ma(1) 0.000 0.850 ar(1) 
LH 0.000 0.995 ar(1) 0.000 0.746 ar(1)
LC 0.000 0.868 arma(1) 0.000 0.961 arma(1)
FC 0.012 0.879 arma(1) 0.000 0.970 arma(1) sma(1)
SB 0.000 0.908 ar(1) ma(2) 0.000 0.733 arma(1) sma(1)
CC 0.000 0.906 ar(1) 0.001 0.837 ar(1)
KC 0.001 0.708 arma(1) 0.002 0.726 arma(1)
CT 0.005 0.756 arma(1) 0.000 0.916 arma(1)
LB 0.002 0.666 arma(1) sma(1) 0.000 0.770 arma(1) sar(1)
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Model Specification test
GARCH PARCH
    Normal dist.              t dist.     Normal dist.                  t dist.
Panel A: Hedger
Q statistics Prob . Q statistics Prob . Q statistics Prob . Q statistics Prob .
of squared  (obs of squared  (obs of squared  (obs of squared  (obs
residuals r-squared) residuals r-squared) residuals r-squared) residuals r-squared)
Minerals
GC 0.006 0.940 0.026 0.875 16.865 0.000 1.935 0.170
SI 0.280 0.620 0.192 0.686 0.297 0.610 0.027 0.849
HG 0.075 0.777 0.068 0.786 0.328 0.564 0.016 0.905
PL 0.426 0.517 0.040 0.844 0.353 0.555 0.007 0.936
CL 0.258 0.608 0.945 0.338 0.336 0.566 0.095 0.758
HO 1.489 0.242 0.025 0.872 0.044 0.835 22.302 0.000
Financials
SP 0.423 0.524 0.255 0.618 0.274 0.608 0.902 0.346
ED 0.654 0.365 0.706 0.360 0.391 0.474 0.616 0.393
US 0.003 0.940 0.078 0.778 2.954 0.088 0.510 0.478
Currencies
BP 3.138 0.081 0.009 0.923 0.196 0.664 4.595 0.034
SF 0.016 0.908 0.147 0.723 0.112 0.744 0.068 0.780
CD 0.606 0.443 0.475 0.497 0.524 0.472 0.654 0.423
JY 0.110 0.744 0.325 0.572 6.628 0.011 2.979 0.089
/pto
This table shows the results for the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) LM test and Q
statistics for the correlograms of squared residuals.    A low Q statistics value and a high probability
(observed r-squared) suggest no ARCH in the residuals.  Panel A reports the results both hedgers’ volatility
under GARCH (see equation 4.13) and PARCH (see equation 4.14.2) volatility models.  Results are also
provided both for normal and t distribution.  Panel B reports the results for speculators. 
 
Table 4.16 
Model specification test (ARCH tests) for GARCH and PARCH 
volatility models for hedgers and speculators, under normal and t 
distribution. 
Appendix 6.13 
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Agriculturals
W 0.000 0.966 0.005 0.965 0.468 0.484 8.383 0.005
KW 0.599 0.436 0.432 0.511 0.433 0.504 0.450 0.505
MW 1.113 0.296 0.862 0.360 0.316 0.579 1.181 0.285
C 0.958 0.342 0.378 0.555 0.390 0.551 0.549 0.473
S 0.213 0.648 0.460 0.501 0.193 0.664 6.785 0.009
BO 0.719 0.424 0.769 0.407 0.208 0.681 3.795 0.035
SM 1.454 0.234 1.342 0.253 0.966 0.328 4.576 0.033
PB 2.365 0.123 2.365 0.123 0.172 0.699 2.090 0.138
LH 0.578 0.462 0.371 0.553 0.070 0.800 1.605 0.155
LC 0.034 0.857 0.073 0.791 1.284 0.267 1.084 0.301
FC 1.340 0.244 2.220 0.138 0.398 0.522 2.655 0.101
SB 0.008 0.930 0.008 0.930 0.188 0.673 0.254 0.619
CC 0.629 0.431 0.364 0.553 0.440 0.505 0.624 0.336
KC 0.030 0.858 0.212 0.642 0.074 0.785 26.109 0.000
CT 0.275 0.616 0.098 0.764 16.134 0.000 0.272 0.616
LB 0.029 0.868 0.035 0.852 0.013 0.901 1.325 0.245
Panel B: Speculator
Q statistics Prob . Q statistics Prob . Q statistics Prob . Q statistics Prob .
of squared  (obs of squared  (obs of squared  (obs of squared  (obs
residuals r-squared) residuals r-squared) residuals r-squared) residuals r-squared)
Minerals
GC 0.021 0.890 0.026 0.875 0.732 0.396 2.328 0.132
SI 0.727 0.417 0.812 0.390 2.109 0.159 0.428 0.428
HG 0.884 0.339 0.824 0.356 1.099 0.288 0.062 0.846
PL 0.459 0.491 0.041 0.841 0.185 0.689 0.021 0.882
CL 0.049 0.820 0.645 0.428 12.696 0.000 2.209 0.144
HO 0.024 0.910 0.142 0.699 0.147 0.735 2.944 0.093
/pto
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Financials
SP 0.002 0.954 0.005 0.923 0.691 0.392 0.985 0.365
ED 1.130 0.272 1.054 0.290 0.773 0.362 0.910 0.326
US 0.035 0.863 0.049 0.823 1.653 0.201 0.482 0.491
Currencies
BP 3.916 0.051 0.043 0.831 0.905 0.349 3.855 0.051
SF 0.175 0.661 0.467 0.486 0.271 0.606 0.000 0.988
CD 0.308 0.579 0.291 0.589 0.207 0.649 0.202 0.653
JY 0.117 0.737 0.410 0.525 0.048 0.831 6.622 0.011
Agriculturals
W 1.366 0.237 0.002 0.951 0.265 0.598 0.102 0.860
KW 0.452 0.507 0.385 0.540 2.300 0.136 0.036 0.861
MW 0.944 0.341 0.573 0.460 1.179 0.288 1.925 0.176
C 0.149 0.716 0.203 0.668 0.069 0.809 0.380 0.557
S 0.001 0.953 0.001 0.952 0.091 0.739 15.062 0.000
BO 0.029 0.840 0.001 0.955 0.062 0.778 8.816 0.001
SM 1.868 0.178 1.870 0.177 0.001 0.983 1.576 0.211
PB 0.290 0.612 0.117 0.748 4.209 0.041 3.785 0.048
LH 0.612 0.445 0.275 0.608 0.000 0.994 0.495 0.413
LC 0.014 0.911 0.030 0.866 0.149 0.698 0.938 0.338
FC 0.335 0.563 0.778 0.388 3.065 0.082 1.332 0.246
SB 0.003 0.953 0.035 0.845 0.017 0.897 3.884 0.053
CC 0.458 0.497 0.403 0.527 0.113 0.733 0.611 0.404
KC 0.032 0.856 0.016 0.894 22.063 0.000 20.767 0.000
CT 0.447 0.515 0.141 0.716 0.382 0.537 0.722 0.397
LB 0.012 0.913 0.006 0.936 0.577 0.443 1.431 0.226
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This graph shows the forecasted returns for hedgers under normal distribution, for both the GARCH and 
PARCH model.  The actual futures returns are included to compare the forecasted returns with the actual 
returns.  The forecasting sample is from Jan 2000 to Dec 2000. 
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Appendix 6.14 
Graph 4.8 
Forecasted returns of hedgers under GARCH and PARCH models 
under normal distribution 
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This graph shows the forecasted returns for speculators under normal distribution, for both the GARCH and
PARCH model.  The actual futures returns are included to compare the forecasted returns with the actual 
returns.  The forecasting sample is from Jan 2000 to Dec 2000.
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Graph 4.9 
Forecasted returns of speculators under GARCH and PARCH models under 
normal distribution 
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This graph shows the forecasted returns for hedgers under t distribution, for both the GARCH and PARCH 
model.  The actual futures returns are included to compare the forecasted returns with the actual returns.  
The forecasting sample is from Jan 2000 to Dec 2000.
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Graph 4.10 
Forecasted returns of Hedgers under GARCH and 
PARCH models under t distribution 
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This graph shows the forecasted returns for speculators under t distribution, for both the GARCH and 
PARCH model.  The actual futures returns are included to compare the forecasted returns with the actual 
returns.  The forecasting sample is from Jan 2000 to Dec 2000.
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Graph 4.11 
Forecasted returns of speculators under GARCH and PARCH models 
under t distribution 
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This graph shows the idiosyncratic volatility, conditional variance and standard deviation under GARCH
and PARCH model for hedgers and speculators under normal distribution.  The full sample size (1 139) is
included in Panel A since conditional variance and standard deviation are not expected to change much in
the forecasted sample.  Actual data are used for out-of-sample observations.  Idiosyncratic volatility is used
as a proxy of actual volatility.  Panel B shows a clearer view of the forecasted sample 127 139. 
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Appendix 6.15.1 
Graph 4.7.1 
Idiosyncratic volatility, conditional standard deviation and variance for 
hedgers and speculators’ returns under normal distribution 
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Panel B 
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This graph shows the idiosyncratic volatility, conditional variance and standard deviation under GARCH
and PARCH model for hedgers and speculators under t distribution.  The full sample size (1 139) is
included in Panel A since conditional variance and standard deviation are not expected to change much in
the forecasted sample.  Actual data are used for out-of-sample observations.  Idiosyncratic volatility is used
as a proxy of actual volatility.  Panel B shows a clearer view of the forecasted sample 127 139. 
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Appendix 6.15.2 Graph 4.7.2 
Idiosyncratic volatility, conditional standard deviation and variance for 
hedgers and speculators’ returns under t distribution 
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Panel B 
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This set of graph shows the recursive coefficient estimates of futures returns from equation 4.20. The
ability to trace the evolution of the returns over the whole sample (1 139) helps in finding whether the
behaviour equation 4.20 is stable.  If coefficient plots show dramatic jumps, this suggests the postulated
equation is trying to digest a structural break.  Any significant structural break is matched with a possible
specific event listed in table 4.19. 
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Appendix 6.16 
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Structural breaks  
Hedgers Speculators date Event
Crude oil ↓ 4/02/1996 End of temporary revival from Japanese recession
↓ 12/08/1998 Start of the Introduction of Euro currency
Corn ↑ 25/07/1995 End tightening of US Interest rates
Cotton ↓ 10/01/1995 Start of EM slump
Eurodollars ↑ 11/01/1994 Start of US tightening interest rates
↓ 21/07/1998 Start of LTCM near financial collapse/ Russian crisis
↑ 13/10/1998 End of LTCM near collapse
Japanese yen ↑ 11/01/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
Soybean ↑ 07/25/1995 End tightening of US Interest rates
↑ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
S&P500 ↑ 1/04/2000 End of Russian crisis
Wheat (Chicago) ↓ 4/02/1996 End of temporary revival from Japanese recession
Cocoa ↑ ↑ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
This table shows the structural breaks for those markets that matched any of the 8 major macroeconomic
events of the 1990s.  The arrow signs show whether there was an upward jump or downward jump in the
recursive coefficient estimates of hedgers’ and speculators’ returns.   
 
Table 4.21 
Structural breaks and macroeconomic events (on behaviour -
trading determinant model)
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Structural breaks  
Hedgers Speculators date Event
Cocoa ↓ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
Corn ↓ 11/01/1994 Start of US tightening interest rates
Cotton ↑ 11/01/1994 Start of US tightening interest rates
Coffee ↑ ↑ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
Lumber ↓ 4/02/1996 End of temporary revival from Japanese recession
Live hogs ↑ 11/01/1994 Start of US tightening interest rates
This table shows the structural breaks for those markets that matched any of the 8 major macroeconomic
events of the 1990s.  The arrow signs show whether there was an upward jump or downward jump in the
recursive coefficient estimates of hedgers’ and speculators’ net positions.  Net positions are adjusted for
stationarity using ADF unit root test. 
 
Table 4.22 
Structural breaks and macroeconomic events (on mean 
equation model) 
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Structural breaks in Return and Risk relationship
Hedgers Speculators date Event
Crude oil ↓ 4/02/1996 End of temporary revival from Japanese recession
Cotton ↑ 25/07/1995 End tightening of US Interest rates
↓ 11/01/1994 Start of US tightening interest rates
↑ 10/01/1995 Start of EM slump
feeder cattle ↓ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
copper ↑ 4/02/1996 End of temporary revival from Japanese recession
japanese yen ↓ 25/07/1995 End tightening of US Interest rates
coffee ↑ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
live hogs ↑ 8/12/1998 Introduction of Euro currency
soybean ↑ 25/07/1995 End tightening of US Interest rates
treasury bonds ↓ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
copper ↑ 3/05/1994 Start of temporary revival from Japanese recession
↓ 4/02/1996 End of temporary revival from Japanese recession
japanese yen ↓ 25/07/1995 End tightening of US Interest rates
wheat (Kansas) ↑ ↑ 25/07/1995 End tightening of US Interest rates
Treasury bonds ↓ 8/03/1994 Start of Mexico crisis
Wheat (Chicago) ↓ 4/02/1996 End of temporary revival from Japanese recession
Panel A ( tσ as a measure of risk) 
Panel B (
2
tσ as a measure of risk) 
This table shows the structural breaks for those markets that matched any of the 8 major macroeconomic
events of the 1990s.  The arrow signs show whether there was an upward jump or downward jump in the
recursive coefficient estimates of hedgers’ and speculators’ attitude towards risk.  Both standard deviation
and variance are used as proxies of risk when modelling the relationship between risk and return.  Panel A
reports the matched structural breaks with standard deviation used as a proxy to risk, and Panel B with
variance as a proxy to risk. 
 
  
Table 4.23 
Structural breaks in the risk and return relationship for large 
hedgers and large speculators 
